

Interim Report on the Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of Proposed Changes in the Banking Regulatory Framework

Institute of International Finance

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This report is an Interim Report of the IIF's Working Group to Assess the Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of Proposed Changes in the Banking Regulatory Framework. The Working Group consists of economists and regulatory experts from IIF member banks, and is chaired by Philip Suttle, the IIF's Chief Economist. It operates under the auspices of the IIF's Special Committee on Effective Regulation, chaired by Peter Sands, Group Chief Executive of Standard Chartered Plc. The Working Group has been working for a number of months to prepare this report, which analyzes the impact of bank regulatory reform on the United States, Euro Area, Japan and (in aggregate) the emerging economies. We now judge that their work has come to sufficient fruition that it warrants sharing more broadly.

It should be emphasized, however, that this is an Interim Report. We aim to complete the Final Report of the Working Group during the second half of 2010. There are three dimensions along which we expect to strengthen the current Report in the months ahead. First, we intend to cover more countries in the study, including some smaller mature economies as well as some larger emerging economies. Second, we aim to strengthen and enrich the technical aspects of our modeling framework. Third, we hope to engage with experts and specialists in this area, including those from the official sector, which has embarked on a similar exercise. The outcome should be a collection of research that allows both industry practitioners and policy makers to understand the macroeconomic implications of the important banking reform program now underway.

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The Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of Increased Regulation of the Banking Industry

Our Objective

- A wide array of reforms to regulations governing the global banking industry has been proposed in recent months in response to the excesses that became evident in the 2007-08 global financial crisis. These include both those proposed by the *Basel Committee on Banking Supervision*, as well as from a variety of different national (and supra-national) authorities.
- The commonly expressed view is that whatever economic implications may result from implementing these reforms, they are a "cost worth paying" both to reduce the likelihood of future crises, and the whole economy costs of whatever future crises do occur. This may indeed be true, and it is certainly not the objective of this report to resist the fundamental case for deep-seated reform¹. Rather, our objective is to put a firmer number on what that "cost worth paying" may turn out to be, measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and jobs foregone. We do not address the benefits of reform, which can probably best be measured in terms of stability gains².

Our Approach

- In order to assess the impact of likely banking regulatory reform on the global economy, we have built a series of simple frameworks, which model the evolution of the banking system in aggregate, and its relationship to the broader economy³.
- These models have a common structure across the major banking systems. In this Interim Report, we model the systems in the United States, Euro Area and Japan. We also address issues relating to the banking systems in emerging economies.

¹ For complete reviews of the case for reform, see Brunnermeier, M., Crockett A., Goodhart C., Persaud A. and Shin, H.S. (2009) and Financial Services Authority (UK) (2009a).

² See Haldane (2010).

³ For an assessment of possible effects on reform on the banking industry alone, see Abouhossein, K. et al. (2009a), (2009b) and (2009c); Barnes, R. (2010); Brennan, M. (2010); O'Donohoe et al. (2010a), (2010b) and (2010c); Samuels, S. et al (2010a), (2010b) and (2010c); Van Steenis, et al. (2010).

- In building these models, the lack of easy availability of key data has been a major challenge. In most countries, for example, it has been difficult to identify the aggregate balance sheet of the banking system in a fashion consistent with the capital and liquidity requirements of the *Basel Committee*. We have not been able (so far) to identify credible off balance sheet aggregates. This has made it impossible to model the constraints imposed by the proposal for a new leverage ratio, which would include both balance sheet assets and off balance sheet commitments. This is an important shortcoming in our modeling work, which would tend to bias our GDP cost estimates down.
- The banking balance sheet models are supplemented by aggregate profit and loss models, a simple bank capital supply framework, and a simple macroeconomic block, which links the evolution of nominal aggregate credit growth (both bank and non-bank) to GDP and employment.
- The logic of how the models work is fairly straightforward. For example, the imposition of higher capital ratios generally requires banks to raise more capital. Net new issuance puts an upward pressure on the cost of capital, which banks then add to their lending rates to the private sector. Higher lending rates reduce bank credit and, thus, the aggregate supply of credit to the economy. This, in turn, lowers GDP and employment. Higher liquidity requirements work through similar channels. Requiring banks either to hold more lower yielding liquid assets or issue more long-term wholesale debt squeezes bank profit margins. Lower profits not only make it more necessary to issue capital via markets (rather than through retained profits), but also make that issuance more expensive, as earnings disappointment makes equity investors more leery. Finally, higher bank taxes reduce post-tax profits and thus have a similar effect as reduced net interest margins.
- As with all models, our approach has advantages and drawbacks. On the positive side, the models allow us to impose most of the (quantifiable) reforms that are being proposed and trace their effect. On the negative side, our models contain relatively little behavioral feedback and rely very heavily on the credit transmission channel. The devastatingly weak performance of the global economy in 2008Q4-2009Q1 was a reminder of the significance of this credit channel, however⁴.
- We obtain our results of the cumulative impact of reform by running two scenarios, from 2011 through 2020. One is a "base" scenario in which we use neutral long-term assumptions about GDP growth and inflation, and a regulatory environment with no significant changes beyond those introduced during and immediately following the crisis. The other is a "regulatory reform" scenario, in

⁴ See Bernanke, B.S. and Lown, C.S. (1991), Bayoumi, T. and Melander O. (2008), Disyatat, P. (2010) and Cappiello, L., et al. (2010).

which we impose a series of regulatory changes that reflect (in both timing and magnitude) the key proposals. Our cumulative effects results are simply the differences between the two scenarios.

 It should be emphasized that we have had to make, in some cases, our own assumptions about the ultimate design and calibration of the new requirements. These assumptions may well turn out to be incorrect and, possibly, too excessive. They do not reflect industry positions on appropriate levels.

Our Preliminary Results

- For the "G3" (United States, Euro Area and Japan), we project that full implementation of regulatory reform on our assumed time frame would subtract an annual average of about 0.6 percentage points from the path of real GDP growth over the five year period 2011-15, and an average of about 0.3 percentage points from the growth path over the full ten year period, 2011-2020 (Table 1).
- The impact is more concentrated in the next five years because this is the period over which the bulk of the reforms are scheduled to be implemented. The fading in this effect as time passes, however, is consistent with the proposition that the long-run effects of these measures are probably relatively modest, but that the transition costs could be significant.
- The Euro Area is hit the hardest; Japan the least, with the United States somewhere in the middle. This relative ranking reflects two main factors: the size and significance of the banking system relative to the economy and the pattern of debt intermediation flows; and the extent to which systems need to adjust to meet the new requirements.
- There would also be direct and, more importantly, indirect employment implications resulting from this lower trajectory for GDP growth, especially during the transition period. Fewer jobs would be created during the economic expansion in our regulatory scenario relative to our base scenario.
- The current global banking reform program is the first to be negotiated under the auspices of the G-20, including participation by emerging market regulators in the *Basel Committee*. There could be three, possibly significant, negative spillovers for emerging economies. First, regulators in emerging economies *might* choose to pass on some or all of the global increase in capital and liquidity requirements to their local system, rather than letting their current ample buffers be reduced. Second, global banking flows could be hindered as large banks in mature economies bump into balance sheet constraints. Under the new leverage ratio proposal, undrawn trade finance lines will attract higher capital charges. Third, the

minority interest exclusion from capital will make the business models of many mature market banks active in emerging economies far more costly to operate. This could be especially damaging for parts of Emerging Europe.

Table 1					
Cumulative Effects Results in Summary difference between regulatory change and base scenario					
Real lending rate (bps)					
United States	169	136			
Euro Area	134	97			
Japan	76	60			
G3 (asset-weighted)	132	99			
Real GDP growth difference					
United States	-0.5	-0.3			
Euro Area	-0.9	-0.5			
Japan	-0.4	-0.1			
G3 (GDP-weighted)	-0.6	-0.3			
Difference in end-period values:	Through 2015	Through 2020			
Core Tier 1 capital (\$bn)					
United States	247	260			
Euro Area	273	738			
Japan	156	169			
G3	676	1167			
Nominal GDP (\$ bn)					
United States	-951	-1297			
Euro Area	-920	-1109			
Japan	-130	-105			
G3	-2001	-2510			
Real GDP (% difference)					
United States	-2.6	-2.7			
Euro Area	-4.3	-4.4			
Japan	-1.9	-1.5			
G3 (GDP-weighted)	-3.1	-3.1			
Employment (million)					
United States	-4.58	-4.87			
Euro Area	-4.68	-4.83			
Japan	-0.46	-0.43			
G3	-9.73	-10.12			

Source: IIF Estimates

Key Considerations

- One very important aspect of our model, which heavily determines the results, is the nature of capital markets in bank paper—both for common equity and longterm debt. In our framework, it is always possible for banks to issue more of both categories of paper, as long as they are willing to pay an appropriate price. At one extreme, it could be argued that this pricing effect overstates the cumulative impact, because investors will demand a lower average return on equity, in return for the lower risk that a higher capital base implies. At the other extreme, however, it could be argued that banks will, at some point, face an absolute limit on the amount of either capital or long-term debt that can be placed in markets. If that limit is reached, then banks would have no option but to reduce (riskweighted) assets to meet higher required ratios.
- Our model also implicitly assumes fairly flexible bank product pricing. The average lending rate rises to meet the rate of return requirements of equity investors. For this *average* to rise, however, banks either have to have the power to re-price existing loans or, perhaps more plausibly, have to attach far more stringent conditions on *marginal*, new lending.
- It should also be noted that the phase when the "transition drag" from tighter regulatory policies is likely to be at its maximum (2011-14), is also the period when fiscal policy in the mature economies is most likely to be at its tightest. There would thus be a double headwind to the expansion. Some offset to this could be provided by an easier G7 monetary policy, although there is currently limited scope for additional interest rate easing.
- In our view, the combination of easy G7 money and concerted banking regulatory reform could lead to a series of unintended consequences. Weaker near-term growth could lead to a less stable system. Additional credit restraint in Japan could worsen deflationary pressures there. The imposition of a leverage ratio could promote more, not less risky behavior from banks. There would be significant incentives for disintermediation of credit flows from the regulated, supervised banking system into the less well regulated credit sector which would, by definition, then become more systemically important. Finally, low rates in the G7 will likely continue to spur the flow of short-term capital to higher yielding emerging economies, adding to the headaches of policy makers there.

Chapter 1

The Net Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of Increased Regulation of the Banking Industry

Introduction and Summary

- In order to assess the impact of likely banking regulatory reform on the global economy, we have built a series of simple macro-banking-economic models. In structure, our model is more similar to the frameworks used by equity market banking analysts than to formal macro models used by economists. Unlike banking analysts, however, our work is focused at the level of the consolidated banking system as a whole, rather than at the level of an individual bank.
- For the non-bank corporate sector, the main impact of these regulatory changes can best be conceived of as an inward shift of the bank credit supply curve: for any given price (in terms of spread over the government yield curve), there will be less availability.
- We construct our assessment of the net cumulative impact of the changes by running two scenarios through 2020. The first is a "base" scenario, where we maintain the same key regulatory requirements as are currently in place through the projection horizon. The second is a "regulatory change" scenario, in which we impose a series of regulatory changes (some global, some local).
- By 2015, the level of G3 real GDP under a regulatory change scenario is projected to be about 3.1% below what it would otherwise be. This amounts to an average of about 0.5%-0.6% per year clipped from the pace of the recovery. Thereafter, this drag fades very notably, however. For the US, the path of real GDP is projected to be 2.6% lower by 2015; for Japan, the path is 1.9% lower; but for the Euro Area the path is as much as 4.3% lower.
- The estimates from our models of the three leading financial systems is that, in total, banks will need to raise \$0.7 trillion of common equity and issue \$5.4 trillion, net, of long-term wholesale debt over the period 2010-15 in order to meet the capital and liquidity requirements likely to be part of the regulatory reform.
- Against a backdrop of continued restraint in bank lending—especially towards small and medium-sized businesses—there would appear to be significant risks relating to enforcing too much restrictiveness on banks too early in the business cycle.

Another argument for caution in rapid implementation of reforms that constrain bank lending is that the likely implementation phase (2011-2012) will correspond to the early stages of a synchronized and, probably quite protracted, effort at fiscal consolidation in the mature economies.

Assessing the Net Cumulative Impact

Any assessment of how the global banking industry will be affected by regulatory reforms designed to improve its long-run safety is inevitably a somewhat subjective endeavor. That said, we believe that it is possible to construct sensible frameworks to assess the possible macroeconomic impact of proposed changes (in terms of bank lending, growth and employment) so that this "cost" of reform can be benchmarked against the perceived benefits of reform⁵.

In addressing the issue of what effects reforms will have, we use the following schema (Chart 1).




Chart 1

In broad terms, we believe that the magnitude of the impact of regulatory changes on the economy can be measured in five steps:

⁵ This type of analysis is definitely a growth industry. Among the important early contributions are Barrell, R. et al. (2009a) and (2009b); Elliott, D. J. (2009) and (2010a) and (2010b); FSA (2009d).

- How significant are the reforms, at both the global and local level?
- How far away are banks now from where they would need to be to meet the requirements of reform?
- How much time will be allowed for banks to meet new reform proposals?
- How important is bank credit intermediation to the operation of the economy?
 - How big are banks relative to the economy?
 - How important are banks relative to non-banks in the process of debt intermediation?
 - How dependent is the economy on debt versus equity financing?
- What other factors are shaping banking sector (and broader economic) health?
 - Scope to ease monetary policy to provide an offset?
 - Scope to ease fiscal policy to provide an offset?
 - Non-bank private sector in re-leveraging mode?

Data for some of these variables are shown below (Table 2). In terms of starting points, the US appears favorably placed and the Euro Area less well positioned. For Japan, the major issue is one of low starting capital ratios.

Table 2 Factors Affecting Impact of Regulatory Reform percent, end 2009							
	Economy's dependence on banks		Distance for banks to adjust				
		Banks' share		Liquidity			
	Bank assets	of credit	Core Tier 1	Coverage	Net Stable		
	as % GDP	intermediation	capital ratio	Ratio	Funding Ratio		
United States	83.1	23.6	10.5	81.8	84.3		
Euro Area	346.6	73.8	8.0	27.8	61.9		
Japan	168.8	52.6	4.1	92.4	82.6		

Sources: National data and IIF estimates

The IIF Cumulative Impact Model

In order to address these questions in detail, we have built a series of macro-bankingeconomic models (see appendix for more detail). In structure, our model is more similar to the frameworks used by equity market banking analysts than to formal macro models used by economists. Unlike banking analysts, however, our work is focused at the level of the consolidated banking system as a whole, rather than at the level of an individual bank. Each country model has four key blocks. Central to the country model is the **Banking Sector Balance Sheet Block** which captures the key adding up constraints in the country banking system. Aggregate banking system assets are divided into six categories: cash, government bonds, claims on the domestic financial system, claims on the domestic non-financial corporate sector, claims on households, and external claims. In turn, each of the latter four categories is broken into two sub-components, according to its weighting in the weighted risk-asset calculation: claims on domestic financial and nonfinancial corporate sectors are broken into the trading book and banking book; claims on households are broken into mortgage claims and (unsecured) consumer credit; and external claims (including external interbank claims) are broken into "safe" assets (i.e. high quality loans with low risk-weighting) and "risky" assets (i.e. loans to emerging market borrowers).

The balance sheet model allows us to capture most of the proposed regulatory changes. First, a required liquid asset ratio can be imposed as the key ingredient of a tighter liquidity regime. Second, the model allows us to change the risk weighting assigned to sub-categories of banks' assets. An increase in trading book capital requirements can thus be modeled straightforwardly. Third, and most importantly, the model derives key capital ratios, which are driven by a combination of regulatory requirements *and* national practice and local regulatory requirement.

The Banking Sector Balance Sheet Block is supplemented by the **Bank Capital Supply Block** and the **Banking Sector Profit and Loss Block**, to complete a quantitative framework of an aggregate banking system. That framework is then linked up to the **Macroeconomic Block**, which is both driven by the other components of the country model, and drives them (the model thus solves iteratively).

In our framework, economic growth is viewed as being ultimately driven by overall credit growth (both bank and non-bank). Thus, one key consideration is how much non-bank sources of credit can substitute for banks. In view of both recent *experience*—which seems likely to have dampened non-bank investors' appetite for private sector credit relative to investment in government debt—as well as likely *regulatory change*, which will likely slow the ability of banks to securitize their on-balance sheet assets, it seems likely that the growth in non-bank sources of credit will be relatively subdued in coming years.

For banks, a key driver of their willingness and ability to lend will be the combination of the various factors that shape the evolution of "core" capital. Higher regulatory requirements will raise banks' demands for capital (for a given asset structure), or—perhaps more plausibly—will cause banks to hold more conservative asset compositions for a given amount of capital. Core capital is boosted by higher retained earnings, and depleted by credit losses (which will, in turn, be driven up by slow nominal growth). Most importantly, banks face an upward sloping supply curve for bank capital. This

curve could be particularly sharply upward sloping in coming quarters, as higher capital ratios are enforced (either by regulators or, de facto, by markets)⁶.

Banks are then likely to pass this higher (shadow) cost of capital on to private sector borrowers in the form of higher lending spreads. For the non-bank corporate sector, therefore, the main impact of these regulatory changes unfolding can thus best be conceived of as an inward shift of the bank credit supply curve: for any given price (in terms of spread over the government yield curve), there will be less availability. The impact of this supply curve shift on the outcome for private sector bank credit will be determined by the precise shape of the private sector credit demand curve, which we assume is downward sloping with respect to lending spreads. The more elastic that demand curve, the more damaging will be the overall effect of higher capital charges on economic activity.

Results in Summary for Key Economies

The results from our studies of individual economies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3-6, but are summarized in the following charts and Table 3. We construct our assessment of the net cumulative impact of the changes by running two scenarios through 2020:

- The first is a "base" scenario, where we maintain the regulatory requirements as they are today through the projection horizon.
- The second is a "regulatory change" scenario, in which we impose a number of regulatory changes (some global, some local).

We define the difference between the two paths in these scenarios as the net cumulative impact of regulatory reform.


The most significant aspect of the difference between the two scenarios is the rise in the real lending rate charged to the private sector in the regulatory change scenario, relative to the base, which generally peaks in 2013-14 (Chart 2).

The aggregate employment as well as GDP implications are significant (although the former naturally follows from the latter; Chart 3). There is a growing body of evidence highlighting the sensitivity of employment to credit. Firms facing tighter credit conditions find it harder to "hoard" labor⁷.

⁶ There is rich, but somewhat inconclusive academic literature of the role of bank capital. See Allen, F. and Santomero, A.M. (1999), Santos, J.A.C. (2000), Shrieves, R.E. and Dahl, D. (1991) and Van Hoose, D. (2007).

⁷ See Wasmer, E. and Weil, P. (2000) and Dromel, N., Kolakez, E. and Lehmann, E. (2009).


Chart 2



* Difference between bank lending rate paths in "regulatory reform" scenario versus "base" scenario

Source: IIF Estimates

Chart 3



Source: IIF Estimates

Table 3

Cumulative Effects Results in Summary


difference between regulatory change and base scenario


Difference in average rates:	2011-15	2011-20
Real lending rate (bps)		
United States	169	136
Euro Area	134	97
Japan	76	60
G3 (asset-weighted)	132	99
Real GDP growth difference		
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Difference in end-period values:	Through 2015	Through 2020
Core Tier 1 capital (\$bn)		
United States	247	260
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G3	676	1167
Nominal GDP (\$ bn)		
United States	-951	-1297
Euro Area	-920	-1109
Japan	-130	-105
G3	-2001	-2510
Real GDP (% difference)		
United States	-2.6	-2.7
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Employment (million)		
United States	-4.58	-4.87
Euro Area	-4.68	-4.83
Japan	-0.46	-0.43
G3	-9.73	-10.12

Source: IIF Estimates

The reason for the "hump" in lending rates is that the cumulation of regulatory change reaches its maximum at that point. As a result, banks are under the maximum pressure to "defend" their profit margins which they do by raising lending rates. Note that this pressure on banks to raise lending rates comes from capital markets, where investors demand a target (risk-adjusted) return on bank equity.

In turn, this interest rate profile helps shape lower paths for both real GDP and, thus, employment through the projection horizon. It should be emphasized that these are lower paths relative to a baseline of no significant increase in capital ratios and liquidity requirements, although banks would nonetheless hold substantially more (and better quality) capital and liquidity through this base scenario than they held in the period of serious excess in 2005-06.






Source: IIF Estimates

By 2015, the level of G3 real GDP in a regime of regulatory reform is projected to be about 3.1% below what it would otherwise be. This amounts to an average of about 0.6% per year clipped from the pace of the recovery. Thereafter, this drag fades very notably, however. For the US, the path of real GDP is projected to be 2.6% lower by 2015; for Japan, the path is 1.9% lower; but for the Euro Area the path is as much as 4.3% lower. The Euro Area would thus appear to be most vulnerable to the impact of regulatory reform. Intuitively, this should not be too surprising, since the Euro Area banking system is large both relative to the economy (about 350%) *and* as source of debt financing for the economy (about 75% of total debt financing), and this all in an economy where financial structures are relatively heavily geared to debt rather than equity.

Chart 5



Box 1: Some Frequently Asked Questions

Have we used the correct methodology?

We believe that our methodology – summarized in the appendix to this chapter – is an appropriate balance of theory, reality, detail and generality. Some of the benefits and drawbacks of our approach are reviewed later in this Chapter. We designed the framework to address the specific question of what the macroeconomic effects of banking reform might be.

How confident are we in our estimates?

We believe that our estimates are a reasonable <u>central</u> estimate of the net impact of reform measures on bank lending rates. We accept that there is probably a significant range of variation around these measures (although do not yet have good measures of the potential distribution). We have less confidence in mapping the likely lending rate increases into the broader economy, but we view our estimates as sensible benchmark assessments as to the impacts on GDP and employment, given the increase in bank lending rates.

Aren't they too large?

It is important to remember that our estimates are based on the cumulative impact of at least six changes in the regulatory environment, each of which exerts some squeeze on bank margins. For example, higher liquidity requirements work powerfully from both sides on margins: liquid assets earn lower rates of return than illiquid assets; and long-term funding is more expensive than short-term funding. There are growing indications, however, that full array of reforms actually implemented, as well as their timing, will be less onerous than we are currently assuming.

Can't banks just absorb these costs?

The answer is, to an extent, yes. In our regulatory scenarios, we assume that banks control non-interest costs (much of which is compensation) very aggressively. But a squeeze on margins eventually finds its way to lower banks' profitability. The resulting disappointment on earnings makes equity holders more leery of holding bank capital and thus makes it more costly to banks to issue more. The role of the capital markets in funding banks is central in our approach (see below).

Haven't banks already adjusted, so we've already taken any pain?

Banks have indeed generally adjusted rapidly over the past couple of years, especially in the United States. But it would be a mistake to think that, even after those adjustments, banking systems are where they need to be to meet these new requirements. Moreover, some of today's balance sheet positioning reflects very conservative banking behavior inspired either by nervous markets, or the recent memory of a near-death experience (and, in the United States, the rigors of the SCAP). A tougher regulatory environment would make this conservative positioning permanent, which would dampen the ability of banks to finance the recovery in the quarters ahead.

Does the economy really need bank lending to grow?


Even if the scope for bank lending is restricted, it is possible that the economy could do better, especially if there are financing alternatives to banks. For example, both Mexico and Korea were able to recover (in 1995-96 and 1998-99, respectively) without a rebound in bank lending. Of course, we do not know what would have happened in these two cases if banks had been strong. The recovery might well have been even more vigorous. For the mature economies, recent extreme weakness in bank lending and the severity of the accompanying recession serve as graphic reminders of the powerful link between banking sector balance sheet adjustment and economic activity.


What about the alternatives to bank lending?


The economic damage done by restricting bank activity could be limited if there were alternative financing sources for economic activity. Unfortunately, this "spare tire" theory of debt intermediation has not held up too well in recent years, and the alternatives in the debt intermediation process appear limited, especially for households and small and medium sized enterprises seeking to access credit markets. In this context, it is crucial to remember one of the most basic functions provided by banks: maturity transformation. Banks transform liquid short-term liabilities into illiquid longer-term loans. To the extent that other institutions develop to perform the same activity (e.g., money market funds), then they are essentially performing the same role as banks, with the same risks for both the institution and the system as a whole.

The Key Determinant: Capital Market Conditions for Bank Paper

The estimates from our models of the three leading financial systems is that, in total, banks will need to raise \$0.7 trillion of common equity and issue \$5.4 trillion, net, of long-term debt over the period 2010-15 in order to meet the capital and liquidity rules currently likely to be part of a scenario of regulatory reform, relative to their funding needs from these markets in a scenario of no regulatory reform (Charts 6 and 7).







* Derived as difference in long-term wholesale debt of banking system in 2015 in regulatory change scenario relative to no change scenario

These amounts are large, and will lead to an increase in the cost of funding to banks through these two channels. The absolute size of these demands also raises questions about whether these amounts are feasible:

 In the case of debt, the increase cost of funding will take the form of higher debt spreads on bank issued paper. In our models, we assume that spreads widen 140 basis points, on average, in order for this paper to be placed with investors. As noted, it is an open issue as to whether the issuance of such large amounts of bank paper even at such higher spreads is a feasible outcome, however. The appetite of investors in bank paper in the future will be heavily influenced by the outcome of the regulatory debate. This hinges not so much on the capital and liquidity discussion (although the need to achieve a minimum Net Stable Funding Ratio is a key reason for so much debt issuance). Rather, the uncertainty relates to the greater risk now likely to be associated with bank debt, since such creditors are now widely expected to suffer significant haircuts under new resolution regimes in the event of market-based run on the banking system⁸. A bondholder assessing the risk of exposure to any individual bank will, therefore, need to assess the likelihood of a capital market run on not just that bank, but also to (global) banking sector, which could come back to affect the value of his or her investment.

- New equity investors in banks will seek a higher *ex ante* rate of return on equity in order to be attracted to purchase such securities. We model this *ex ante* rate of return (which we call the "shadow" price of equity) as the sum of four components:
 - a core objective of (12.5% for the US, 10% for Euro Area and 5% for Japan);
 - plus half of the difference between the rate of growth of bank equity and nominal GDP in each period; this term captures the "upward sloping" component of the bank equity supply curve⁹;
 - minus half the difference between the realized rate of return on equity and the core objective in the previous period¹⁰;
 - minus half of the difference between the banking system's actual capital ratio and the ratio set by local supervisors¹¹.

The resulting "shadow price" of equity enters the bank lending pricing term as the "cost" of equity that the bank charges in setting rates to borrowers (see Appendix for more details).

As with the supply of debt, however, we have concerns that the absolute supply of bank equity may not be as smooth and continuous as our model assumes. Bank equity has become a more risky asset class in recent years. In contrast to bondholders, who have generally been supported by government guarantee and lending programs, equity holders have suffered considerable losses (as should be the case). Looking ahead, policy makers are determined that bank equity holders will bear relatively more of what risk banks are allowed to take. This means either that investors are likely to demand a higher ex ante rate of return (i.e. our core objective term could be too low, especially in Japan), or that an adequate equity rate of return may be hard to achieve if prudential limits on banks are tightened significantly (i.e. banking is forced more into the "utility space"). Moreover, dividend payments by banks are much diminished, and likely to remain so as banks re-build core capital. Finally, some jurisdictions are tightening limits on the potential investors in bank equity. For example, the new Solvency II requirements in Europe will reduce of insurance companies' scope to hold bank equity.

⁸ The emphasis of these resolution regime proposals is to avoid the need for use of central bank lending or any other form of government support that might imply a future direct liability for taxpayers.

⁹ Nominal GDP is used as a proxy for the aggregate portfolio of potential investors in bank equity. For investors to raise their exposure to banks, they must be compensated adequately.

¹⁰ This is a penalty/reward term: if a bank over achieves return targets in one period, it finds it cheaper to raise equity in the next (and vice versa).

¹¹ This is a "Modigliani-Miller" term, which recognizes that banks will be seen as less risky by investors the more capital that they hold (in excess of the regulatory minimum). The effect of this second term is to cancel out, somewhat, the first.

If the supply curves for either bank capital or long-term debt liabilities were to become inelastic (i.e. investors became unwilling to buy more of either instrument at any price), then the banking system would be faced with a "sudden stop": i.e. the need to produce a sudden reduction in bank assets very quickly. This is liable to be very damaging to the economy, especially since banks would be forced to cut short-term lending facilities, which typically support working capital. The burden of the adjustment could also fall heavily on households and small and medium-sized enterprises¹².

It is helpful to scale the amounts of likely future capital needs against the aggregate amounts of capital raised since the onset of the crisis in the middle of 2007. According to (widely cited) Bloomberg estimates, banks have raised about \$1 trillion of capital from all sources over a three year horizon since the onset of the financial crisis (Chart 8)¹³. This covers all banks and not just those in the three leading jurisdictions.




Chart 8

Banks have raised capital from three main sources. In 2007-2008H1, sovereign wealth funds were key providers, buying a total of \$56 billion, or 13% of bank equity issued in 2007Q3-2008Q3 (Chart 9). In 2008Q4-2009Q2, governments in the mature economies— primarily the United States and the United Kingdom—became major providers of bank equity. In the case of the United States, however, most of this has since been repaid

¹² An extreme version of such a "sudden stop" occurred (for different reasons) following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.

¹³ Note that we have adjusted the Bloomberg data to account for repayment of equity by banks to the US Treasury under the TARP program and other measures taken to provide support to banks. According to the US Treasury, about \$180 billion of the \$245 billion that was invested in 707 banks has since been repaid.

(accounting of the negative purchases in 2009Q2-2010Q1). The residual, which can be interpreted as the amount of common equity issued to traditional buyers of bank equity, has averaged about \$60 billion per quarter since 2007Q3.




Chart 9

Avoiding Pro-cyclicality in the Reform Effort

The recent weakness in bank lending has been a hindrance to the global recovery. While the tightening in bank lending standards across the major jurisdictions appears to be over, bank lending caution seems inevitable for the foreseeable future, in part driven by tougher oversight by supervisors criticized for missing unduly lax bank lending practices in the last cycle.

Against this backdrop, there would appear to be significant risks relating to enforcing too much restrictiveness on banks too early in the business cycle. There are multiple plausible (nominal) paths that the global economy could follow in the years ahead. The most likely one seems to be one where the mature economies, in aggregate, grow quite slowly in nominal demand terms, while emerging economies grow quite rapidly¹⁴. The implication of this is that nominal credit growth in the mature economies will be relatively subdued, while it will be more brisk in emerging economies¹⁵. But it is also


¹⁴ See IMF (2010a).

¹⁵ One corollary of this would be that banking sector risks are liable to grow in emerging economies in coming years, as credit growth booms and confidence about future growth (and thus debt-servicing capability) rises. See Chapter 6 for more discussion of emerging economies.

quite plausible that too much restrictiveness on bank lending in mature economies would lead to a deflationary path for nominal GDP, which could then become a selfreinforcing spiral that even an extremely easy monetary policy stance might find it impossible to escape.

Japan offers a vivid example of how this can happen (see Chapter 5). While the reasons for Japan's extensive experience with weak nominal GDP are not fully understood (if they were, the economy would probably have been able to escape them by now), the correlation between the collapse in Japanese credit growth and the economy's potential growth rate is quite striking (Chart 10).





Several commentators, including central bank officials, have argued that the threat of contractionary effects of tighter bank regulation should not be a concern since these can be offset by central bank easing¹⁶. This view seems too blasé for four important reasons. First, it ignores the example of Japan, where a decade of zero interest rates has not worked to counter nominal weakness in the broader economy. Second, this view (in our opinion) tends to underestimate the likely impact of proposed regulatory reform in raising lending rates to private sector borrowers. Third, the scope to lower central bank interest rates in coming years will likely be limited, given their low starting point. Finally, there are broader distortionary implications likely to result from a situation where domestic bank lending margins in mature economies are higher, but key central bank lending rates are held close to zero (as in Japan) for an extended period. Those

¹⁶ See Miles (2009).

distortions could show up in another credit bubble in the unregulated financial sector in mature markets or, more likely, in a bubble in emerging economies.

Sequencing Policy Tightening

Another argument for caution in rapid implementation of reforms that would constrain bank lending is that the likely implementation phase (2011-2012) will correspond to the early stages of a synchronized and, probably quite protracted, effort at fiscal consolidation in the mature economies¹⁷.

The explosion of budget deficits in mature economies coincided with the recent credit shock, especially the phase of severe stress following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In other words, the growth in the leverage of the public sector has been something of the mirror image of the deleveraging of the private sector. Some of the rise in budget deficits is due to the direct fiscal costs of the financial sector interventions¹⁸. Some was also due to explicit counter-cyclical policy easing. Most, however, seems to have been the result of cyclical factors, operating mainly through swings in tax revenue. In the last cycle, strong tax revenues look to have been driven by credit fueled asset price gains, and the rapid evaporation of the latter led to a plunge in the former.

While it would be undesirable to try to return to a state where rapid asset price inflation was propping up nominal tax growth, there seems little doubt that the process of public sector *de-leveraging* would be helped by a process of private sector *re-leveraging*¹⁹. Put another way, the process of public sector deficit reduction in the years ahead will be made a lot harder if the private sector remains cautious about debt accumulation and seeks to run a persistent financial surplus. The likely outcome would be very subdued nominal GDP growth and, thus, weak growth in tax revenue. Once again, Japan stands out as a case of how not to do it.

Stability Benefits of Reform

Our study focuses on a specific angle of the reform debate, namely the plausible estimates of costs associated with imposing a particular type of banking sector reform over a specific time horizon. Our study is thus not a full cost-benefit analysis.

¹⁷ See Cecchetti, S.G., Mohanty, M.S. and Zampolli, F. (2010).

¹⁸ In the United States, for example, the addition of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac added \$291 billion, or 2 percentage points to the 2009 Federal budget deficit; see CBO (2010).

¹⁹ Arithmetically, this need not happen since the foreign sector could, in the aggregate, build up its leverage. For the mature economies as a block, the "foreign sector" is the emerging economies, which do seem likely to experience a reduction in their external surpluses and a greater propensity to import capital in the years ahead. See Chapter 6 and Suttle et al. (2010a) and (2010b).

The stability benefits of regulatory reform are potentially very large, although as conceptually challenging to measure as the costs (which are the focus of this study). The benefits come mainly in the form of lower systemic risk. In this context, it is worth bearing several key points in mind, however:

- Previous efforts at global reform of international banking regulation have evidently not been met with the stability success that had been hoped for by their authors²⁰. Moreover, their implementation led to the creation of a number of unintended consequences, many of which—in retrospect—are now seen to have been very undesirable²¹. Just as the costs of reform are very hard to quantify and subject to considerable uncertainty and debate, so too are the benefits.
- The severe and generalized economic costs associated with the debacle credit boom and bust of recent years were sufficiently extreme to underline that major changes were indeed needed in international banking practices. From early on in the crisis, the members of IIF have been active in taking the lead in promoting improved industry-wide market practices, and we believe that these improved practices and behaviors will be a major ingredient in supporting the more sustainable, stable banking flows necessary for future economic growth²². From the official sector perspective, the case for improvements in supervisory practices (i.e., the enforcement of existing regulation) would seem to be at least as important as the case for more regulation.
- A typical by-product of greater regulation of the banking industry is the encouragement of disintermediation i.e. the transfer of credit flows from the regulated bank sector to the unregulated non-bank sector. The creation of the "shadow" banking system in the years leading up to July 2007 is a good example of such a development. The ability of non-bank credit intermediaries to step in for the banks and thus provide non-bank borrowers with a healthy supply of competitively-priced credit is often cited as a reason why the damage from any extra layers of regulation on banks will be minimal. But this assertion would seem to risk confusing the institutions that are classified as banks with the function which is the hallmark of banking, namely the transformation of liquid short-term liabilities into less liquid longer-term assets. To the extent that the function of banks is increasingly carried out by non-bank intermediaries, then this would seem to be simply shifting systemic risk, rather than reducing it. In such circumstances, the benefits of a more regulation


²⁰ See Tarullo (2008) for a comprehensive summary of the recent history of international banking regulation.

²¹ The most conspicuous example of this is the "regulatory arbitrage" encouraged by Basel I, which led, inter alia, to the creation of what is now commonly termed the "shadow" banking system.

²² See IIF (2008) and IIF (2009a) and IIF (2009b).

(in the form of a more tightly managed banking system) might turn out to be illusory²³.

• One outcome of the need for banks to meet higher liquidity requirements especially in the Euro Area—is the likelihood that they will purchase substantially higher amounts of low yielding government debt. This is indeed already happening (Chart 11). This would make banks vulnerable to two new sets of risks: (i) duration risk resulting from potential losses on holdings of higher coupon longer-term bonds funded by shorter-term liabilities; and (ii) sovereign credit risk, which has risen quite sharply in recent months (Chart 12).



Advantages to the IIF Methodology

We believe that our approach to assessing the plausible macroeconomic impact of key banking sector reforms is a helpful and informed contribution to the debate that will better inform policy makers in their analysis as they move ahead with the global reform process in the months ahead. In our view, its advantages are four-fold:

• By starting with a detailed analysis of the banking system, we are able to impose a series of regulatory changes and assess their plausible impact on bank lending conditions. In turn, we are able to map those lending conditions into key macroeconomic outcomes. The approach thus blends the "micro" bank level

²³ It should be remembered that the extreme global financial instability of 2008Q4 and the resulting massive infusion of public risk was triggered by the near-collapse of the US money market fund sector. See also Tucker (2010).

approach, as typically performed by bank analysts, with the macroeconomic analysis needed to produce whole economy results.

- The analysis is rooted in data, and takes the current reality as the starting point. It is not a theoretical analysis of a long-run steady state.
- The framework is common across the major jurisdictions and thus allows for contrasts and comparisons.
- The framework is transparent. Because we use a spreadsheet-based approach, our time series, projections, model frameworks and parameter values are readily observable.

Drawbacks to the IIF Methodology

While we feel that our approach offers many useful insights into the possible cumulative macroeconomic effects of the reforms likely to be proposed by the *Basel Committee*, we are aware that our approach suffers from a number of shortcomings. While we do not feel that these shortcomings invalidate our core results, they are a reminder that all results should be treated as a preliminary assessment. These shortcomings will serve as the basis of our future research agenda in this area:

- The output of any framework of analysis is only as good as the inputs that serve to go into it. One problem that we have had in constructing our models is data availability (see box). For some countries, we have found adequate sources of data that meet our requirements. In other cases, however, we have been required to mix and match data from a variety of sources. The macro data issue raises important concerns, since many of the data that we use in our study would presumably be central to the process of macro prudential supervision.
- Our model incorporates a number of important behavioral linkages, but more needs to be done to develop these models in two ways. First, while we have made our best efforts to estimate relationships using historical data, we have also been required to impose coefficients in other equations that we believe to be sensible, but which obviously condition the results of our work²⁴. Second, the links between the banking sector and macroeconomic blocks in our models is very basic and driven simply through a credit channel. Moreover, our macroeconomic block is missing some important linkages, including the feedback from outcomes in the credit markets to monetary policy. As outlined above, a scenario in which regulatory reform leads to a weaker outcome for aggregate credit growth and, thus, the broader economy could

²⁴ An example would be the parameters associated with our equation shaping the shadow price of capital, which is, inherently, an unobservable term (see Appendix, pages 30-35).

be avoided by an offsetting reduction in official interest rates. In our model, rates are set exogenously, but some kind of feedback mechanism could be specified.

- Our models are also explicitly national in construction. We project the evolution of each banking system's external assets and liabilities. We are also mindful of the spillover effects of several national banking systems all trying to raise substantial amounts of common equity and long-term debt in global markets simultaneously. Otherwise, however, interactions between national models are lacking.
- Our scenarios projecting the impact of various regulatory reforms capture only a
 part of the changes now being discussed (see Chapter 2). In part, this is because our
 focus is on measures that are likely to be agreed internationally under the auspices
 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; in part, it also reflects the not fully
 specified nature of some of the nationally-based proposals; in part, it also reflects
 the difficulty in amending our framework to capture adequately the implications of
 the proposals in question²⁵.
- Our framework focuses on the consolidated national banking system and cannot differentiate between type of bank or borrower. In our view, however, some of the regulatory measures proposed are likely to have an importantly differentiated effect across both lending institution and, especially, type of borrower. This topic is discussed in each country chapter, but the general point would be that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are typically far more dependent on bank financing than other forms of credit intermediation (especially securities issuance). A set of regulatory changes that encourages disintermediation from the banking system is thus almost certain to bias credit flows away from SMEs to larger companies that enjoy direct access to public securities markets²⁶.

²⁵ For example, our framework would not offer a particularly useful way of assessing the costs of introducing a "narrow banking" framework.

²⁶ For SMEs, the main access to public securities markets is through securitization – a route that has been severely damaged in recent quarters and which regulatory reform proposals will probably weaken further.

Box 2: Data Issues

One of the major challenges of our exercises was building datasets for each country which pull together—at the whole economy level—data on the banking system in a usable form for our analysis. Country specific data issues, and how we handled them, are covered in the appendices to following chapters.

Our biggest headache has been constructing the banking sector's overall balance sheets, such that assets are appropriately divided (e.g. into banking book and trading book), and the other side of the balance sheet is appropriately split into regulatory capital and liabilities. In view of the significance to be placed in meeting aggregate capital requirements, we have found it surprising (and perhaps telling) that such data are so hard to find on a consistent, cross-country basis²⁷.

The challenge of collecting off-balance sheet data was so overwhelming that, for now, we have not addressed this issue. This is a problem, as the proposal to introduce an aggregate leverage ratio, with total assets defined to include off balance sheet positions is an important part of the Basel Committee proposals. Unfortunately, we have found no way of assessing the macroeconomic effects of this proposal on a comprehensive, global basis²⁸.

Indeed, we would strongly recommend that macroprudential supervisors place a far greater emphasis on the collection (and dissemination) of timely whole economy data on banking sector balance sheets, profit and loss statements and, especially, capital structures. An ideal place for this would be a data annex of each country's Financial Stability Report (usually produced by the local central bank). It is, of course, possible to build up a macro picture bank-by-bank, but our efforts to do this (using publicly available databases such as Bankscope) produced challenges with varying sample sizes.

²⁷ The IMF would seem well placed to step up to perform this function. In a way, this would mirror the role played by the IMF in the aftermath of debt crises in emerging economies in the 1990s, when the provision of more complete, relevant and timely information was seen as key aspect of improving the performance of financial markets.

 ²⁸ For an assessment of the potential impact of the leverage ratio on the German economy, see Frenkel and Rudolf (2010).

Appendix: The IIF Projection Model in Outline

In order to simulate plausible effects of regulatory changes on the major economies, we have built a series of spreadsheet-based projection models, which attempt to capture an appropriate combination of detail, behavior and adding-up constraints. Although each country model has its own local flavor, they all have a similar structure, which is described below.

The model is built from four basic blocks: (a) a banking sector balance sheet model; (b) a core capital supply model; (c) a banking sector profit and loss model; and (d) a macroeconomic block, which links the output from the balance sheet model to the broader economy.

Proposed regulatory reforms are imposed as a series of shocks to the banking sector's balance sheet, which – ex ante -- have the effect of squeezing banking sector profit margins. Faced with capital market disciplines, banks then pass on this squeeze to private-sector borrowers. This squeeze then reduces bank credit supply to the private sector, which weakens economy-wide private sector credit growth, nominal real GDP growth and, thus, real GDP growth and employment.

Banking Sector Balance Sheet Model

The banking sector is modeled as a single unit. In this context, banks can be thought of as providing a specific function: taking in deposits from the public with a generally short-term tenor, and transforming those deposits into longer-term loans to the private sector (businesses and households). There are other parts of the financial system that provide credit intermediation services between borrowers and lenders, and the behavior and response of these to proposed regulatory reforms is an important consideration for the outcome of the macro framework (see below). But our detailed focus is on the banking system.

We start with the basic balance sheet definition:

(1) ASSETS = LIAB + CAP

Banking sector assets are categorized into three significant categories: (a) liquid assets (cash and government securities), which are safe (zero risk weighted) but low yielding; (b) loans to, and holdings of securities issued by, the non-financial corporate sector (these are risky, but more profitable); and (c) external assets (which can be either safe or risky depending on the nature of the ultimate borrower). This asset mix can be written as follows:

(2) ASSETS = CASH + GOV + IB + CORP + HH + EXTA + OTHERA

The path of liquid assets (CASH+GOV) is determined by the need to maintain a specific liquid asset ratio. In turn, this is one of mechanisms through which some of the liquidity provisions of proposed regulatory reform can be introduced.

The path of private sector credit (CORP+HH) is one of the key outputs of the model, since it is, in turn, a key driver of output growth, inflation and employment. Its path is determined by the combination of nominal GDP growth in the previous year, the *change* in the real lending rate charged by banks on their loans and the difference between the real rate *level* in the regulatory versus the base scenario. This amounts to saying that there is a downward sloping demand curve for bank credit with respect to price, and upward sloping with respect to activity:

(3) $\Delta CORP+HH = f (\Delta NOMGDP/NOMGDP_{t-1}, \Delta REALRATE, [REALRATE_{REG}-REALRATE_{BASE}])$

For the banking sector as a whole, therefore, one key decision variable is what rate to charge on their lending. As will be seen below, this lending rate is determined by the profit and loss and bank capital supply blocks. But the (monopoly) banking sector is assumed to face a downward sloping demand curve for credit, and essentially picks where it wants to be on that demand curve (i.e. there is no credit rationing in our framework).

Another key way in which regulatory reform enters the model is for higher capital requirements to make banks want to choose a point on the private sector's credit demand curve that is more to the north-west (i.e. higher price, lower quantity). This amounts to saying that regulatory reforms will lead to a leftward shift in the bank lending supply curve.

External assets (EXTA and OTHERA, which includes banks' fixed assets) are assumed to evolve along a path determined by nominal GDP, although the allocation of external assets between "safe" and "risky" allocations (i.e. to foreign holdings of OECD area government bonds versus lending to emerging economies) is viewed as a bank decision variable that will affect the use of regulatory capital.

Finally, it should be noted that both interbank lending and exposures to the corporate sector are split into trading book and banking book components:

- (4) IB = IB(TB) + IB(BB)
- (5) CORP = CORP(TB) + CORP(BB)

This is relevant since the two components are assigned different weights in a riskweighted asset framework, and an increase in risk weightings of trading book assets from 2011 onwards is one of the regulatory changes underway. The liabilities side of the balance sheet is broken into four main components. Retail deposits (M1) are projected to evolve along a path determined by nominal GDP. This amounts to assuming that banks are takers of all deposits that "walk in the door". Similarly, inter-bank borrowing (M2) and external liabilities (EXTL) are projected to evolve along neutral, nominal GDP paths. Finally, wholesale market borrowing (M3) is determined as a residual, since it amounts to the extra amount of funding needed to support banks' assets, given the capital structure and funding achieved from other sources.

(6) LIAB = M1 + M2 + M3 + EXTL

Wholesale funding, in turn, is split into short-term and long-term:

(7) M3 = M3(LT) + M3(ST)

Making this split allows us to identify another way in which regulatory reform affects bank behavior, as the net stable funding requirements (part of the liquidity reforms) will require banks to hold relatively more long-term wholesale funding. Since interest payments on M3(LT) exceed M3(ST), this implies an additional squeeze on net interest margins and, thus profitability.

Finally, banking sector capital is broken into a number of key subcomponents: balance sheet capital (CAP), regulatory capital (REGCAP), Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (T1 and T2) and core-Tier 1 capital (TCE):

- (8) CAP = REGCAP + REGADJ
- (9) REGCAP = T1 + T2
- (10) T1 = TCE + NONCORE

In turn, these drive certain key balance sheet ratios, where risk-weighted assets (RWA) are generally the denominator. Realized capital ratios can be written as the sum of specified minima (BIS and BIS(T1)) and national buffers (BUFCAP and BUFCAP(T1)). Note that we further break the Tier 1 national buffer into two components: a buffer required by national supervisors under Pillar 2 arrangements, and an excess maintained by the banking system, presumably for its own prudential purposes. This is relevant in the context of the bank capital supply model (see below):

- (11) RWA = $\Sigma w_i * ASSET_i$
- (12) REGCAP/RWA = BIS + BUFCAP
- (13) T1/RWA = BIS(T1) + BUFCAP(T1)
- (14) BUFCAP (T1) = REQ(P2) + EXCESS

Banks' Core Capital Supply Model

The banking sector capital supply model is focused on the evolution of the flow variables that drive the stock of core Tier 1 capital, or tangible common equity (TCE).

There are three variables that drive the evolution of TCE:

(15) $\Delta TCE = NEWTCE + PROFRET + REDEF$

where NEWTCE is new (market) issuance of TCE and PROFRET is the amount of undistributed profits, when PROFRET >0, and is the amount of shareholder capital extinguished when banks (in aggregate) make a loss. The third variable, REDEF, is driven by the way in which core Tier 1 capital is affected by redefinitions of capital. These are usually negative.

The variable NEWTCE is assumed to be a decision variable, in aggregate, for banks. Capital markets are willing to supply capital to banks at an appropriate price and this pricing, in turn, drives banking sector loan pricing, which is a key variable in the banking sector profit and loss (P&L) model (see below).

This appropriate price is a "shadow price", or an *ex ante* aspiration of the rate of return on equity that banks try to achieve (ROE _{shadow}). In our work, we have assumed that this variable is, in turn, driven by four factors:

(16) ROE shadow = Target + θ_1 (TCE growth – Nominal GDP growth) $_{t-1} + \theta_2$ (Target – Realized ROE) $_{t-1} + \theta_3$ (EXCESS) $_{t-1}$

where each of the θ_i elasticities is > 0. Banks thus aspire to make a target ROE to keep shareholders happy, but this aspired return is increased when (in the previous period):

- the growth in bank core equity has exceeded the growth in nominal GDP (this is akin to an upward sloping supply curve for TCE to the banking system from global capital markets);
- the *realized* rate of return on equity in the previous period falls short of the aspired rate (in the case of the U.S. this is 12.5%, for the Euro Area 10% and for Japan 5%) this variable is a proxy to a "punishment" variable; and
- the realized capital ratio in the previous period short of the ratio (minimum plus national buffer) required by local supervisors (i.e. EXCESS, as defined from equation (14) above, is negative). This last variable rewards banks for being "safer" (i.e. having more capital) and punishes them for falling short on this front.

Banking Sector Profit and Loss Model

The profit and loss model is very straightforward, although it is something of the engine room of the model. Its two key outputs are the amount of profit retained (PROFRET) and

thus added to core Tier 1 equity (TCE), and the spread charged by banks on their loans to households and businesses, which is the main driver of the key variable REALRATE (see equation (3) above).

Banking sector profits are straightforwardly defined as net interest earnings (NIE), plus net other earnings (OOE; e.g. fees, commissions and trading income), less non-interest costs (mainly labor costs), less credit losses (CREDLOSS), plus other items:

- (17) PROFIT = NIE + OOE NIC CREDLOSS + OTHER
- (18) POSTTAXPROFIT = $(1-\tau)$ * PROFIT, where τ is the average tax rate
- (19) PROFRET = π * POSTTAXPROFIT
- (20) NIE = INTEARN INTCOST
- (21) INTEARN = FFUNDS * CASH + BOND * GOV + BOND * IB(TB) + (BOND + SPREAD) * IB(BB) + (BOND + SPREAD) * CORP + (BOND + SPREAD) * HH + EXTARATE* EXTA
- (22) INTCOST = (FFUNDS + M1FUNDSPREAD) * M1 + (FFUNDS + M2FUNDSPREAD) * M2 + (FFUNDS + M3FUNDSPREAD) * M3(ST) + (BOND + M3FUNDSPREAD) * M3(LT) + EXTLRATE * EXTL

In our projections, the share of profits retained, π , is a decision variable, and CREDLOSS is tied to the business cycle. OOE and NIC are projected to evolve along paths driven by nominal GDP.

Most projection paths for most interest rates in the model are set by assumption. The term structure of official interest rates – the official policy rate at the short end (FFUNDS) and the 10-year bond yield at the longer end (BOND) form the basis for most interest rate calculations.

The key model-determined variable in the P&L block is the spread over official rates to be charged by banks in their lending to private sector borrowers (SPREAD). This is determined by taking the overall profit equation (17), dividing it through by CAP (to give return on equity), setting the left-hand side of the resulting equation equal to the shadow cost of equity (equation (16)), and then re-arranging that equation to solve out for the one unknown: SPREAD. The real borrowing rate thus facing the private sector (which shapes the evolution of bank credit growth to the private sector) is then given by:

(23) REALRATE = BOND + SPREAD – PGDPG

Where PGDPG is the inflation rate in the GDP deflator.

Macroeconomic Framework

The macroeconomic framework is based on a straightforward idea that nominal GDP growth is supported by nominal credit growth. There are a multitude of theories that can be used to support this proposition, but our approach is more pragmatic: activity needs credit, and vice versa. For each country model, we have estimated a simple equation, where we link nominal GDP growth to bank credit growth to businesses and households, as well as to credit growth from other sources. The path of nominal GDP (NOMGDP) growth is deflated to produce a path for real GDP (RGDP) growth. The GDP deflator (PGDP) is driven by an output gap model. Finally, the path of real GDP drives a path for (whole economy) employment (EMPL):

- (24) $\Delta NOMGDP/NOMGDP = f (\Delta CORP/CORP; \Delta HH/HH;$ $<math>\Delta NONBKCRED/NONBKCRED)$, where f' > 0
- (25) $\Delta NONBKCRED/NONBKCRED = f (\Delta (CORP+HH)/(CORP+H))$
- (26) $\Delta PGDP/PGDP = f$ (Output Gap), f' > 0
- (27) $\Delta RGDP/RGDP = \Delta NOMGDP/NOMGDP \Delta PGDP/PGDP$
- (28) $\Delta EMPL/EMPL = f (\Delta RGDP/RGDP)$

This reduced form approach of macro modeling could clearly be enriched over time, in part to allow other feedback mechanisms and interactions to develop. For example, the policy rate and government bond yield are set exogenously in our framework, but could be made endogenous in future research.

One additional important area for future research is the evolution of non-bank credit channels and, in particular, the ability of non-bank credit to substitute for bank credit as regulatory reform crimps the ability of banks to lend. Currently, the path for non-bank credit growth is driven by bank credit growth.

Chapter 2

Planned Regulatory Measures

A very wide array of measures is currently under consideration by policy makers. While the industry broadly supports the goals of stronger, more consistent regulatory capital and liquidity norms, the likely changes in regulation will impose significant new burdens on the banks, place constraints on balance sheets, affect their cost of capital, perhaps make it more difficult to get assets off balance sheet, change asset preferences as well as business behavior, and hence have potential implications for the supply of credit. For the purposes of this exercise it is appropriate to distinguish among the measures currently under consideration on a number of dimensions: the clarity with which the proposals have been articulated, the directness of any effect on the banking system and the likely timing of their implementation.

Clarity of the proposals. None of the regulatory changes under consideration by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has yet been calibrated²⁹. That will await the outcome of the Basel QIS and other impact studies. However there is, even at this stage, much more specificity about the thrust of some measures than others. It is clear, for example, that there will be significant adjustments to the quantity and quality of Tier 1 capital requirements, even though the final scope of the detailed proposals published by the BCBS and the magnitude of the ultimate new requirements have yet to be specified. Detailed proposals have been made on a leverage ratio and on liquidity, but the final shape of those regimes is still far from clear. It seems likely that the BCBS will change the proposal from gross calculation of the ratio into a net calculation more akin to those already in use in Canada, Switzerland, and the US. Comments from the BCBS have also indicated that, while the two liquidity ratios currently proposed had broad support, attention would need to be given to the many specifics of the proposals that have been criticized by the industry. In contrast, only directional indications have been published on capital buffers and macro prudential regulation, to be fleshed out later this year. And it is possible, though still far from certain, that direct limits (in addition to those implied by capital, leverage and liquidity requirements) may be placed on the size of banks or the scope of their activities, probably outside of the Basel structure.

An unexpected addition to the lack of clarity has come from the U.S. Senate, where a last-minute amendment promoted by the FDIC and opposed by the Fed would, if it

²⁹ For full details, see BIS (2009c) and BIS (2009d). The one exception to this is the change to the trading book arrangements which are finalized except for the treatment of correlation trading and other technical details that need attention, BIS (2009b).

survives the reconciliation process with the House and is included in the final law, take away from major US banks any benefit of the advanced Basel II capital calculations, requiring them to be subject to at least the capital requirements produced by the standardized approach for smaller banks. It would also mandate that only common equity could be included in Tier 1 (not what Basel calls Other Going Concern Capital such as trust preferred). These amendments would greatly complicate the US role in the negotiation of the final Basel revisions due to be finalized by the end of the year.

- **Directness of effect**. Significant changes in the quantity or quality of required capital or liquidity will directly affect firms' lending behavior. At the opposite extreme, requirements for detailed recovery or resolution plans could also directly affect individual banks significantly, particularly if they lead supervisors to require some restructuring of banks' operations.
- Timing of the proposal. There is some uncertainty about the timing of the capital proposals. The aim is that they will be introduced by 2012³⁰ (as per the commitment by the G-20), but the *BCBS* has made it clear that general imposition of requirements will depend in part on assessment of the recovery of the system. The Secretary General of the *BCBS* has recently underscored the Committee's intent to meet the deadlines of completion of fully calibrated proposals by the end of 2010 and implementation in 2012, subject to analysis of the impact on recovery. Regarding grandfathering, the Basel documents foresee some grandfathering of existing capital instruments, but without specificity. The industry is also arguing for phasing in the more drastic capital and liquidity requirements. The timing of non-Basel changes, including those that may involve changes to the structure of the banking industry, is much less certain and the industry would argue ought to be subject to extensive grandfathering.

In the remainder of this section (and in the following paper) therefore proposed regulatory changes are classified according to whether they are category 1, 2 or 3 according to the following criteria (Table 4).

³⁰ With the exception of the new trading book rules which are to be implemented by the end of 2010.

Table 4 Category	Definition	Measures included
1	High level of conceptual clarity (albeit unquantified) Substantial technical changes possible, but clear direct effect on lending High/reasonable clarity regarding timing	Quantity of capital Quality of capital (including deductions) Trading book changes Leverage ratio Liquidity changes Countercyclical buffers
2	Fair degree of clarity regarding concept Clear potential effect on lending Low clarity regarding timing	Capital requirements on systemic firms Recovery and Resolution plans 'Volcker' and other plan to limit scope or size
3	Basic concept proposed Significant effect on lending but exact mechanism may be unclear Low clarity regarding timing Unclear that there is global consensus	US "push out" of derivatives business Subsidiarization requirements Cross-border resolution regime Bank tax and levy arrangements

Category 1 Measures

Most of the capital and liquidity proposals currently under consideration by the *BCBS* qualify as category 1 in terms of the above classification. The following needs to be borne in mind however:

- A detailed and extensive list of proposals has been published. The list is not final however and some proposed measures may be dropped or amended in the light of discussion (or others added);
- None of the measures has yet been calibrated;
- The final package is likely to involve elements of a trade off—for example with changes in required capital levels depending to some degree on the extent to which necessary increases in prudential standards are achieved through changes in the capital calculation requirements and definition of capital used in the Basel formula;
- The liquidity, leverage, and certain other technical points have been the subject of extensive criticism and are likely to be revised as to many details as well perhaps as some important, basic design elements, but are likely to survive in revised form.

Total Minimum Capital

The current requirement is that banks hold total minimum capital equivalent to 8% of risk weighted assets. This is potentially subject to revision and could increase to 9% or even 10%.

Tier 1 Capital

Tier 1 capital under the Basel proposal consists of retained earnings and common equity, both subject to deductions (see below) as well as "additional going concern capital", which up to now has meant hybrid instruments. The current requirement is that Tier 1 capital is equivalent to 4% of risk weighted assets. This may increase perhaps to 6%. Under the present standards, as little as half of the Tier 1 requirement can be accounted for by retained earnings and common equity (before regulatory deductions). The intention in the new regime is that Tier 1 should consist "predominantly" of common equity and retained earnings. "Predominant" has not been defined, but could be as much as 85% of total Tier 1, according to some reports.

Additional Going Concern Capital

There is a much increased focus in new proposals on the 'loss absorption' capacity of hybrid capital instruments on the basis of stringent criteria that would preclude various previously used instruments, although the full impact will depend on final requirements including the definition of "predominantly", as discussed above.

- The current 'Sydney' definition allows hybrids up to 50% of Tier 1, but there is wide variation in the allowance and interpretation of acceptable instruments across jurisdictions.
- "Innovative hybrid" instruments, now allowed at up to 15% of total Tier 1 would be phased out altogether under current proposals.
- The new criteria generally make the instruments more equity-like and reduce investors' formal or informal seniority and protections. Debt instruments recognized for Other Going Concern purposes would need conversion or write-down features.
- These changes would reduce banks' flexibility in offering instruments to different classes of investors other than equity investors, and probably increase costs by making it more difficult to issue tax-deductible instruments.

The effects of these changes will vary greatly across banks, depending both on their existing capital structures and the appetite of their primary markets for Tier 1 instruments. Many banks have relied extensively on "hybrid" securities to provide Tier 1 capital, often on a tax-deductible basis.

The impact on banks will come from (a) the level at which "predominant" is set (in many countries banks were hitherto allowed to have up to 50% of Tier 1 in hybrids, so that a higher requirement would have a significant effect on capital costs), and (b) the much more demanding minimum requirements for "other going concern capital", which would greatly affect the markets for such instruments, albeit in ways that cannot yet fully be understood. There are thus uncertainties about the amount of equity a given bank would have to have and about the pricing of and market for the new instruments.

The *BCBS* is considering the terms of grandfathering existing hybrids, but there are as yet no specifics and, furthermore, it is unclear how markets and rating agencies will

treat banks that attempt to continue to rely on grandfathered instruments for a protracted period.

Tier 2 Capital

Tier 2 "gone concern" subordinated debt capital, which would provide resources available in the event of the winding up of a firm, is being simplified in the Basel proposals. There is concern that prescriptive Basel proposals may limit the terms on which banks can sell such instruments (e.g., minimum maturity and amortization periods), and hence make it more difficult to raise such capital. There is also concern that, although both banks and supervisors should have an incentive to raise goneconcern capital, the focus on Tier 1 and Predominant Tier 1 by supervisors and markets may erode the value of Tier 2 for regulatory and market purposes.

Contingent Capital

It is likely that contingent capital—that is debt which is convertible into equity in certain prescribed stressed conditions—will be allowed or possibly even required. As yet the features of permissible instruments and their maximum permitted share in total capital (and whether they would count as Tier 1 or Tier 2) are unclear, as are pricing and whether there would be a market for them.

There are extensive debates in the official and private sector both about the characteristics of such instruments, including such fundamental questions as whether they should convert into going-concern capital (equity) or convert only upon insolvency to provide gone-concern resources; the levels at which conversion triggers should be set (well above, near, or at the point where the firm might enter into the "recovery" phase, or at insolvency), and whether triggers of conversion should be objective and mandatory, optional with management, or under the control of regulators.

In terms of their financial impacts on banks, the question is whether such instruments could be priced to be attractive for banks to issue (relative to the cost of equity) and yet compensate investors for the "insurance" risk of conversion. The final contours of the instruments will determine whether they have any attraction to fixed-income investors or the investors who have been interested in hybrids hitherto; some forms might be attractive to hedge funds but not to traditional bank investors. If, as is sometimes suggested, banks would be obliged by regulators to issue such instruments, efforts by numerous banks to sell them in large amounts would certainly have effects on the banks' cost of capital.

Definition of Capital: Deductions

The Basel proposal aims to harmonize regulatory adjustments to capital, such as deduction of goodwill, which are not covered by current international minima, and hence vary substantially across jurisdictions. A number of items are likely to become subject to much more severe treatment as a result.

The current proposal is that goodwill, minority interests in majority-owned subsidiaries, deferred tax assets and other "intangibles" such as mortgage servicing rights should all be deducted in full from core Tier 1. If agreed, the effect of this would be to reduce the banks' current levels of capital from which the new higher quantitative requirements would have to be met. The distribution of such impacts would be highly variable across firms and across markets. Many European firms would see a substantial reduction of their Tier 1 capital as calculated absent any revision of the proposals on exclusion of minority interests. Many US banks have substantial mortgage servicing rights that the proposals would require to be deducted as intangibles and full deduction of deferred tax assets would have a substantial effect on firms in many countries, again with wide variations. The fallout from the changes, depending on their final contours, could have appreciable to substantial impact on different banks, again with different effects in different countries.

Forward-Looking Provisioning

There is a proposal that banks should be required to determine provisions on the basis of recognition of "expected losses" over the life of a portfolio, as opposed to the current standard requiring recognition of "incurred losses". This would be complementary to the countercyclical capital buffers mentioned below. While the *BCBS* has put forth clear proposals for forward-looking provisions, their design is up to the international accounting standard setters. Intensive discussions on the accounting front are ongoing but it is not clear that the result will be what the *BCBS* wants. It is likely that the net result will be an improvement over the narrow interpretation of "incurred loss" (i.e., banks will be able to take provisions sooner, with somewhat less volatility) but there remains a danger that the US and international standard-setters will not agree on a common approach, which will at the least make comparison of major banks more difficult.

Countercyclical Capital Buffers

The current proposal has two very general provisions for banks to hold capital buffers above the regulatory minimum for Tier 1 capital. One is a "fixed" buffer, which would be determined by the supervisor and maintained through the cycle, to be drawn down at times of stress (with "capital conservation" limitations on dividends, share buy-backs and discretionary employee bonuses when a bank is below a buffer range determined by the regulator). In common with the rest of the package, the fixed capital buffers have not yet been calibrated. A tentative working assumption is that the buffer could amount to an additional 1% on total capital. There is also the risk that this could—contrary to the stated expectations of regulators—become a permanent buffer throughout the cycle.

There is a further "macro prudential" buffer proposal whereby an additional variable buffer would be established by reference to macroeconomic conditions, by means to be determined. Such a regime would be explicitly designed to curtail "excessive credit growth". No specifics have been provided on how this would work, but the general idea would be to give discretion to ratchet up capital requirements if the judgment of the official sector is that credit is expanding too rapidly or terms are becoming too lax.

Leverage Ratio

There are three issues: how would the leverage ratio be calculated; at what level the ratio requirement would be set; and whether it would be mandatory regulatory requirement or a point of supervisory evaluation.

Current proposals include a measure based on *gross* exposure. On current proposals, the leverage ratio would be calculated on a very strict basis (in terms of the non allowance of credit risk mitigants, full value for written derivatives, and the treatment of off balance sheet items). If the current proposals disallowing netting and credit-risk mitigation, treatment of derivatives, and sweeping in wide ranges of off-balance-sheet transactions were maintained, stated exposures would be highly inflated as compared to (net) economic exposures as banks (and regulators) have traditionally analyzed them. Where they exist, leverage ratios have always been determined on a net basis (note: the Senate and House versions of the US financial reform bill includes provisions for the calculation of the leverage ratio that do not seem to take cognizance of the Basel proposals, which may be expected to complicate negotiation of the final accord)

The level at which the ratio is set—and at which it therefore could in principle become the binding constraint—is equally critical, especially of course if the radical gross calculation is maintained. The effect on banks' balance sheets could be significant, all the more so, of course, if a conservative ratio such as the conditional ratio that regulators could systemically important firms in the House version of the US reform bill (15:1) were adopted.

Official-sector pronouncements have often said that the leverage ratio, which by definition is not risk-adjusted, ought to be a "backup" measure to the risk-based capital accord; however, there appears to be a substantial risk that, depending on final definition and calibration, the leverage ratio will become the binding measure.

These negative effects would be all the more likely if, as proposed, the leverage ratio is required to "migrate" to become a fixed Pillar 1 requirement, rather than remaining subject to supervisory discretion in Pillar 2. Banks have advocated a Pillar 2 approach, pursuant to which the bank would assess its leverage among other risk metrics and its supervisors would evaluate the evolution of its leverage over time.

The effects on banks are thus hard to predict and will vary considerably depending on mix of business and mix of assets. This is all the more the case as it is not apparent that the leverage-ratio proposals have taken into account the effects of the liquidity requirements, which will likely push banks to more lower-yielding government obligations. While there is sentiment in the *BCBS* to revise the proposal to put it on a net basis, it is impossible at present to predict what such a net ratio would look like, what its calibration would be, or what effects it would have; it is, however, clear that the Committee intends a significant constraint on leverage compared to the pre-crisis period.

Trading Book Capital

Specific changes to regulatory capital requirements for trading book activities have already been issued, based on the results of a QIS that the *BCBS* has undertaken, and are to be implemented at the end of 2010. Further adjustments are still required, but the new requirements will include:

- An incremental risk charge—reflecting the risk that a trading counterparty will default;
- Punitive provisions on complex securitizations;
- A charge for **credit migration risk**—reflecting losses potentially arising from internal or external ratings changes; and
- Additional **VaR calculations** to include inputs taken from periods of significant market stress ("Stress VaR" as well as the current VaR requirements).

The effects of these measures will vary widely from bank to bank but early estimates are that, on an industry wide basis, regulatory capital supporting trading activities could increase by three times or more.

Counterparty Risk

This is the risk that a counterparty defaults on a derivative contract prior to maturity. The capital charge is intended to cover effective potential exposure to a counterparty in the future, estimated using data that takes account of period of past stress. These estimates will also be subject to add-ons to cover risks that third party guarantors may be unable to meet their obligations. These proposals, if maintained, would pose significant methodological challenges, which the *BCBS* has said it would address. Present proposals would, however, have very substantial effects on trading firms.

Liquidity

Current proposals are for two binding ratios:

• A Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) would specify the quantity of high quality liquid assets that banks would need to hold to ensure that they could survive short acute stress, reflected in exceptional net cash outflows over a 30 day period.

• A Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is intended to ensure that firms manage mismatches in funding profiles conservatively over longer time horizons, discouraging reliance on shorter-term wholesale funding. As such it imposes a number of requirements upon banks' structural long term funding, including detailed behavioral assumptions for client business. The NSFR requires a one year buffer against a scenario of moderate though significant stress.

The requirements as currently drafted are extremely strict—in terms of both the calibration of the pressures on firms' likely liquidity needs and the assets eligible to be counted as liquid. It will certainly have effects on both short-term and medium-term markets and also change the market among banks for other banks paper, which is generally treated less than favorably. Finally, it will increase competition for retail assets, which are treated as a more stable source of funding (perhaps undermining the basis of the assumption of deposit "stickiness" in the process).

The assumption is that such requirements would raise banks' cash holdings significantly. Insofar as the proposals push banks toward lower-yielding "safer" government obligations (which may not look as safe today as they did in December), require more expensive, longer-term funding, and will have substantial but unpredictable effects on funding markets and markets for bank paper, it would necessarily have a substantial effect on banks' costs, and on their appetite for various types of assets, generally lowering their ability to provide their traditional intermediation function.

Category 2 Measures

"Surcharges" for Systemically Important Firms

A separate sub group of the *BCBS* is currently considering whether firms judged to be systemically relevant should be required to hold additional regulatory capital, and additional liquidity, to reduce the probability of their default to a level below that of non-systemic banks. There are currently no firm proposals though proposals are expected after the July *BCBS* meeting. Even if proposals do emerge, there is no indication of the likely timing of implementation. There are proposals in the US and other national reform packages that would give micro prudential regulators and perhaps also new macro prudential authorities the power to impose such additional requirements. Other parts of the Basel proposal also suggest that there may be scope to impose less-favorable risk-weighting and liquidity treatment on large institutions, with clear implications for the basis on which they are able to do business.

As a working assumption, however, it might be postulated that the type of capital and liquidity surcharges envisioned could amount to an average of 1.5% to 2.5% on the minimum capital requirements of the 30 to 40 largest global banks.

Limits on the Scope of Banks' Activities

There are a number of proposals for limiting the scope of banks' activities. These include the 'Volcker plan' for preventing deposit taking institutions from undertaking proprietary trading or participating in hedge funds, private equity, together with a variety of other 'narrow banking' proposals³¹. These ideas have been spelled out with some clarity in the context of the proposed US legislation—a version is included in the US Senate's bill and a more aggressive amendment that was not adopted by the Senate is still being promoted through the conference process. There is a reasonable chance of final adoption, at least in the US. Such ideas do not however command global support—neither is there any realistic prospect of this. In the event of any of them being adopted, the macro economic implications could be considerable—over a considerable time scale. The ability of affected banks to extend credit (in all its forms) would be reduced and regulatory arbitrage would inevitably result in a reconfiguration of financial intermediation. The macro economic effects would be substantial but are difficult to quantify at present.

In addition, the Volcker plan in the US would put an additional cap on the size that any bank group could attain in the US, and there has been discussion of more radical plans to limit bank size and market share, though the latter do not appear to be likely to pass at this writing.

Category 3 Measures

Limits on Banks' Geographic Reach

These include proposals to require banks to limit their overseas activities, possibly through requirements that they operate through subsidiaries, or to hold substantial amounts of capital or liquidity in local markets regardless of form of organization. Here too, plans have not been fully articulated and the subsidiarization idea in particular could have modest effects or large ones depending on how it is configured. In principle, heavy handed approaches could weaken global trade (and global business more generally) and slow development in emerging markets. Macro economic effects could, in consequence, be substantial but they are difficult to quantify at present.

Separation of Derivatives

A provision in the US Senate version of the US reform bill would also require any group that includes a bank taking insured deposits to divest or fence-off all derivatives activities. This would have a substantial effect on the profitability of banks that are heavily involved in derivatives businesses, and on derivatives markets. This point is expected to be hotly debated in the conference process leading up to a final law. There is no global consensus about the appropriateness of such a measure and little prospect that it would be adopted more widely.

³¹ See Kay (2009a) and (2009b).

Recovery and Resolution Plans

There has been extensive debate about these measures and it is highly likely that some version will be introduced as a matter of general norms and national legislation. While the measures are not yet finalized in terms of an international standard, supervisors in several countries have already conducted discussions of such plans with their banks, and are requiring work on the lines discussed below. The ultimate cost implications will depend critically on the model adopted, how aggressively supervisors interpret the requirements, and the tax implications of required changes.

- **Recovery** plans are intended to allow the institution to continue as a going concern in the event of financial distress, and return to financial health. They will typically involve strengthening liquidity and capital and curtailing—or divesting—parts of the business.
- **Resolution** plans are about making provision for an institution to fail in a way which does not create systemic risk and require it to be rescued using public funds.

Putting such plans into place entails three types of cost. Putting in place the elements of the plan itself – making improvements to 'knowing your business', responding to the information needs of regulators and colleges involve some cost, which would range from minor to relatively material depending on what ongoing information requirements are imposed. To the extent that firms are then obliged to make changes to the business—to simplify structures, develop new IT and reporting, or to put in place additional assured sources of liquidity or capital, this will involve significant additional costs, including higher tax burdens, on the institutions concerned.

The third, and probably most substantial, set of costs arises from the resolution or winding down of failed institutions. Such costs may arise from a variety of sources, including the need for working capital or the costs associated with transferring systemically important activities to a bridge institution. There is general agreement (including from the industry) that such costs should not fall to taxpayers and that the industry should pay. Much current debate focuses on whether these costs should be met from resolution funds set up in advance, or by means of recovering costs from the financial sector following resolution.

This has become a major political issue in the US, but it appears that the ultimate financial reform law might include an ex-post approach. The balance of opinion within the industry is also for an *ex-post* approach (though this view is not universally held). An ex-ante fund would in effect constitute an additional tax on the industry, regardless of the basis of assessment. The IMF has recently proposed a wider array of tax ideas, discussed below.

Taxes on Banks

The IMF recently proposed two broad types of taxes on financial institutions.³²

- A 'financial stability contribution' to meet the costs of support for the financial sector. This would be imposed initially on a flat rate—but subsequently on a risk based—basis.
- A 'financial activities tax' which would be levied on institutions' profits and/or remuneration.

It remains unclear whether the proceeds of such taxes would go to general tax revenue or form part of an ex ante fund to finance future bank resolutions. The IMF found no compelling arguments for a financial transactions tax (or 'Tobin' tax to be paid on specific types of financial transactions).

There is at present no consensus regarding the desirability of any specific new tax on financial institutions, let alone the form this might take. Meanwhile a number of national measures have been implemented or proposed.

- The proposed 'Obama levy' is for a fee totally 0.15% of covered liabilities defined as total assets less Tier 1 capital less FDIC insured deposits. Although ostensibly designed to repay TARP costs to the taxpayer, it has also been described as a charge on an implicit guarantee for banks with wholesale funding (thus perpetuating the idea of 'too big to fail') and as a measure to discourage leverage through wholesale market funding. This provision was not included in the Senate financial reform proposal but is still under active legislative consideration.
- Taxes on bankers' bonuses. Both the UK and France have announced plans for one-off taxes on bank bonuses. The UK measure, which was proposed as a one-off, imposes a 50% tax on bonuses in excess of £25000 and was expected to raise around £550mn.
- The new UK government has in the past proposed a tax on banks amounting to around £ 1bn per annum which would be paid into general taxes.

³² See IMF (2010b).

Chapter 3

Impact on the United States Economy

Introduction and Summary

- The US banking system has adjusted rapidly since the onset of the phase of financial stress in the middle of 2007.
- The crisis of 2008-09 produced a substantial increase in both liquidity and capital ratios of the US banking system. In both cases, these sharp increases have been driven not only by policy steps such as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) and the Fed's extraordinary liquidity provision but also by banks' desire to cope with market pressures and position themselves for likely regulatory tightening.
- In comparing two forward-looking scenarios—one with ten specific aspects of regulatory change and a base scenario—we have to make a series of assumptions. Although we assume that banks are able to run lower capital and liquidity ratios in our base scenario relative to our reform scenario, it would nonetheless involve banks making dramatic changes in their behavior and risk management practices that reduce systemic risk.
- Through a variety of channels, reform measures would be passed on to bank borrowers in the form of a higher lending rate. All other things equal, this dampens the demand for bank credit, overall (nominal) credit, which then affects nominal GDP, real GDP and employment.
- The imposition of tighter regulatory controls over the next five years raises core Tier 1 capital requirements for US banks by about \$250 billion by 2015. This, and a variety of other changes in funding costs, would lead to an increase in bank lending rates of about 193 basis points by 2014.
- As a result, the path of real GDP would be lower than in a scenario of no regulatory change, with the negative impact rising fastest in the next five years when the economy is struggling to resume a solid growth against the headwinds of a fiscal policy reversal. By 2015, the downward deviation would be about 2.6%.
- The loss in jobs in the regulatory change scenario (relative to the base) is about 4.6 million by 2015. This slower recovery in employment and output can be viewed as

a significant price to pay for a more heavily-regulated and arguably more stable system.

- Given that bank intermediation accounts for less than one guarter of total credit intermediation in the US, the macroeconomic impact of bank regulatory change hinges critically on the ability of the non-bank financial sector to substitute for banks in the credit intermediation process.
- Among the important constraints on the non-bank sector to do so, the most significant include the very limited potential for growth in the assets of government-sponsored financial enterprises, wholesale market funded finance companies, and securitization activity. High dependency on banks of small and medium sized businesses, which typically create 70 % of new jobs, presents another key issue.

The Starting Point: Rapid Adjustment Achieved


The US banking system has adjusted rapidly since the onset of the phase of financial stress in the middle of 2007 (Table 5). Most notably, there has been a significant decline in the number of banks, with a total of FDIC insured banks falling by 511 in the two and half years after June 2007. Whereas shrinkage of the number of banks has been a standard feature of the US landscape for many years, what was most striking about 2008 and, especially, 2009 was the number of banks that failed, as distinct from being merged. A further 57 banks have failed so far in 2010^{33} .

Table 5				
The U.S. Banking System in Summary				
	Jun 07	Dec 07	Dec 08	Dec 09
Number of Banks	7350	7283	7086	6839
Bank Failures (total over previous 12 months)	1	3	25	140
Total Assets				
FDIC Data (<i>\$ trillion</i>)	10.411	11.176	12.309	11.846
%оуа	8.4	10.7	10.1	-3.8
Federal Reserve Data (<i>\$ trillion</i>)	10.07	10.786	12.282	11.681
%оуа	8.9	10.9	13.9	-4.9
Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA, \$ trillion)	8.121	8.606	9.021	8.736
%oya	11.0	10.8	4.8	-3.2
Capital Ratios (all expressed as % of RWA)				
Regulatory Capital	12.2	12.2	12.7	14.2
Tier 1 Capital	9.6	9.4	9.7	11.4
Core Tier 1 Capital	8.2	8.3	8.4	10.5
Liquid Asset Ratio	14.4	12.8	17.3	19.3
Share of Banks in Credit Intermediation (%)	23.6	24.0	24.2	23.6

³³ Through April 25th, 2010 (see http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html).

There has also been a dramatic increase in liquidity and capital ratios (Chart 13). We have defined a (narrow) liquid asset ratio, consisting of banks' balances at the Federal Reserve and banks' holdings of Treasury debt relative to total assets. This ratio rose sharply in the past two years, from 12.8 percent, to 19.3 percent. In large part, this was because of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy which left banks with substantial excess reserves (about \$1 trillion, or 8.5 percent of total assets). Regulatory capital ratios have risen by about 2 percentage points of risk-weighted assets in the past two years, with the rise concentrated on core Tier 1 equity (or tangible common equity).






Part of the increase in capital ratios will have been driven by the prospects of regulatory reform as well as the strictures of the SCAP. Some also reflects an increase in market pressures, with banks responding to systemic solvency concerns by building up buffers in the midst of the recession.

Total banking system assets have actually risen (on both an unadjusted and a riskweighted basis) since the onset on the crisis in 2007Q3. In part this is because of the need by banks to re-intermediate credit back on to their balance sheets, especially in the second half of 2007 and 2008. Most measures of bank credit have been falling for the past year or so, however (Charts 14 and 15).

Chart 14

Chart 15



Modeling Regulatory Change: Anticipation versus Market Discipline

In modeling the impact of regulatory change on the economy, we have created a simple spreadsheet model and used it to make two detailed projections of the US banking system and the economy: one with reform and one without. We interpret the difference between the two scenarios as the "cumulative impact".

In our model, the detail of the banking system is more extensive than the detail of the economy, so our economic results are best interpreted as broadly indicative of trends, rather than precise estimates. The US model, together with detailed results of each scenario, is presented in the appendix to this Chapter, while the generic description of the IIF models is given in the appendix to Chapter 1.

The specifics on the regulatory change scenario and its implications for the US banking and financial system and economy and reviewed in the next two sections, but it is important to note that the base scenario of "no change" involves, in itself, important assumptions of change from the current situation.

As noted above, the crisis of 2008-09 produced a substantial increase in both liquidity and capital ratios of the US banking systems. In both cases, these sharp increases appear to have been driven in part by a desire on the part of banks to position themselves as "ultra-safe", so as to reassure regulators, supervisors, equity investors, wholesale funders and depositors. From a regulatory standpoint, the push for safety was carried out through the enforcement of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) by the Federal Reserve, the successful implementation of which represented an important turning point in the financial crisis³⁴. The capital increases appear also to have been driven in part by a desire to anticipate, and thus position for, higher regulatory capital and liquidity requirements³⁵. Banks' liquidity positions have been boosted by the \$1 trillion of excess reserves that were put into the system by the Federal Reserve. These are projected to be run down to more normal levels in both scenarios.

Specifics of Regulatory Change Scenario³⁶

In our quantitative work to date, we have focused on modeling those measures which have both a high level of clarity (albeit so far unquantified) and likelihood of occurrence (see Chapter 2). We have also focused on the Basel III proposals (see Chapter 2), which can be put into our framework in a relatively straightforward manner. In the light of the recent stepped up effort to pass US-specific reform legislation, we have endeavored to capture the impact of these additional measures, although our framework is not well-positioned to capture some of the most radical proposals, including those to limit bank size and severely restrict use of derivatives.

In assessing the cumulative effects of regulatory change on the US economy, our specific assumptions can be broken into two groups. The first is the changes that are part of the globally-coordinated efforts through the *BCBS*:

- 1) An increase in trading book capital at the end of 2010. Our estimate is that the commercial banking system held about \$751 billion in trading book assets at the end of 2009. This was already well down from a peak of \$829 billion at the end of 2008, and we expect this decline to continue through 2010, in large part in anticipation of the increase in the capital charges against holding these assets. Based on industry estimates, we project the capital charge levied against these holdings to rise by about three fold, which we capture by raising the average risk weighting assigned to such trading book securities from 10% to 30% for securities of financial firms held in the trading book), and from 25% to 75% for securities of non-financial firms.
- 2) A two percentage point increase in the minimum Tier 1 and overall regulatory capital ratios, to 6% and 10%, respectively, to take place in 2012. If this change were enacted today, then the increase would have little immediate direct impact

³⁴ See http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090507a1.pdf

³⁵ These two effects are probably related, as market expectations of what banks should do with regard to liquidity and, especially, capital are almost certainly shaped by an expectation of conditions that regulators are expected to set for the future.

³⁶ This section sets out working assumptions about regulatory developments used in the analysis. Given the number of aspects of regulatory reform which are yet to be finalized, arbitrary decisions needed to be made about what assumptions to be used. These are not predictions or expectations. In addition, as in any broad economic analysis, some of the assumptions have had to be somewhat simplified. The Institute has provided detailed comments to the Basel Committee about numerous specific issues raised by its December 2009 consultative documents on capital and liquidity.

on US banks, since they currently hold capital (on both definitions) well in excess of BIS regulatory minima (at the end of 2009, the ratios were 10.5% and 14.2%, respectively). More at issue is what to assume about the buffer over the minimum that would be required by the national authorities in the two scenarios. As far as the "regulatory change" scenario is concerned, this issue is covered in the discussion of counter-cyclical buffers (see below). For the base scenario, however, we assume that US regulators maintain about the same average buffers in 2011-20 as prevailed from 1992-2008 (these buffers were 4.5 percentage points on total and 5.9 percentage points on Tier 1 capital). This would allow the core Tier 1 capital ratio to fall steadily from 12.5% at the end of 2010 to 11.6% in 2015-16.

- 3) Quality of capital. The greater emphasis on "core" Tier 1 equity (TCE) versus total Tier 1 would not greatly stress US banks, given their holdings of TCE amounted to 92% of total Tier 1 capital at the end of 2009. Redefinition effects are more of an issue (i.e. items currently counted as part of Tier 1 capital will no longer be eligible for such treatment under new regulations). Based on estimates from brokers' reports, we anticipate that about \$120 billion of what is currently eligible to be counted as Tier 1 capital is re-classified (as Tier 2 capital) over a 3 year horizon from 2012 to 2014 (i.e. \$40 billion per year).
- 4) Countercyclical buffers. We project a countercyclical buffer, in the form of a higher Tier 1 capital buffer, to be imposed as the business cycle unfolds. In the absence of a clear guidance from the BCBS on this matter, we have assumed that this would take the form of an additional 1 percentage point increase in the Tier 1 minimum for the expected "central phase" of the next business cycle, which we would interpret as years 3 through years 6 of the expansion. In the upcoming cycle, this period would be 2012 through 2015. This period would correspond to the phase 2004-2007 in the last cycle, which is clearly the phase when, retrospectively, it would have been desirable to impose some brakes on the expansion phase of the credit cycle. Of course, it is always easy to see the strong phase of a business cycle in retrospect, and far more challenging to be so decisive on an *ex ante* basis. Importantly, we assume that that these leads to an equivalent increase in observed capital ratios during this period of the expansion.
- 5) Higher holdings of liquid assets as a result of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The Liquidity Coverage Ratio will require that banks hold sufficient liquid assets to ensure that they can survive a period of extreme stress. In our framework, we set the overall liquid asset ratio, so at to ensure that banks comfortably meet the LCR through the projection horizon in the regulatory change scenario. In the base scenario, the LCR is not a binding constraint. Specifically, in that scenario banks target a stable liquid asset ratio through the next five years (2010-2014), followed by a steady decline back to 15% thereafter. For the regulatory reform scenario, we project the liquid asset ratio to be increased to 22% in 2012, maintained at that level through 2013, and trimmed steadily back to 18% thereafter.

6) A greater reliance on longer-term over short-term wholesale funding, as a result of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The new liquidity provisions will also apply on the liabilities' side of banks' balance sheets. We assume that the NSFR will be introduced in 2012, and that this will have the effect (in the 2010-2012 period) of shifting the split of banks' wholesale funding from short-term to long term, and maintaining it there through the forecast horizon.

The second set of changes is those that are US-specific, at least currently (although USspecific changes are apt to become part of a new global standard and spread to other countries). These proposals are currently developing in the Financial Reform Bill, different versions of which have now passed the House and the Senate³⁷. This will now go to Conference (a joint committee of both parts of the legislature) for reconciliation. This process could be completed by July 4th, 2010. There are 118 new regulations in the Senate bill, so it is impossible to capture the likely myriad of changes embodied in the new legislation fully in our framework. Nonetheless, we believe that the first two of the points below incorporate some of the effects of the legislation. The other two changes reflect what we believe to be plausible other developments (part from the Financial Reform Bill) that need consideration:

- 7) *Higher cost of wholesale bank funding*. While there are considerable uncertainties as to the final shape of the legislation, one key aim is to increase resolution powers of the FDIC. In principle, financial support programs for institutions suffering any kind of "run" would be forbidden, and a large financial institution in difficulty—or perceived to be in difficulty—would be put in the hands of the FDIC and wound down in an "orderly" way. The main implication of this proposal would be to raise the cost of wholesale funding, since debt holders would now be far more vulnerable to losses resulting from disorderly financial market conditions, and would not enjoy the support provided by government guarantees in the 2008 crisis. This effect of raising the cost of wholesale market funding—the result of reduced *demand* for bank debt by investors—would come on top of the increased supply of long-term paper caused by the net stable funding rule. Our framework assumes that there is always some price at which investors will be willing to buy longer-term bank debt, so the increase in the supply of such securities leads to an increase in overall funding costs³⁸. In our projections, we have assumed an added cost of long-term bank wholesale funding of 200 basis points. It is possible, of course, that such marginal wholesale funding might not be available (at any reasonable prices), in which case the banking system would be forced to cut its assets more aggressively than our projections envisage.
- 8) *Lower growth in credit from non-bank sources*. There are many other provisions of the legislation, but many of them center on reducing the ability of banks to

³⁷ See http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/HR_4173_Senate_passed_as_amended.pdf

³⁸ A number of IIF members have questioned this assumption, pointing out that there may be no price at which all wholesale debt can be sold. This would imply the need for a more explicit deleveraging by banks.

engage in securities sales and trading activities, including severe limits on banks abilities to engage in derivatives business. While there is no straightforward way to model the impact of these measures within our framework, we believe that it is reasonable that the combination of these measures would be sufficient to raise the cost of non-bank credit intermediation sufficiently to trim the growth in non-bank credit to be one percentage point lower than in a "no change" scenario between 2011-15. Given the importance of non-bank credit intermediation to the US economy, this slower rate of growth in non-bank credit cumulates to a significant restraint on the economy.

- 9) Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee (FCRF). In January 2010, President Obama proposed a fee on all banks and finance companies with more than \$50 billion in assets in order to recoup the costs of the TARP program³⁹. According to industry estimates, annual revenues from the tax could amount to about \$11 billion⁴⁰. While the universe of firms covered by the tax is not quite the same as the banking sector in our model, the pre-tax net income of banks in our model averages \$265 billion in 2010-11. If enacted, the FCRF would thus amount to an additional marginal tax rate of about 10 percent. We assume that this tax is imposed as a one-off levy in 2011, but this tax could easily be made permanent. Indeed, one provision of the original Senate legislation was the creation of a \$50 billion fund to meet the cost of possible future financial crises. This did not make it into the final bill. The House bill creates a pre-funded Dissolution Fund of \$150 billion paid for by taxes on banks. While this is also unlikely to make it into final legislation, there is growing momentum to make the FCRF permanent, rather than one-off. If this were done, it would obviously add to our estimates of the GDP growth and employment effects of regulatory change.
- 10) Greater pressure on compensation. We assume that the regulatory change scenario will lead to greater pressure on banks to restrain employee compensation. In our model, employee compensation is part of the "non-interest cost" component of the profit and loss and account. In 2009, overall non-interest costs were \$353 billion. In our base scenario, we assume that this component grows in line with nominal GDP. In our regulatory change scenario, we assume that non-interest costs rise by 2.5 percentage points less than nominal GDP between 2011-16 (given that employee compensation is only a part of this cost line, the implied decline in employee compensation would be more significant).

Our regulatory change scenario does not capture all of the proposals that could be part of the financial reform legislation. For example, when President Obama proposed the "Volcker Rule" in January (a ban on banks trading for their own book or owning hedge funds), he also suggested that there should be limits imposed on the overall size of banks and the degree of concentration in the banking industry⁴¹. Presumably, this could

³⁹ See <u>http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg506.htm</u>. Note that all banks with assets in excess of \$50 billion have repaid TARP related equity injections, with the Treasury registering a significant profit on these transactions.

⁴⁰ See Glionna and Crivelli (2010)

⁴¹ See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform

be expressed in the form of limits on the share of overall wholesale funding. Such a "hard stop" (forcing banks to shed assets and wholesale liabilities) could be quite disruptive.

Our Results in Outline

In its simplest terms, the model operates through tighter regulatory requirements squeezing the banking sector's net interest margins. This squeeze is then passed on to borrowers in the form of a higher lending rate. All other things equal, this dampens the demand for bank credit, overall (nominal) credit, which then affects nominal GDP, real GDP and employment⁴².

A comparison between the outcome for many key variables from both the banking sector and the economy is presented in Table 6 (below), which cover projections through 2020.

Not surprisingly, the main differential between the two scenarios opens up over the next 5 years, when the regulatory measures take hold. Over the first five years of the regulatory change scenario, real growth (and employment) is appreciably weaker and prices lower. Economic performance is more even later in the decade, in part because counter-cyclical buffers are reversed.

The imposition of tighter regulatory controls over the next five years, however, would act to raise core Tier 1 capital requirements for US banks by about \$250 billion by 2015. Through an increase in what we call the shadow price of bank equity, this would lead to an increase in bank lending rates of about 193 basis points by 2014 (Chart 16).


This would contribute to a halving in the rate of growth of bank (and total) credit to the private sector over that time horizon. In turn, this would cumulate in the loss of about \$860 billion of nominal GDP by 2014, after which time this nominal loss would continue to rise, albeit it more slowly (Chart 17). Note that this income loss is not absolute but *relative* (i.e. by 2014, nominal GDP is projected to be \$860 billion *lower* than it would otherwise be).

⁴² It should be noted that our model has no explicit feedback in (at least) one important area. We set the path of policy rates (and bond yields) exogenously, so this does not allow for the possibility that an easier Federal Reserve policy stance could offset some of the regulation-induced rise in bank lending rates. Of course, with Fed rates now close to zero (and unlikely to rise significantly in the quarters ahead), the scope for such a compensating monetary policy response is limited. Moreover, such an offsetting monetary ease (limiting the "headwinds" of regulatory reform) might well exacerbate other extremes.

United States: Cumulative Eff	ects Result	ts										Avg
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2011-20
Real GDP (2010 = 100)												
Base	100	102.7	105.2	108.1	110.6	113.6	116.7	119.5	122.5	125.6	128.8	
Regulatory change	100	101.4	103.4	105.8	107.7	110.7	113.8	116.5	119.5	122.4	125.3	
Difference (%)	0.0	-1.2	-1.7	-2.1	-2.6	-2.6	-2.5	-2.5	-2.5	-2.5	-2.7	
Real GDP (%y/y)												
Base	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.3	2.7	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.6
Regulatory change	3.0	1.4	2.0	2.4	1.8	2.7	2.8	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.3
GDP deflator (2010 = 100)												
Base	100	102.0	104.6	107.6	110.6	113.7	116.9	120.1	123.5	126.9	130.4	
Regulatory change	100	101.6	103.6	106.1	108.5	111.3	114.4	117.6	120.9	124.2	127.5	
GDP deflator (%y/y)												
Base	1.4	2.0	2.5	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7
Regulatory change	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.5
Nominal GDP (\$ trillion) Base	14.938	15.647	16.434	17.374	18.261	19.284	20.369	21.441	22.605	23.817	25.080	
Regulatory change	14.938	15.324	15.936	16.707	17.401	18.333	19.376	20.393	22.005	22.631	23.783	
Difference (\$bn)	-56	-323	-498	-667	-860	-951	-993	-1048	-1109	-1186	-1297	
Employment (millions)					<u> </u>							
Base	129.7	131.3	132.4	133.6	134.6	135.7	137.1	138.2	139.3	140.4	141.5	
Regulatory change Difference ('000)	129.4 -274	129.7 -1620	129.5 -2844	130.1 -3525	130.3 -4242	131.1 -4585	132.6 -4516	133.7 -4474	134.7 -4539	135.7 -4655	136.6 -4867	
Difference (000)	27.1	1020	2011	5525		1565	1510		1000	1000	1007	
Private sector credit (2010 = 1	00)											
Base	100	108.0	113.0	119.9	125.8	133.1	140.3	146.9	154.3	161.8	169.6	
Regulatory change	100	103.9	106.1	110.2	112.9	118.4	125.0	130.8	137.3	143.8	150.0	
Private sector credit growth (9	6v/v)											
Base	-0.9	8.0	4.7	6.1	4.9	5.9	5.4	4.7	5.0	4.9	4.8	5.4
Regulatory change	-2.1	3.9	2.1	3.8	2.5	4.9	5.5	4.7	5.0	4.7	4.3	4.1
Bank assets (%y/y)												
Base	-1.6	7.9	3.8	5.8	4.4	4.4	4.0	3.2	3.6	3.5	5.2	4.6
Regulatory change	-1.4	6.3	3.9	4.1	-1.4	5.4	4.1	5.2	3.5	5.2	4.7	4.1
Risk-weighted assets (%y/y) Base	-2.0	9.2	4.7	5.9	4.4	5.2	5.4	4.6	5.2	5.0	5.5	5.5
Regulatory change	-2.0	9.2	2.8	4.2	4.4	5.2	5.5	4.0 5.2	4.9	5.0	4.8	4.9
negalatory change	2.0	517	2.0			5.1	0.0	5.2		515		
Bank credit growth to the priv	ate sector	(%y/y)										
Base	-2.2	8.0	4.2	5.8	4.4	5.6	6.0	5.2	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.6
Regulatory change	-2.7	4.3	2.2	4.2	2.6	5.4	6.2	5.1	5.5	5.2	4.8	4.5
Core equity shadow price (per	cent)											
Base	19.0%	7.5%	10.0%	9.4%	10.2%	10.2%	10.4%	10.8%	11.2%	11.6%	12.4%	10.4%
Regulatory change	19.0%	12.9%	12.8%	12.3%	13.7%	12.1%	11.5%	11.6%	11.6%	12.0%	12.7%	12.3%
Real lending rate (percent)												
Base	3.7%	2.1%	2.4%	2.0%	2.6%	2.3%	2.0%	2.3%	2.1%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%
Regulatory change	4.0%	3.8%	4.0%	3.7%	4.5%	3.7%	3.2%	3.4%	3.1%	3.1%	3.2%	3.6%
Difference (bps)	31	170	163	171	193	146	119	103	98	93	99	136
Regulatory capital ratio (% of I	-	13.8%	12 10/	12.5%	12 10/	11 (0/	11 10/	10.6%	10.10/	0.6%	0.10/	11 40
Base Regulatory change	15.2% 16.5%	15.8%	13.1% 15.9%	16.3%	12.1% 16.9%	11.6% 16.3%	11.1% 15.7%	15.1%	10.1% 14.6%	9.6% 14.0%	9.1% 13.6%	11.4% 15.4%
hegalatory change	20.070	1011/0	101070	1010/10	2013/10	2010/0	101770	1011/0	1 110/0	1 110/0	10.070	10.174
Core Tier 1 Capital (\$ billion)												
Base	918	918	918	935	953	970	986	1003	1018	1031	1045	
Regulatory change Difference	1023 105	1068 150	1103 185	1164 229	1199 246	1217 247	1236 249	1254 252	1272 254	1288 257	1305 260	
Directence	103	100	103	223	240	241	243	232	234	237	200	
Core Tier 1 capital ratio (% of I	RWA)											
Base	11.2%	10.2%	9.8%	9.4%	9.2%	8.9%	8.6%	8.3%	8.0%	7.7%	7.4%	8.7%
Regulatory change	12.5%	11.9%	11.9%	12.1%	12.3%	11.8%	11.4%	11.0%	10.6%	10.2%	9.9%	11.3%
Return on bank equity (%)												
Base	15.5%	11.4%	12.9%	12.7%	13.8%	13.0%	12.3%	12.2%	11.4%	9.8%	10.3%	12.0%
	15.3%	10.5%	11.2%	10.7%	11.9%	10.8%	10.6%	10.5%	9.9%	8.9%	9.2%	10.4%


Sources: IIF Estimates


Chart 16



United States: Change in Real Lending Rate to Private Sector Borrowers *basis points*

Chart 17






The employment implications of this loss in income are driven by real GDP, which is less severely hit than nominal GDP, since inflation in the regulatory change scenario is weaker throughout. In part, this reflects lower nominal credit growth; in part, the higher

(negative) output gap. Once again, this is a relative not an absolute story. That said the relative loss in jobs under a regulatory change scenario is quite striking (and sustained; see Chart 18).

The most concerning development of the negative economic developments resulting from the regulatory change scenario is not just their scale, but their timing. The maximum hit comes in 2011-2014 when the tougher new regulatory policies are assumed to be imposed. This is the period, however, when the US (and global) economies are expected to be struggling to sustain a healthy recovery from the damage of the deep recession of 2008-09. Particularly concerning are the risks associated with deflation, and high and rising budget deficits. A scenario that contributes to weaker nominal growth and subdued leverage in the private sector would seem, at face value, to be one that could add to the downward pressures on the price level and upward pressures on government debt.

Chart 18



U.S. Employment Implications of Regulatory Reform


Non-Bank Credit Intermediation: The "Spare Tire" Theory

One critical issue shaping the macroeconomic impact of bank regulatory change is the ability of the non-bank financial sector to substitute for banks in the credit intermediation process. This is particularly important in the United States, where the share of bank intermediation (as measured by the proportion of total financial sector credit market instruments held by commercial banks) is less than one-quarter

(Chart 19). This share had been falling steadily between 1974 and 2004, but actually rose slightly between 2003Q4 and 2008Q4. It fell again through 2009, however. The ability of the non-bank sector to substitute for the bank sector at times of weakness was widely seen as a major strength of the US financial system, at least until recently. It was even given a name: the "Spare Tire" theory⁴³.

These "spare tire" effects became most evident at two points between 1997 and 2003 (Chart 20). During the Asian-Russian-LTCM crisis in 1998-99, bank credit slowed, but this effect was offset by acceleration in credit growth by non-bank entities. Indeed, it was at this time that the "spare tire" phrase was conceived, in part to highlight the diversity of credit supply sources in the United States, as well as to underline why the financial crisis had been so traumatic to East Asian economies, since they had been over-dependent on large banking systems and, thus, vulnerable to the sudden downturn in the banking sector's fortunes⁴⁴.

Chart 19



Source: Federal Reserve

The second episode was the recession and debt reduction phase of 2001-03, when a sharp dip in bank credit growth was offset by acceleration in credit from other sources.

⁴³ See Greenspan (1999) and (2005).

⁴⁴ In retrospect, such analysis looks less correct, since East Asia's traumas in 1997-98 in many ways mirror those experienced by Western financial systems following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 1998. In East Asia, a series of local, but relatively modest, financial excesses combined to produce a breakdown in trust in the financial system. The subsequent rush for liquidity and safety produced powerful ripples across the region, including significant pressures on even the strongest links (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore)

Major corporate bankruptcies (especially Enron and WorldCom) did thus not have a devastating impact on the overall credit supply process, presumably helping dampen the depth and duration of the 2001 recession.

In both of these "spare tire" episodes, the bank credit expanded, at the margin, by less than non-bank credit. In both episodes, however, Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) and Agency and GSE-insured mortgage pools contributed about one-third of total credit creation (Table 7). Outside these episodes, there were some phases during the period 1996-2002 that growth rates in bank lending and non-bank lending were positively correlated. But, for the period as a whole, there was essentially no correlation between the (year ago) growth rates of the two variables.

	1999Q2-1998Q2	2000Q4-2003Q4
Overall financial system	1814	5550
Banks	246	991
Contribution (%)	13.6%	17.9%
Non-bank	1523	4404
Contribution (%)	84.0%	79.3%
o/w GSE and Agencies	610	1608
Contribution (%)	33.6%	29.0%
ABS issuers	249	711
Money market funds	187	154
Finance companies	118	367
Contribution (%)	64.1%	51.2%
Others	361	1564
Contribution (%)	19.9%	28.2%
Memo: Federal Reserve	45	155
Contribution (%)	2.5%	2.8%

Table 7


Changes in Quality in True life and Timeli places

Sources: Federal Reserve, IIF Estimates

More recently, however, the view that bank and non-bank credit are offsetting alternatives has not held. Since 2003Q1, the positive correlation between the (year ago) growth in bank and non-bank credit has been a relatively high 84 percent. Significantly, the plunge in credit growth from non-bank sources preceded the drop in bank credit in the most recent downturn (Chart 20).

As has been well documented, some of the most buoyant forms of non-bank credit in the latest upswing came in the form of a rapid expansion of on and off balance sheet activity by the (housing-related) GSEs, as well as rapid growth in credit assets held issuers of asset backed securities (ABS) and wholesale market funded finance companies. These institutions had also been very supportive of overall credit growth during the "spare tire" episodes mentioned above (Table 7). In retrospect, however,

policy makers and market participants came away from the 1998-99 and, especially, the 2001-03 episodes with too sanguine a view towards the system stabilizing properties of the non-bank financial sector. In the latest downturn, it became a key source of, rather than protection against, financial instability.⁴⁵



Although the overall decline in non-bank credit over the past year matched that of banks, the severity of the decline in some key components of non-bank credit over that time has been quite dramatic (Table 8). Savings banks, money market funds, ABS issuers, finance companies, broker-dealers and funding corporations all suffered double digit declines. Key stabilizing forces were GSEs, insurance companies and pension funds and, especially, mutual funds (excluding money market funds)⁴⁶.

This diversity in recent performance is a salutary reminder that the non-bank credit sector in the United States is far from a homogenous block. This makes projecting a plausible path for the sector over the years ahead quite challenging.

In constructing our two scenarios, we developed a model for aggregate non-bank credit growth whose main ingredient is the same factors that drive bank credit growth. In

⁴⁵ The same point seems relevant for credit default swaps (CDS), the markets for which handled their first major tests in the credit downturns of 1998-99 and, especially, 2001-03 (this included major corporate and sovereign bankrupcies). Having come through those tests with flying colors, policy makers and market participants were generally unfazed by the exponential growth in the CDS market after 2004.

⁴⁶ The growth of mutual funds relative to money market funds probably reflects the normalization of financial conditions as 2009 progressed, and investors re-allocated funds out of low yielding money funds and into higher-yielding bond funds.

addition (as noted above), we assumed that non-bank credit grows by a percentage point per year less in the regulatory change scenario relative to the base scenario. The resulting two paths (neither of which is strong) are shown in Chart 21.


	Dec-09		Change s	ince (%saar)
	\$ billion	% of total	Dec-08	Dec-06
Commercial banks	9.005	23.6	-4.5	3.8
Federal Reserve	1.988	5.2	101.6	36.7
Savings banks and credit unions	1.804	4.7	-10.6	-5.8
Insurance companies	3.883	10.2	4.3	2.4
Pension funds (public and private)	1.939	5.1	0.8	5.1
Money market funds	2.031	5.3	-24.1	9.2
Mutual & closed end funds & ETFs	2.896	7.6	17.5	10.9
GSE and GSE-backed pools	8.087	21.2	1.2	8.0
ABS issuers	3.333	8.7	-16.7	-6.5
Finance companies	1.550	4.1	-11.8	-5.1
Real estate investment trusts	0.172	0.5	-4.7	-13.5
Brokers and dealers	0.530	1.4	-26.2	-3.2
Funding corporations	0.875	2.3	-14.6	34.8
Total	38.092		-2.0	4.4
Memo: Excluding banks and Fed	27.100	71.1	-4.8	3.2

Table 8

Total C 4:+ N/

Source: Federal Reserve

Chart 21



As with banks, it is also difficult to determine the relative roles of changed behavior versus the fear of future regulation in shaping recent conservative behavior by some non-bank intermediaries.

In the case of non-bank financial intermediaries, however, there are two specific institutions that seem certain to shrink their balance sheets over coming years. First, the Federal Reserve (which is not part of our non-bank credit aggregate) will most likely endeavor to reduce its balance sheet back towards its pre-crisis size. This would imply a reduction of about \$1 trillion. Second, likely GSE reform will be accompanied by an overall reduction in those institutions' aggregate balance sheets. Both of these balance sheet declines would be concentrated on one specific asset—mortgage backed securities. Other sectors may well continue to shrink (e.g., ABS issuers). For the overall non-bank aggregate to grow at anything like the rate of nominal GDP, therefore, we would need to see steady, significant growth in the assets of "healthy" non-bank credit intermediaries (e.g. mutual funds and insurance companies)⁴⁷.

There are two ways in which the regulatory reform agenda would likely restrain nonbank credit flows relative to a base scenario of no change:

- Most obviously, reforms are understandably geared to achieving a safer overall financial system, and a key part of this will be ensuring that no new "shadow" banking system will be created. In particular, this is liable to constrict the growth of money market funds, whose ability to engage in bank-like maturity transformation (e.g. by holding the commercial paper of ABS issuers) will be limited.
- There will be efforts to curtail the growth in off-balance activities of banks primarily through the introduction of a leverage ratio, where the assets to be included in the numerator are likely to be off balance sheet positions measured on a gross notional basis⁴⁸. This would likely lead to a sharp reduction in banks' offbalance sheet positions, which would probably spill-over not only on to their willingness to hold inventories of securities, since these would be more costly to hedge in a less liquid derivatives market. In turn, this could dampen financial intermediation through the bond market. Moreover, thinner derivatives markets

⁴⁷ Mutual funds and insurance companies will also be subject to additional regulatory requirements that will restrict their investment policies, in some cases significantly changing their roles in markets. Money-market funds in particular are already subject to new liquid-asset requirements that are substantially more conservative than before the crisis, generally requiring shorter-maturities and higher-quality assets. To some extent these changes run in the opposite direction to the liquidity changes for banks (generally requiring them to seek longer-maturity liabilities). While the market interaction of these changes is yet to be determined, it is important to keep in mind that these important market players will also be significantly affected when considering the markets for capital and funding in which banks will be operating (see Chapter 1 for more discussion).

⁴⁸ In the United States, banks have operated with a 20x liquidity ratio since the early 1990's. However, the current Basel proposals would radically change this ratio, which is calculated on a net, not gross, basis and disregards off-balance-sheet items (which in turn will be substantially changed by intervening regulatory and accounting changes).

might well make it more costly for non-banks to manage bond portfolios, directly reducing intermediation flows through this channel.

Distributional Issues: The Bank Dependency of Small and Medium Sized Firms

Our modeling work focuses on macro aggregates, treating the banking sector, the nonbank financial sector and the non-financial sector (businesses and households) as uniform blocks. In the real world, of course, each major sector is made up of many individual actors, be they firms or households.

Small businesses are more relatively dependent on bank financing than large businesses, and can only access capital markets indirectly through securitization⁴⁹. The tightening in lending conditions for credit cards and small business loans will thus have no doubt acted as a significant restraint on small business activity in the past few quarters. A further tightening in bank credit conditions relative to those for non-bank credit would be liable to favor larger businesses relative to smaller businesses. It should be noted that small businesses account for the creation of 60 to 80 percent of net new jobs annually⁵⁰. This makes it likely that our estimates for net job losses resulting from tighter lending conditions could well be too low, since they are based on broad macro aggregates and do not take these likely adverse compositional effects into account.

⁴⁹ See Mach, T.L. and Wolken, J.D. (2006).

⁵⁰ See Ou (2006).

Appendix: United States Data Sources

Type of Data	Sources
	FDIC database of Statistics on Banking
	http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/
Balance Sheet	Maturity structure of wholesale liabilities was determined based
	on a sample of top 20 commercial banks, ranked by asset size.
	Data retrieved via Bloomberg and Bankscope
	FDIC database of Statistics on Banking
Capital	http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/
	FDIC database of Statistics on Banking
P&L Model	http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/
	Bureau of Economic Analysis
	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Macroeconomic Data	Federal Reserve Statistical Release – Flow of Funds Accounts of
	the United States, March 2010
	http://federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf
	OECD Economic Outlook 86 database

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\$ billion							Projection period	ро										
		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Bank Balance Sheet Model	le/																	
								No new risk-										
Bank Assets		9040	10092	11176	12309	11846		weighting	12578	13056	13814			15661		16752	17337	18245
LIQ	Cash	400	433	482	1042	976	874	%0	880	849	829		753		808	838	867	912
GOV	Government bonds	1058	1088	950	1088	1311	1410	%0	1585	1710	1879					1843		1825
LIQ/IA IB	Liquid asset ratio Domestic financial	16.1% 132	%1.61 92	12.8% 86	17.3% 67	75	19.6% 75		19.6% 75	19.6% 50	19.6% 50	1 9.6 % 1	1 9.0 % 1 56		.0%0.71 64	.0% 65	1 5.0% 1	67 67
IB (TB)	Trading Book	66	69	64	50	56	50	10%	50	25	25	25		27	58	59 83	8 8	9 10
IB (BB)	Banking Book	33	23	21	17	19	25	25%	25	25	25	27		33	36	36	36	36
CORP	Domestic non-financial	2301	2613 250	2976	3114 770	2779	2718) U L O	2936 555	3061	3240	3383 CCC		3786 650	3982 675	4203 675	4430 671	4664 677
	Iraaing book Banking Book	6/G	1060	/ 1 44 2232	118 2335	080 080	2030	%0001	010	5511	2/5 2665	000 2783		00U 3136	2/0 2/02	0/0 3528	2755	20805
	%oya	13.1	13.6	13.9	4.6	-10.7	-2.2	~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	14.6	7.5	6.1	4.4	5.9	6.4	5.4	6.7	6.4	6.2
HH :	Household	2593	2871	3082	3225	3278	3206		3464	3610	3822	3990		4466	4697	4958	5226	5501
MORT	Mortgages	1755	2013 0F0	2123	2226	2299	2300	100%	2300	2315 1005	2330	2350		2450	2500	2550	2600	2650
EXTA	Ouner External	000 2049	000 2428	909 2981	999 2978	900 2595	900 2553	%001	2755	2860	3026 3026			2010 3430	2197	3669	3797	1002
EXTA (HG)	High-grade	615	729	894	893	778	766	25%	826	858	908	948		1029	1062	1101	1139	1199
EXTA (EM)	Risky (EM)	1434	1700	2086	2085	1816	1787	100%	1928	2002	2118	2212		2401	2479	2569	2658	2797
	Fixed Assets	92	97	105	110	111	109	100%	117	122	129	135		146	151	156	162	170
	Other Assets	414	470	514	686	721	2000	100%	765	795	841	878		953	984	1019	1055	1110
IRWA	HISK-weignted assets Implied RWA	6575	7455	8000 8442	902 I 8868	87.30 8389	2779		09/90	9400	2005	10393		1034	12004	12021	13322	14048
Donk I inhilition		0100	0060	10000	11166	10616	01001		11070	11767	10501	10101	00201	0001	1 1070	15.44.4	15006	6003
	Retail	4256	4511	4764	5462	5896	6177		6471	6796	7185	7551	7975	8423	8867	9348	9849	10372
M2	Domestic financial	92	120	122	172	150	157		165	173	183	192	203	215	226	238	251	264
M3	Wholesale (non-capital) Short-term	3600	4157 2739	4835 2925	5202 3165	4153 2216	3679 1963		4292 2290	4425 2362	4752 2536	4953 2644	5116 2730	5235 2794	5262 2808	5325 2842	5369 2866	5713 3049
	Long-term	1214	1418	1909	2037	1937	1715		2001	2063	2216	2310	2386	2441	2454	2483	2504	2664
EXTL	External	179	273	312	318	315	330		346	363	384	403	426	450	474	499	526	554
Capital		912	1030	1143	1154	1332	1311		1305	1299	1310	1323	1336	1338	1340	1342	1341	1342
72	Tier II	173	201	240	271	244	250		240	230	220	210	200	180	160	140	120	100
11 TCF	Lier I Core	604 604	967 999	812 715	811 755	994 018	997 018		1001 918	6001 810	1027	0601	2/01	680 C	1003	1138 1018	1031	11/8
T1-TCE	Non-core	85	93 93	97	122	76	210		83	87	92	97	102	108	114	120	127	133
REGCAP	Regulatory	863	096	1052	1148	1237	1247		1241	1235	1247	1260	1272	1275	1277	1278	1278	1278
REGADJ	Regulatory Adjustments	50	70	91	9	94	64		64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64
Key Capital ratios	Regulatory Capital	10.3%	12 4%	12.2%	10 7%	14 2%	15.2%		13 8%	13 1%	10 5%		11.6% 1	11 1%	10.6%	10.1%	96%	91%
BIS	Regulatory minimum	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%		8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%				8.0%	8.0%	8.0%
BUFCAP	National buffer (% pts)	4.3%	4.4%	4.2%	4.7%	6.2%	7.2%		5.8%	5.1%					2.6%	2.1%	1.6%	1.1%
TCF/RWA	lier I Core Tier I	9.8% 8.6%	9.8% 8.6%	9.4% 8.3%	9.7% 8.4%	11.4% 10.5%	12.1%		11.2% 10.2%	9.8%	9.4%	9.2%	9.8% 8.9%	9.5% 8.6%	9.3% 8.3%	9.0% 8.0%	8.1% 7.7%	8.4% 7.4%
BIS(T1)	Regulatory minimum	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	1	4.0%	4.0%					4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%
BUFCAP (T1)	National buffer (% pts) Becuired buffer	5.8% 5.0%	5.8% 5.0%	5.4% 5.0%	5.7% 5.0%	7.4% 5.0%	8.1% 5.0%	Ì	7.2% 5.9%	6.7% 5.0%	6.3% 5.0%	6.1% 5.0%	5.8% 5.0%		5.3% 5.0%	5.0% 5.0%	4.7% 5.0%	4.4% 5.9%
LEVRAT	Leverage ratio	10.5	10.5	10.6	10.7	9.6	9.3		10.1	10.6	11.1	11.5	11.8		12.7	13.1	13.6	14.3
68						_												

United States: Base Scenario

\$ billion						Ľ.	Projection period										
		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Key Liquidity ratios	Liquidity coverage ratio Net stable funding ratio Cash/Assets	4.4%	4.3%	4.3%	8.5%	8.2%	86.3 85.9 7.5%	83.4 83.8 7.0%	83.3 83.0 6.5%	82.6 82.7 6.0%	82.5 82.5 5.5%	80.1 81.9 5.0%	76.2 81.0 5.0%	72.5 80.2 5.0%	68.7 79.3 5.0%	64.9 78.4 5.0%	64.4 78.1 5.0%
Bank Core Capital Supply Model	iply Model																
Total new Core Capital NEWTCE	al Required new issuance						0 0	00	00	17 0	18	17 0	16 0	16 0	15	0	4t 0
RROE REDEF	Core equity shadow price Redefinition effects	12.5%	12.3%	14.4%	15.5%	19.7%	19.0% 0	7.5% 0	10.0% 0	9.4% 0	10.2% 0	10.2% 0	10.4% 0	10.8% . 0		11.6% 0	12.4% 0
PROFRET/PROF	Retained income % of profits retained	50 44%	48 37%	18 18%	-27 -180%	-33 -284%	0%0	0%0	0%0	17 10%	18 10%	17 10%	16 10%	16 10%	15 10%	13 10%	14 10%
Banking Sector P&L Model	odel																
Interest earnings		433	548	611	530	482	565	531	629	670	746	752	760	809	812	834	875
	Cash Doto of rotium	13	21 4 0602	23 E 0602	16 2 0002	1	1 0 1282	0 5002	9	10	12		12	14	14 1 76 02	17	18
	Government bonds	3. 13 % 46	4.90% 51	9.000 47	2.00% 37	0.12%	0.13% 52	%00°.0	%00.1	%cz.1	88						د.uu% 62
BOND	Rate of return	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%	3.86%	4.00%	4.25%	4.25%	4.50%	4.25%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
	Domestic financial Trading Book	04	04	4 თ	n 0	NO	να	10 C	5 CN	N -	N -	ο -	- α	n ←	σ -α	- α	τ ο –
BOND	Backing Book	4.28% 2	4.79% 2	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%	3.86%	4.00%	4.25%	4.25%	4.50%	4.25%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.50% 2	3.50%
	Barining Book Rate of return	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%	3.86%	4.00%	4.25%	4.25%	4.50%		4.00%		3.75%		3.50%
SPREAD (BANK)	Lending spread	0.79%	0.75%	0.77%	0.78%	0.79%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75% (0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%
	Domestic non-financial Trading Book	118 29	1/0 42	189 47	148 37	128 32	141 35	27	28	27	31	31	31	34	33	33	33
	Rate of return	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%	3.86%	4.00%	4.25%	4.25%	4.50%					3.50%	3.50%
SPREAD (CORP)	Lending spread Banking Book	1.15% 88	2.12 % 127	2.14% 142	1.23 % 111	1.11% 96	1.27 % 106	0.15% 91	0.62% 118	0.62 % 126	0.83 % 145	0.84 % 146	0.88 % 148	1.10% 164	1.17% 168	1.42% 179	1.46 % 192
	Rate of return	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%	3.86%	4.00%	4.25%	4.25%						3.50%	3.50%
SPREAD (CORP)	Lending spread Household	1.15% 136	2.12% 189	2.14% 201	1.23% 154	1.11% 141	1.27% 166	0.15% 138	0.62% 172	0.62% 181			0.88% 212	1.10% 234	1.17% 238	1.42% 251	1.46% 266
	Mortgages	6	130	140	106	98	118	95	112	113	125				124		130
SPRFAD (HH)	Rate of return Lending spread	4.28% 1 15%	4.79% 2.12%	4.63% 2.14%	3.64% 1 23%	3.24% 1 11%	3.86% 1 27%	4.00% 0.15%	4.25% 0.62%	4.25% 0.62%	4.50% 0.83%	4.25% 0.84%		4.00%	3.75% 1 17%	3.50% 1 42%	3.50% 1 46%
	Other	46	59	61	48	43	48	43	60	68	84				113		136
SPREAD (HH)	Lending spread	4.28%	4.79% 2.12%	4.03% 2.14%	3.04% 1.23%	3.24% 1.11%	3.80% 1.27%	4.00% 0.15%	4.25% 0.62%	4.25% 0.62%	4.5U% 0.83%	0.84%	4.00% 0.88%	4.00%	3./5% 1.17%	3.5U%	3.5U%
	Real borrowing rate	2.10%	3.64%	3.91%	2.73%	3.05%	3.68%	2.12%	2.37%	1.98%	2.59%				2.13%	2.15%	2.22%
	External Hinh arada	110	98 7	159 15	182 21	211	201 23	208 23	229	246 25	259 26	264 27	272 30	281	285 32	288 34	301 35
	Rate of return	1.82%	1.01%	1.84%	2.33%	3.22%	3.00%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%				3.00%		3.00%
	Risky (EM)	100	91	144	161 2.6.407	184	178	186	205	221 1 050	233	237			252 0 750/	255	266
SPREAD (EXTA)	Lending spread	4.20% 2.92%	4.73% 1.02%	4.03% 2.97%	3.04% 4.10%	5.24% 6.18%	3.00% 6.00%	4.00% 6.00%	6.20%	6.50%	4.30% 6.25%		6.25% (3.73% 6.25%		5.25%
	Implied Interest Earnings	428	534 4 0602	624 5 0502	540	523	70610	U EO02	1 0002	1 7602	1 5002		1 5002		1 76 0Z		7000 6
BOND	10yr bond yield	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%	3.86%	4.00%	4.25%	4.25%		4.25%		4.00%		3.50%	3.50%
Interest expenses	Dotoil	165	263	308 1 5 6	211	122	157	197	261	299 175	347	357	367	411 250	420	462	484
	Key policy rate	3.19%	4.96%	5.05%	2.08%	0.12%	0.13%	0.50%	1.00%	1.25%	1.50%						2.00%
6 RATEM1	Spread over official Domestic financial	-1.19% 3	-1.93% 5	-1.68% 6	0.04% 3	1.18% 0	1.25% 0	1.25% 1	1.25% 2	1.25% 2	1.25% 3	1.25% 3	1.25% . 3	1.25% 4		1.25% 5	1.25% 5

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S billion						ā	Projection period										
		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
RATEM2	Key policy rate Spread over official Wholesale (non-capital) Short-term	3.19% -0.07% 72 39	4.96% -0.08% 118 79	5.05% -0.07% 146 96	2.08% -0.05% 90 36	0.12% -0.04% 40 -12	0.13% 0.00% 73 3	0.50% 0.00% 85 11	1.00% 0.00% 110 23	1.25% 0.00% 122 31	1.50% 0.00% 141 39	1.50% 0.00% 140 40	1.50% 0.00% 138 41	1.75% 0.00% 147 49	1.75% 0.00% 142 49	2.00% 0.00% 144 57	2.00% 0.00% 150 59
RATEM3	Key policy rate Spread over official I onc-term	3.19% -1.47% 33	4.96% -1.86% 39	5.05% -1.65% 49	2.08% -0.90% 54	0.12% -0.58%	0.13% 0.00% 70	0.50% 0.00% 74	1.00% 0.00% 86	1.25% 0.00%	1.50% 0.00% 102	1.50% 0.00% 100	1.50% 0.00% 97	1.75% 0.00%	1.75% 0.00% 93	2.00% 0.00% 87	2.00% 0.00%
RATEM4	10yr bond yield Spread over official	4.28% -1.47%	4.79% -1.86%	4.63% -1.65%	3.64% -0.90%	3.24% -0.58%	3.86% 0.00%	4.00% 0.00%	4.25% 0.00%	4.25% 0.00%	4.50% 0.00%	4.25% 0.00%	4.00% 0.00%	4.00% 0.00%	3.75% 0.00%	3.50% 0.00%	3.50% 0.00%
RATEEXTL	External Average interest rate Implied Interest Expense	-0.13% 157	-0.15% 256	-0.16% 308	-0.10% 201	-0.07%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%
Net interest earnings		268	285	303	320	360	408	335	368	371	400	395	393	399	392	372	392
00E NIC	Other earnings Non-interest costs	203 276	217 290	211 314	194 331	243 353	254 370	266 387	280 407	296 430	311 452	328 477	347 504	365 531	385 559	405 589	427 621
Operating profits (pre-credit losses) CREDLOSS Credit Losses Other	-credit losses) Credit Losses (-) Other	194 -27 0	212 -26 -1	200 -57 -1	183 -153 -14	250 -230 -1	293 0 0	214 0 0	241 0 0	237 0 0	259 0 0	246 0 0	235 0 0	233 0 0	218 0 0	188 0 0	198 0 0
Income before tax Net Income	Tax Extraordinary gains, net	168 54 114	185 59 3 128	142 43 98	16 5 15	0 4 4 0	293 88 0 205	214 64 150	241 72 0 168	237 71 0 166	259 78 0 181	246 74 0	235 71 0	233 70 163	218 65 0	188 56 0 131	198 59 0 138
ROE ROA	Return on Equity Return on Assets	12.87% 1.30%	13.02% 1.33%	9.12% 0.93%	1.32% 0.13%	0.85% 0.09%	15.50% 1.74%	11.43% 1.23%	12.94% 1.31%	12.70% 1.23%	13.76% 1.28%	12.97% 1.17%	12.33% 1.07%	12.19% 1.03%	11.36% 0.93%	9.80% 0.77%	10.32% 0.78%
Macroeconomic Framework	swork																
Nominal GDP growth	Pasid al	6.5	6.0	5.1	2.6	-1.3	4.8 2.5	4.8 -1 0	5.0	5.7	5.1	5.6	5.6	5.3	5.4	5.4	5.3
RGDPG PGDPG	GDP deflator	3.1 3.3	2.7 3.3	2.1 2.9	0.4 2.1	-2.4 1.3	3.3 1.4	2.7	2.5 2.5	2.7 2.9	2.3 2.7	2.7 2.8	2.7 2.8	2.4 2.8	2.6 2.8	2.5 2.8	2.5 2.7
	Output gap	0.8	1.1	1.0	-0.9	-4.9	-2.8	-1.4	-0.2	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4
	Employment (thousands) %oya	133694 1.7	136086 1.8	137588 1.1	136777 -0.6	130901 -4.3	129697 -0.9	131304 1.2	132382 0.8	133607 0.9	134588 0.7	135717 0.8	137094 1.0	138189 0.8	139263 0.8	140399 0.8	141482 0.8
Risk-weighted assets	%oya	11.3	10.9	10.8	4.8	-3.2	-2.0	9.2	4.7	5.9	4.4	5.2	5.4	4.6	5.2	5.0	5.5
Bank assets	%oya %GDP	9040 7.4 71.5	10092 11.6 75.3	11176 10.7 79.4	12309 10.1 85.2	11846 -3.8 83.1	11654 -1.6 78.0	12578 7.9 80.4	13056 3.8 79.4	13814 5.8 79.5	14424 4.4 79.0	15056 4.4 78.1	15661 4.0 76.9	16168 3.2 75.4	16752 3.6 74.1	17337 3.5 72.8	18245 5.2 72.7
Bank credit to private sector	sector %oya	4894 10.2	5484 12.0	6059 10.5	6339 4.6	6058 -4.4	5924 -2.2 00.7	6400 8.0	6671 4.2	7061 5.8	7373 4.4	7785 5.6	8253 6.0	8679 5.2	9162 5.6	9656 5.4	10165 5.3 40.5
Other credit	%GUP %ova	38.7 22627 8.0	40.9 24656 9.0	43.0 27013 9.6	43.9 28476 5.4	27100 27100 -4.8	39.7 26948 -0.6	40.9 29092 8.0	40.6 30490 4.8	40.6 32365 6.1	40.4 33968 5.0	40.4 35980 5.9	40.5 37881 5.3	40.5 39617 4.6	41560 4.9	43542 43542 4.8	40.5 45571 4.7
Private sector credit 00	%GDP \$ billion %oya	179.0 27522 8.4	184.0 30140 9.5	191.9 33072 9.7	197.2 34815 5.3	190.1 33157 -4.8	180.4 32872 -0.9	185.9 35492 8.0	185.5 37162 4.7	186.3 39426 6.1	186.0 41341 4.9	186.6 43765 5.9	186.0 46133 5.4	184.8 48296 4.7	183.8 50722 5.0	182.8 53198 4.9	181.7 55735 4.8
Nominal GDP		12638	13399	14078	14441	14258	14938	15647	16434	17374	18261	19284	20369	21441	22605	23817	25080

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& hillion						μ. Γ	Projection period											
		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010		2011 2	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Bank Balance Sheet Model	10																	
							New risk- waichting	risk-										
Bank Assets		9040	10092	11176	12309	11846							13955	14531	15280	15813	16632	17420
LIQ	Cash	400	433	482	1042	976	876	%0					698	727	764	791	832	871
GOV	Government bonds	1058	1088	950	1088	1311	1460			1999				2034	2139	2056	2162	2265
LIQ/IA IB	Liquid asset ratio Domestic financial	16.1% 132	%L.3L 00	72.8% 86	17.3% 67	75	20.0% 75	2	21.0% 22 75			20.0%		60%	19.0% 64	18.0% 65	18.0% 66	18.0%
IB (TB)	Trading Book	66	69	64 64	50	56								27	28	29	80	31
IB (BB)	Banking Book	33	23	21	17	19		25%			25			33	36	36	36	36
	Trading Book	2301	2613	2976	3114	21/9					3001 676			3444 660	3621 676	3821 676	4020 676	4211
CORP (IB)	lrauing book Banking Book	1726	000 1960	7232	2335	2084		%001	2219		575 2426			2794	2946	3146	075 3345	3536
	%oya	13.1	13.6	13.9	4.6	-10.7	-2.7			5.1	4.1	2.2	5.7	6.7	5.4	6.8	6.3	5.7
HH	Household	2593	2871	3082	3225	3278					3540			4063	4272	4507	4742	4968
MOKI	Mortgages	CC/ L 828	2013	2123	9222	6622		100%			2330			2450	1770	1052	2600	2050
EXTA	External	2049	000 2428	2981 2981	2978 2978	2595			2720		2942			3183	3347	3464	3643	3816
EXTA (HG)	High-grade	615	729	894	893	778					883			955	1004	1039	1093	1145
EXTA (EM)	Risky (EM)	1434	1700	2086	2085	1816		. %001			2059			2228	2343	2424	2550	2671
	Fixed Assets	92	97	105	110	111					125			136	143	148	155	162
	Other Assets	414	470	514	686	721					817			884	930	962	1012	1060
RWA IRWA	Risk-weighted assets Implied RWA	7002 6575	7764 7455	8606 8442	9021 8868	8736 8389	8199				9634			10848	11408	11971	12601	13209
Bank Liabilities M1	Rotail	8128 4256	9062 4511	10033 4764	11155 5462	10515 5896	10267 6154	2	10965 1 6337 6		11794 . 6909	11524 7196	12217 7581	12769 8013	13493 8433	14003 8880	14799 9359	15565 9835
M2	Domestic financial	92	120	122	172	150	157					183	193	204	215	227	239	251
M3	Wholesale (non-capital)	3600	4157	4835	5202	4153	3627	,		1255	4340	3761	4037	4124	4394	4412	4702	4954
	Short-term	2387	2739	2925	3165	2216	1523			1064	868	564	606	619	659	441	470	495
EXTL	Long-term External	1214 179	1418 273	1909 312	2037 318	1937 315	2104 329		2724 339	3191 352	3472 369	3197 384	3431 405	3505 428	3735 451	3971 475	4232 500	4458 525
Capital		912	1030	1143	1154	1332	1415		1453	1531	1636	1715	1738	1762	1786	1810	1832	1855
Т2	Tier II	173	201	240	271	244	250			280	320	360	360	360	360	360	360	360
Ŧ	Tier I	690	759	812	877	994	1102			1188	1253	1291	1315	1339	1363	1386	1409	1432
TCE T TOT	Core	604 01	666 00	715	755	918	1023			1103	1164	1199 20	1217	1236	1254	1272	1288	1305
I I-I UE REGCAP	Nori-core Regulatory	00 863	93 960	97 1052	1148	1237	1352 1352		01 1389	00 1468	69 1573	92 1651	9/ 1675	1699	1723	1746	1769	1792
REGADJ	Regulatory Adjustments	50	70	91	9	94	64			64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64	64
Key Capital ratios																		
REGCAP/RWA BIS	Regulatory Capital	12.3% 8.0%	12.4% 8.0%	12.2% 8.0%	12.7% 8.0%	14.2% 8.0%	16.5%	φ	15.4% 15 8.0% 10	15.9% 1		16.9%	16.3%	15.7%	15.1%	14.6%	14.0%	13.6%
BUFCAP	National buffer (% pts)	4.3%	4.4%	4.2%	4.7%	6.2%	8.5%				5.3%				5.1%	4.6%	4.0%	3.6%
T1/RWA	Tier I	9.8%	9.8%	9.4%	9.7%	11.4%	13.4%	12					12.8%	12.3%	11.9%	11.6%	11.2%	10.8%
TCE/RWA	Core Tier I	8.6%	8.6%	8.3%	8.4%	10.5%	12.5%	÷		1					11.0%	10.6%	10.2%	9.9%
BIS(TT) BUFCAP (T1)	regulatory minimum National huffer (%nts)	4.0% 5.8%	4.0% 5.8%	4.0% 5.4%	4.0% 5.7%	4.0% 7.4%	4.0% 9.4%	4 w	8.8% 0	0.0%	6.0%	6.2%	7.0%	7.0%	5. 9%	0.0 %	5 .2%	0.0% 4.8%
	Required buffer	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%						5.9%		5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%
LEVRAT	Leverage ratio	10.5	10.5	10.6	10.7	9.6	8.6				8.5	8.0	8.3	8.6	8.9	9.1	9.4	9.7

United States: Regulatory Change Scenario

							Projection period										1
\$ billion		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Key Liquidity ratios	Liquidity coverage ratio Net stable funding ratio Cash/Assets	4.4%	4.3%	4.3%	8.5%	8.2%	100.2 91.5 7.5%	113.1 94.7 7.0%	134.0 99.1 6.5%	144.7 101.3 6.0%	143.1 100.7 5.5%	142.3 100.6 5.0%	134.7 99.1 5.0%	134.0 99.0 5.0%	135.9 99.2 5.0%	135.3 98.9 5.0%	134.8 98.6 5.0%
Bank Core Capital Supply Model	ily Model																
Total new Core Capital NEWTCE RROE REDEF PROFRET PROFRET	Required new issuance Core equity shadow price Redefinition effects Retained income % of profits retained	12.5% 50 44%	12.3% 48 37%	14.4% 18 18%	15.5% -27 -180%	19.7% -33 -284%	105 0 19.0% 105 50%	45 0 12.9% 45 30%	35 25 12.8% -40 50 30%	61 50 12.3% -40 51 30%	35 25 13.7% -40 25%	19 0 12.1% 19 10%	19 0 11.5% 19 10%	19 0 11.6% 19 10%	18 0 11.6% 1 10%	16 0 12.0% 0 16 10%	17 0 12.7% 17 10%
Banking Sector P&L Model	del																
Interest earnings		433	548	611	530	482	578	602	688	734	803	778	785	834	843	866	913
FFUNDS	Cash Rate of return	3.19%	21 4.96%	23 5.05%	10 2.08%	0.12%	0.13%	4 0.50%	9 1.00%					13 1.75%	14 1.75%	10 2.00%	2.00%
BOND	Government bonds Rate of return	46 4.28%	51 4.79%	47 4.63%	37 3.64%	39 3.24%	53 3.86%	64 4.00%	79 4.25%	88 4.25%	92 4.50%	85 4.25% <i>i</i>	83 4.00% 2	83 4.00%	79 3.75%	74 3.50%	77 3.50%
BOND	Domestic tinancial Trading Book Rate of return	6 4 4.28%	6 4 4.79%	4 3 4.63%	3 2 3.64%	2 2 3.24%	.3 3.86% 3.86%	3 2 4.00%	3 2 4.25%	4.25%	4.50%	3 1 4.25% [,]	3 3 4.00% 4	3 4.00%	3 1 3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
SPRFAD (RANK)	Banking Book Rate of return Lending spread	2 4.28% 0.79%	2 4.79% 0.75%	1 4.63% 0.77%	1 3.64% 0.78%	1 3.24% 0.79%	1 3.86% 0.75%	1 4.00% 0.75%	1 4.25% 0 75%	1 4.25% 0.75%	1 4.50%	1 4.25% 4 0.75% 1	1 4.00% 1.75%	2 4.00% 0.75%	2 3.75% 0.75%	2 3.50% 0.75%	2 3.50% 0.75%
	Domestic non-financial Trading Book	118	170	189	37	32	37	34							40	39	40
SPREAD (CORP)	Rate of return Lending Spread Banking Book Pote of return	4.28% 1.15% 88	4.79% 2.12% 127	4.63% 2.14% 142 7.63%	3.64% 1.23% 111	3.24% 1.11% 96	3.86% 1. 49 % 3.86%	4.00% 1.38% 114 10%	4.25% 1.73% 136	4.25% 1.87% 146	4.50% 2.33% 168	4.25% 2.07% 161 15%	4.00% 2.00% 162 162	4.00% 2.12% 176	3.75% 2.16% 180 3.75%	3.50% 2.34% 189	3.50% 2.39% 203
SPREAD (CORP)	Lactor of read Household Mortgages Bate of return	1.15% 136 90	2.12% 189 130	2.14% 201 140 4.63%	1.23% 154 106 3.64%	1.11% 141 98 3.27%		1.38% 175 124 100%	1.73% 201 138 138						2.16% 259 149 3.75%	2.34% 270 150 3 50%	2.39% 286 155
SPREAD (HH)	Lending spread Other Rate of return	4.28%	2.12% 59 4.79%	2.14% 61 4.63%	3.64%	3.24%		4.00%	4.25%						2.16% 2.16% 3.75%	2.34% 120 3.50%	2.39% 131 3.50%
SPREAD (HH)	Lending spread Real borrowing rate External High grade Rate of return Risky (EM)	1.15% 2.10% 110 1.82% 100	2.12% 3.64% 98 7 1.01% 91	2.14% 3.91% 159 1.84% 144	1.23% 2.73 % 182 21 2.33% 161	1.11% 3.05% 211 27 3.22% 184	1.49% 3.99% 201 23 3.00% 178	1.38% 3.83% 207 22 2.80% 185	1.73% 3.99% 226 2.80% 2.80%	1.87% 3.69% 241 241 2.80% 2.80% 217 2.17	2.33% 4.53% 244 25 2.80% 25 2.80%	2.07% 2 3.75% 2 244 25 25 2.80% 2 219 2 19 219	2:00% 252 252% 252 3:00% 28 224	2.12% 3.35% 264 3.00% 3.00% 234	2.16% 3.11% 269 3.00% 238 238	2.34% 3.09% 274 3.00% 243	2.39% 3.21% 288 3.00% 255
SPREAD (EXTA) FFUNDS BOND	Lending spread Implied Interest Earnings Key policy rate 10yr bond yield	4.28% 2.92% 3.19% 4.28%	4.79%	4.03% 2.97% 624 5.05% 4.63%	2.04% 540 2.08% 3.64%	0.12% 6.18% 523 0.12% 3.24%	6.00% 6.00% 3.86%	6.00% 6.00% 4.00%							6.25% 1.75% 3.75%	6.25% 2.00% 3.50%	6.25% 2.00% 3.50%
Interest expenses RATEM1	Retail Key policy rate Spread over official Domestic financial	165 83 3.19% -1.19% 3	263 133 4.96% -1.93% 5	308 156 5.05% -1.68% 6	211 108 2.08% 0.04% 3	122 74 0.12% 1.18%	164 83 0.13% 1.25% 0	263 109 0.50% 1.25%	345 145 1.25% 2	392 169 1.25% 1.25% 2	424 194 1.25% 3	422 203 1.50% 1.25%	435 214 1.50% 1.25% 3	479 247 1.75% 1.25%	495 260 1.75% 1.25%	536 297 2.00% 1.25% 5	566 312 2.00% 1.25% 5

United States: Regulatory Change Scenario

						<u>P</u>	Projection period										
\$ billion		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
RATEM2	Key policy rate Spread over official Wholesale (non-capital)	3.19% -0.07% 72	4.96% -0.08% 118	5.05% -0.07% 146	2.08% -0.05% 90	0.12% -0.04%	0.13% 0.00% 80	0.50% 0.00% 152	1.00% 0.00% 197	1.25% 0.00% 220	1.50% 0.00% 227	1.50% 0.00% 216	1.50% 0.00% 217	1.75% 0.00% 228	1.75% 0.00% 231	2.00% 0.00% 235	2.00% 0.00% 249
RATEM3	Short-term Key policy rate Spread over official Long-term	38 3.19% -1.47% 33	4.96% -1.86% 39	5.05% -1.65% -19	2.08% -0.90% 54	- 12 0.12% -0.58%	2 0.13% 0.00% 78	0.50% 0.00% 145	1.00% 0.00% 185	1.25% 0.00% 208	1.50% 0.00% 217	ع 1.50% 0.00%	a 1.50% 0.00% 208	1.75% 0.00% 217	1.75% 0.00%	2.00% 0.00% 226	2.00% 0.00% 2.39
RATEM4	10yr bond yield Spread over official	4.28% -1.47%	4.79% -1.86%		•	3.24% -0.58%	3.86% 0.00%	4.00%	4.25% 2.00%	4.25% 2.00%	4.50% 2.00%	4.25% 2.00%	4.00% 2.00%	4.00% 2.00%	3.75% 2.00%	3.50% 2.00%	3.50% 2.00%
RATEEXTL	External Average interest rate Implied Interest Expense	0 -0.13% 157	0 -0.15% 256	-0.16% 308	-0.10% 201	-0.07% 114	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%
Net interest earnings		268	285	303	320	360	414	339	344	343	378	356	350	355	348	329	347
00E NIC	Other earnings Non-interest costs	203 276	217 290	211 314	194 331	243 353	253 368	261 370	271 376	284 384	296 391	312 402	330 415	347 436	366 460	385 484	405 509
Operating profits (pre-credit losses) CREDLOSS Credit Losses Other	credit losses) Credit Losses (-) Other	194 -27 0	212 -26 -1	200 -57 -1	183 -153 -14	250 -230 -1	299 0 0	230 0 0	240 0	243 0 0	284 0 0	266 0 0	265 0 0	266 0 0	254 0 0	230 0 0	243 0 0
Income before tax Net Income	Tax Extraordinary gains, net	168 54 0 114	185 59 3 128	142 43 -2 98	16 5 15	0 4 4 C	299 90 209	230 80 150	240 72 0 168	243 73 0 170	284 85 0 199	266 80 0 186	265 79 0	266 80 0 186	254 76 0 178	230 69 0	243 73 0 170
ROE ROA	Return on Equity Return on Assets	12.87% 1.30%	13.02% 1.33%	9.12% 0.93%	1.32% 0.13%	0.85% 0.09%	15.25% 1.78%	10.47% 1.25%	11.24% 1.32%	10.72% 1.29%	11.85% 1.49%	10.79% 1.37%	10.59% 1.30%	10.49% 1.25%	9.88% 1.14%	8.85% 0.99%	9.23% 1.00%
Macroeconomic Framework	work																
Nominal GDP growth		6.5	6.0	5.1	2.6	-1.3	4.4 5 E	3.0	4.0	4.8	4.2	5.4	5.7	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.1
RGDPG PGDPG	Real growth GDP deflator	3.1 3.3	2.7 3.3	2.1 2.9	0.4 2.1	-2.4 1.3	3.0 4.1	1.4 1.6	2.0 2.0	2.4 2.4	1.8 2.3	2.7 2.6	2.8 2.8	2.4 2.8	2.5 2.8	2.5 2.7	2.3 2.7
	Output gap	0.8	1:1	1.0	-0.9	-4.9	-3.1	-2.6	-1.5	-0.4	-0.7	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.2
	Employment (thousands) %oya	133694 1.7	136086 1.8	137588 1.1	136777 -0.6	130901 -4.3	129423 -1.1	129684 0.2	129538 -0.1	130082 0.4	130346 0.2	131131 0.6	132578 1.1	133716 0.9	134724 0.8	135744 0.8	136615 0.6
Risk-weighted assets	%oya	11.3	10.9	10.8	4.8	-3.2	-2.3	9.7	2.8	4.2	1.2	5.4	5.5	5.2	4.9	5.3	4.8
Bank assets	%oya %GDP	9040 7.4 71.5	10092 11.6 75.3	11176 10.7 79.4	12309 10.1 85.2	11846 -3.8 83.1	11682 -1.4 78.5	12417 6.3 81.0	12896 3.9 80.9	13431 4.1 80.4	13239 -1.4 76.1	13955 5.4 76.1	14531 4.1 75.0	15280 5.2 74.9	15813 3.5 73.6	16632 5.2 73.5	17420 4.7 73.2
Bank credit to private sector	ector %oya %.c.np	4894 10.2 38 7	5484 12.0 40.0	6059 10.5 43.0	6339 4.6 4.2 0	6058 -4.4 42 5	5892 -2.7 30.6	6143 4.3 40.4	6279 2.2 30.4	6541 4.2 30.2	6710 2.6 38.6	7072 5.4 38 6	7507 6.2 38 7	7893 5.1 38.7	8328 5.5 38.7	8762 5.2 38 7	9179 4.8 38.6
Other credit	%oya	22627 8.0	24656 9.0	27013 9.6	28476 5.4	27100 -4.8	26555 -2.0	27572 3.8	28155 2.1	29212 3.8	29919 2.4	31344 4.8	33039 5.4	34544 4.6	36223 4.9	37894 4.6	39503 4.2
Private sector credit	%GDP \$ billion %oya	179.0 27522 8.4	184.0 30140 9.5	191.9 33072 9.7	197.2 34815 5.3	190.1 33157 -4.8	178.4 32447 -2.1	179.9 33715 3.9	176.7 34434 2.1	174.8 35753 3.8	171.9 36630 2.5	171.0 38416 4.9	170.5 40546 5.5	169.4 42437 4.7	168.5 44551 5.0	167.4 46656 4.7	166.1 48682 4.3
Nominal GDP		12638	13399	14078	14441	14258	14881	15324	15936	16707	17401	18333	19376	20393	21496	22631	23783

United States: Historical Dataset

\$ billion

	Bank Balance Sheet Model Bank Assets LLQ/TA GOV LLQ/TA B GOV LLQ/TA B GOV LLQ/TA B B B B B B B B B B B B B B CORP B B B CORP B B B CORP CORP CORP CORP CORP CORP CORP CORP	Bank Liablilities M1 M2 M2 M3 EXTL Capital T2 T1 T0 T1-TCE REGCAP
	fodel Cash Government bonds Liquid asset ratio Domestic financial Trading Book Banking Book Banking Book Banking Book Mortgages Mortgages Other Fixed Assets Risky (EM) Fixed Assets Risk-weighted assets Implied RWA	Retail Domestic financial Wholesale (non-capital) Short-term Long-term External Trer II Trer I Core Non-core Regulatory Adjustments Regulatory Adjustments Regulatory Capital Regulatory Capital Regulatory Minimum National buffer (%pts) Trer I Core Trer I Regulatory minimum National buffer (%pts) Regulatory minimum
	Current Tisk- weighting 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100%	
1992	3506 298 25.8% 21 15 15 877 877 877 877 877 877 213 2542 2639 2742 2742 2542 2712	3243 2186 58 900 900 157 157 157 263 263 263 263 246 2.3% 913 2.3% 9.7% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9%
1993	3707 25.2% 25.2% 6662 6852 855 855 618 633 613 613 613 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 2222 2426	3410 2219 60 753 753 268 1110 297 67 277 2779 2779 2779 2779 2779 277
1994	4012 304 304 304 10 10 23 644 10 20 11 22 824 68 824 69 611 53 28 28 28 50 28 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50	3700 75 75 1274 1274 304 304 312 312 312 312 312 133 301 133 314 14 15.0% 10.0% 5.5% 10.7% 10.7%
1995	21.6%2 307 307 307 307 556 524 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 74	3965 2306 68 68 1151 1151 146 350 350 350 350 350 401 -51 10.0% 4.0% 4.0% 10.0% 5.9% 10.8%
1996	4582 336 611 1052 52 694 694 694 694 711 1052 694 718 3128 3148 3148 3148 3148	
1997	5019 355 355 661 14 14 1295 755 1295 324 971 1295 760 760 760 760 766 766 766 766 756 7760 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324	
1998	5443 357 357 357 57 57 53 53 53 1456 11456 11456 11456 11456 11380 809 809 809 833 357 112.5 11380 809 833 357 71 208 833 357 377 3773	-
1999	5735 5735 366 366 81 722 81 400% 11207 110.3 883 883 883 883 883 841 1201 360 841 26 841 360 841 26 841 26 841 26 841 861 360 841 861 86 841 861 866 866 866 866 81 1200% 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1200% 81 1000% 800% 8	5255 2693 88 22693 1658 1658 143 143 143 143 121 429 550 550 550 550 550 8.4.% 10.% 10.% 10.%
2000	6246 6246 370 370 370 96 72 72 72 1757 724 1318 9.13 9.13 9.13 9.13 9.13 9.13 9.13 9.13	5715 22897 113 113 11855 712 11855 712 712 712 712 712 713 463 66 40 8.0% 8 9.47% 4 66 6 7.12 133 8.0% 8 8.0% 8 66 9.48 66 9.48 66 9.49 7.0% 9.48 7.12 12 7.12 12 7.12 12 7.12 12 7.4% 9.48 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 7.4% 9.49 <tr< td=""></tr<>
2001 2	6552 7 390 396 7560 7560 72 439 1316 11316 11316 11316 11316 11316 1129 11459 11459 11459 11459 11459 11459 11459 11459 11459 11459 11459 11459 11455 11455 11455 11455 11455 11455 11455 11455 1145555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 114555 11455555 1145555 11455555 11455555 11455555 11455555 11455555555	
2002 2	7077 7 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384	6430 6 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
2003 2	7602 8 387 7602 8 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387	6910 7 109 109 109 2 109 2 109 2 109 2 109 2 109 2 109 2 109 2 105 2 105 2 105 2 105 2 106 2 107 2 257 3 257 3 258 3 257 3 258 3 258 3 355 3 355 3 355 3 355 3 355 3 355 3 355 3 355 3 355 3 356 3 357 3 358 3 359 <
2004 20	8416 90 388 338 41 17.55% 16. 121 121 121 30 30 30 30 30 509 151 1567 15 1567 15 1567 15 1567 15 1567 15 110.1 1 110.1 1 110.6 20 833 88 20 87 46 572 6 572	7565 8 1002 43 1002 43 1151 13 1151 13 1151 14 1151 13 1151 14 1151 15 1151 15 1151 15 1151 15 63 63 633 63 633 63 633 63 64 8.6 55 9.0% 8.6 8.1 6.00% 8.1 10.0% 8.1 10.0% 8.1 10.0% 8.1 10.0% 5.1 10.6 5.1
2005 20	9040 10092 9040 10092 1058 1088 16.1% 15.1% 16.1% 15.1% 15.1% 15.1% 13.2 99 69 93 23 33 23 1726 1960 13.1 13.6 1755 2013 1755 2013 1755 2013 1755 2013 1755 2013 1756 1960 13.4 1756 2013 1756 1960 13.4 1700 13.6 1700 13.6 1700 13.6 1700 13.6 1700 13.6 1700 13.6 1700 13.6 1700 13.6 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 170	8128 906 4256 4511 92 120 92 121 1214 1415 173 273 912 173 912 103 912 103 912 103 956 906 85 912 912 103 912 103 913 755 914 912 853 966 853 966 853 956 863 96 863 96 816% 8.6% 816% 8.6% 816% 8.6% 816% 8.6% 816% 8.6% 810% 5.9% 510% 5.9% 510% 5.9% 510.5 10.5
2006 20	11176 11176 11176 11176 11176 11176 11176 11176 1117 1117 1117 1117 1113 1114 1115 1115 </td <td>9062 10033 157 105 10033 1457 120 122 2739 2225 2739 2225 2739 2225 201 143 201 143 201 240 712 93 97 960 1052 93 97 93 960 1052 93 96 93 96 94 93 96 93 96 93 96 94 93 96 94 96 96 96 97 96 96 97 96 96 96 96 96 97 96 96 96 97 96 96 97 96 96 96 97 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96</td>	9062 10033 157 105 10033 1457 120 122 2739 2225 2739 2225 2739 2225 201 143 201 143 201 240 712 93 97 960 1052 93 97 93 960 1052 93 96 93 96 94 93 96 93 96 93 96 94 93 96 94 96 96 96 97 96 96 97 96 96 96 96 96 97 96 96 96 97 96 96 97 96 96 96 97 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
2007 2008	76 12309 82 1042 1988 1042 1088 66 1088 64 50 1088 64 50 713 44 713 716 3114 713 716 3114 718 88 4.6 718 718 718 718 718 718 718 718 718 718	33 11155 64 54155 22 1725 335 5405 225 3165 225 3165 225 3165 226 3165 227 133 91 15 93 1154 93 1154 94 112 875 1148 877 1552 91 87 93 1227% 84% 8.0% 8:% 8.4% 9:% 8.4% 9:% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.6 10.7
38 2009	39 11846 42 976 38 1311 37 75 35 755 55 56 56 56 58 2034 59 696 29 2035 56 2299 335 114 2035 20845 203 2035 335 111 203 2036 335 1816 336 2593 337 778 336 2595 337 3333 36 2593 37 778 336 2595 337 8389	
60	44 62 73 73 73 73 74 74 74 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75	315 553 553 553 553 566 566 566 56

United States: Historical Dataset

\$ billion

Key Liquidity ratios Liqu Net Bank Core Capital Supply Model Total new Core Capital		1	000	-	1990	000	1001	000	000	2000	1004	7007			200	000	1001	0001	1000
3ank Core Capital Sup, Total new Core Capits	Liquidity coverage ratio Net stable funding ratio Cash/Assets	8.5%	7.4%	7.6%	7.1%	7.3%	7.1%	6.6%	6.4%	5.9%	6.0%	5.4%	5.1%	4.6%	4.4%	4.3%	4.3%	8.5%	8.2%
Total new Core Capits	oly Model																		
NEWICE RROE DEDEE	al Required new issuance Core equity shadow price		7.6%	14.4%	9.8%	14.3%	10.4%	12.2%	12.8%	8.0%	14.7%	15.9%	14.8%	9.7%	12.5%	12.3%	14.4%	15.5%	19.7%
PROFRET PROFRET/PROF	recentition enects Retained income % of profits retained	18 56%	21 49%	17 37%	18 36%	14 26%	17 28%	21 34%	19 27%	17 24%	20 27%	22 24%	25 24%	48 46%	50 44%	48 37%	18 18%	-27 -180%	-33 -284%
Banking Sector P&L Model	bdel																		
Interest earnings		255	245	258	303	313	340	362	367	428	402	357	335	346	433	548	611	530	482
FFUNDS	Cash Rate of return		9 3.00%	12 4.21%	18 5.83%	17 5.27%	19 5.44%	19 5.35%	18 5.00%	23 6.25%	15 3.93%	6 1.68%	4 1.12%	5 1.35%	13 3.19%	21 4.96%	23 5.05%	16 2.08%	1 0.12%
(Government bonds		37		42		40	36	40	43	37	38	38	45	46	51	47	37	0
BOND	Hate of return Domestic financial		5.85% 1	7.08% 2	6.57% 3	6.43% 4	6.34% 4	9.25% 3	5.64% 4	6.U2% 5	3.00% 5	4.59% 5	4.00% 5	4.26% 5	4.28% 6	4.79% 6	4.63% 4	3.64% 3	3.24% 2
	Trading Book				5	e	e	2	ε	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	ε	5	
BOND	Hate of return Banking Book		5.85% 0		6.57% 1	6.43 <i>%</i> 1	6.34% 1	5.25% 1	5.64% 1	6.02% 2	5.00% 1	4.59% 1	4.00% 1	4.26% 2	4.28% 2	4.79% 2	4.63% 1	3.64% 1	3.24% 1
SDREAD (BANK)	Rate of return		5.85% 0.84%	7.08% 0.66%	6.57% 0 70%	6.43% 0.78%	6.34% 0 79%	5.25% 0.03%	5.64% 0.83%	6.02% 0.82%	5.00%	4.59% 0.80%	4.00%	4.26% 0.76%	4.28% 0.70%	4.79% 0.75%	4.63% 0.77%	3.64% 0.78%	3.24%
(אויהט) טרטר זט	Domestic non-financial		50 50		74	83	91	81	107	127	107	06	74	93 93	118	170	189	0.1970	128
	Trading Book		12		19		23	20	27	32	27	23	18	23	29	42	47	37	
	Rate of return		5.85%	7.08%	6.57% 1 26%	6.43% 1.66%	6.34% 1 44%	5.25% 0.61%	5.64% 1.35%	6.02% 1 51%	5.00%	4.59%	4.00%	4.26%	4.28%	4.79%	4.63% 2.14%	3.64%	3.24%
	Banking Book		37		56		89	61	80	95	80	68	55	70	88	127	142	111	-
	Rate of return		5.85%		6.57%		6.34%	5.25%	5.64%	6.02%	5.00%	4.59%	4.00%	4.26%	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%
SPREAD (CORP)	Lending spread		0.00% 54	2.27% 06	1.26% 90	1.66%	1.44% 101	0.61% 79	1.35% 90	1.51%	1.06% 98	0.53%	0.09%	0.52% 108	1.15%	2.12% 189	2.14% 201	1.23%	1.11%
	Mortgages		8		64 64	55	57	4 6	20	02	61	58	23 23	202	06	130	140	106	
	Rate of return		5.85%		6.57%	6.43%	6.34%	5.25%	5.64%	6.02%	5.00%	4.59%	4.00%	4.26%	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%
SPREAD (HH)	Lending spread		0.00%	2.27%	1.26%	1.66% 15	1.44%	0.61%	1.35%	1.51%	1.06%	0.53%	%60.0 %0	0.52%	1.15%	2.12%	2.14%	1.23%	1.11%
	Ouner Rate of return		5.85%		40 6.57%	43 6.43%	44 6.34%		5.64%	6.02%	5.00%	4.59%	4.00%	30 4.26%	40 4.28%	93 4.79%	4.63%	40 3.64%	4.0 3.24%
SPREAD (HH)	Lending spread		0.00%		1.26%	1.66%	1.44%	0.61%	1.35%	1.51%	1.06%	0.53%	0.09%	0.52%	1.15%	2.12%	2.14%	1.23%	1.11%
	Real borrowing rate		3.64%		5.74%	6.19%	6.01%	4.74%	5.51%	5.37%	3.80%	3.50%	1.94%	1.94%	2.10%	3.64%	3.91%	2.73%	3.05%
	External		88		65 1	- 19	73	14 4	96 96	101	148 i	136	143	80	110	98	159	182	211
	High grade		7020 V	-4-	C 20 20 1	C 2007 1	9	18 F 1102	9 2 61 02	9 9 25 07	7001 V	10 2 6602	18 2 7 1 02	1 2702	70C0 F	1 0102	CL	700000	12
	Risky (EM)				09	62	89 89	0.14 % 126	87	92	131	121	126	23	100	910.1	1.04 20	161	0.22.0 184
	Rate of return		5.85%		6.57%	6.43%	6.34%	5.25%	5.64%	6.02%	5.00%	4.59%	4.00%	4.26%	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%
SPREAD (EXTA)	Lending spread				3.22%	2.64%	2.84% 1	10.66%	4.76%	4.16%	8.22%	6.95%	7.32%	1.64%	2.92%	1.02%	2.97%	4.10%	6.18%
	Implied Interest Earnings	7007 6	240 2 0002	244 1 21 02		310 5 2702	328 5 1102	363 F 25.02	365	414 6 06 07	410 2 0 2 0 2	368	348	336	428	534 1 0602	624 5 0502	540	523
BOND	10yr bond yield	7.00%	5.85%		0.57% 6.57%			5.25%	5.64%	6.02%	5.00%	4.59%	4.00%	4.26%	4.28%	4.79%	4.63%	3.64%	3.24%
Interest expenses	Lated.	122	106	111	148	150	165	179	175	225	188	121 69	95	97 10	165	263	308	211	122
	Key policy rate	3.49%						30 5.35%	32 5.00%	6.25%	3.93%	00 1.68%	32 1.12%	49 1.35%	3.19%	4.96%	5.05%	2.08%	0.12%
RATEM1	Spread over official	0.03%	-0.31%	-1.53% -				-1.69%	-1.57%	-2.13%	-0.48%	0.38%	0.34%	-0.07%	-1.19%	-1.93%	-1.68%	0.04%	1.18%

United States: Historical Dataset

\$ billion

		1999 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 1.74% 5.64% 1.24% 1.24% 1.24% 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.32 1.32 1.33% 1.13 1.31% 1.31% 1.33% 1.	1999 2000 5.00% 6.25% 3 -0.12% -0.13% -0 5.10% 6.25% 3 -1.74% -1.89% -1 2.44 6.02% 5 5.00% 6.25% 3 -1.74% -1.89% -1 2.44 -1.89% -1 2.24 -1.89% -1 102 2.17 29 -1.74% -1.89% -1 2.24 -1.89% -1 172 2.26 -141 172 205 217 132 141 -22 -1.33 0 0 33 338 33 0 72 71 132 1.18% 1.18% 1.13 1.18% 1.1 1.31% 1.18% 1.1 1.31% 1.18% 1.1 1.31% 1.18% 1.1 1.31% 1.	1999 2000 2001 76 105 7.4 7 105 7.4 7 105 7.4 7 105 7.4 7 105 7.4 5.00% 6.25% 3.93% 1 1.15% -1.13% 5.64% 6.02% 5.00% 5.64% 6.02% 5.00% 1.172 2.189% -1.35% 5.64% 6.02% 5.00% 1.172 2.26 183 1.172 2.018% -1.13% 1.172 2.018% -1.13% 1.17 1.18% 1.11 1.13 141 150 1.13 1.16% 1.11 39 20 2.13 1.33 1.18% 1.16% 1.13 1.18% 1.16% 1.13 1.18% 1.16% 1.34 1.18% 1.16% 1.34 1.18% 1.16% <	1999 2000 2001 2002 2002% 216% 112% 112% 112% 112% 111% 111% 111% 111% 111% 1106% 117% 1106% 117% 111% 111% 1102% 111% 1102% 111% 1102% 111% 1102% 1111% 1102% 1111% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1111% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102% 1102%	1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 712% 2005% 2003% 106% 1112% 2005% 201% 2005% 2117% 1112% 2112% 2112% 2112% 2112% 2112% 210% 2112% 210% 2112% 210% 2112% 210% 21	199 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2003 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2007 2017 31 31 355 3155 3112% 1.12% 1.355% 1.17% 1.01% -129% 303 5.66% -0.018% -1.355% -1.355% -1.17% -1.01% -129% -129% 7.4 29 2.03 2.003 2.003 2.004 -0.07% 5.66% -1.89% -1.355% -1.17% -1.101% -1.29% -1.29% 1.74% -1.89% -1.355% -1.17% -1.01% -1.29% -1.29% 0.018% 0.11% 0.011% 0.011% 0.011% -1.29% -1.29% 1.74% -1.89% -1.17% -1.01% -1.29% -1.29% -1.29% 1.75 2.11 2.14 2.36 -1.17% -1.19% -1.29% 1.11	1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2004 2005 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2017% -007% 2004 2005 2017% -007% 2004 2005 2112% 1.135% 3.195% 3.15% 3.15% 3.15%	199 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 <th< th=""><th>1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 <t< th=""></t<></th></th<>	1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 <t< th=""></t<>
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Chapter 4

Impact on the Euro Area Economy

The IIF wishes to acknowledge and express its gratitude for the help and collaboration received from the European Banking Federation (EBF⁵¹) in the preparation of the Euro Area chapter.



Introduction and Summary

- The Euro Area banking system is the largest in the world. Total on-balance sheet assets of Euro Area banks were €31.1 trillion at the end of 2009, which was almost 350 percent of regional nominal GDP. In the first decade of the Euro, lending growth to the private sector was vigorous, averaging about 8% per year from 1999 to 2008.
- Euro Area banks have recently improved their capital positions, through a combination of capital raising activities (including state injections) and, in 2009, through a reduction in risk-weighted assets. From December 2007 through December 2009, Euro Area banks' aggregate total regulatory capital ratio rose from 10.6% of risk-weighted assets to 12.5% of risk-weighted assets, while the aggregate Tier 1 capital ratio rose from 7.7% to 9.4% of risk-weighted assets.
- In assessing the impact of regulatory reform on Euro Area banks, we focus on the implementation of the Basel III proposals, which are likely to be reflected in European Union law quite soon after agreement.
- For Euro Area banks, the redefinition of capital is significant issue (especially the handling of minority interests).

⁵¹ Set up in 1960, the European Banking Federation is the voice of the European banking sector (European Union & European Free Trade Association countries). The EBF represents the interests of some 5000 European banks: large and small, wholesale and retail, local and cross-border financial institutions. The EBF is committed to supporting EU policies to promote the single market in financial services in general and in banking activities in particular. It advocates free and fair competition in the EU and world markets and supports the banks' efforts to increase their efficiency and competitiveness.

- Based on our framework, the Euro Area economy could be hit quite hard by projected regulatory changes. For 2011-2020 as a whole, average annual growth would be reduced by about 0.5 percentage points per year, which would compound to a cumulative loss of about 4.5 percentage points. Nominal GDP would end up about €853 billion lower by the end of the decade. In turn, this would imply a trajectory for employment that would lead to about 4.8 million less jobs being created over the next 10 years or so than might otherwise be the case.
- The Euro Area would thus appear to be quite vulnerable to regulatory reform. Intuitively, this should not be too surprising, since the Euro Area banking system is large both relative to the economy (about 350%) and as source of debt financing for the economy (about 75% of total debt financing), and this all in an economy where financial structures are relatively heavily geared to debt rather than equity.
- While the magnitude of these results is eye-catching in itself, their dynamic is also quite concerning. In our regulatory change scenario, restraint imposed on banks is sufficiently severe to keep the economy in or close to recession through 2014.
- While our model may be overstating the sensitivity of the economy to banking flows, there are three reasons to worry that the outcome could be even worse than projected.
- First, banks do not fully meet new liquidity ratio requirements into our regulatory reform scenario, which might imply the need for even more lending restraint.
- Second, this banking restraint will come against the backdrop of a significant trend towards fiscal retrenchment across the Euro Area. Indeed, we suspect that it will be very difficult to achieve a lowering in public sector leverage without a resumption of growth in private leverage. Regulatory reform will limit the latter possibility.
- Third, regulatory reform could weaken bank lending flows to Emerging Europe, which could then feedback to weaken Euro Area growth through lower exports.

Euro Area Banks Dominate the Region's Financial System

The Euro Area banking system has a number of important characteristics. First, and most importantly, it is the largest banking system in the world. Total on-balance sheet assets of Euro Area banks were €31.1 trillion at the end of 2009, which was almost 350 percent of regional nominal GDP (Table 9)⁵². At the end of 2009, the Euro Area banking system was about 3.75 times the size of the US banking system⁵³. Second, banks dominate the credit intermediation process in the Euro Area. Banks account for about three-quarters of intermediation in the Euro Area (and non-banks thus account for about 25 percent of the total). In the United States, these relative shares are reversed.

The Euro Area Danking System in Summary				
	Dec 06	Dec 07	Dec 08	Dec 09
Number of Banks	6,130	6,127	6,596	6458
Number of Banks that Left the System*	251	198	334	233
Total Assets (€ trillion)	25.945	29.440	31.837	31.147
%оуа	9.8	13.5	8.1	-2.2
%GDP	303.2	326.9	343.8	346.6
Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA, € trillion)	14.134	14.385	15.795	15.302
%оуа	11.3	1.8	9.8	-3.1
Capital Ratios (all expressed as % of RWA)				
Regulatory Capital	11.2	10.6	11.6	12.5
Tier 1 Capital	8.0	7.7	8.6	9.4
Core Tier 1 Capital	6.8	6.6	7.3	8.0
Liquid Asset Ratio	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.9
Share of Banks in Credit Intermediation (%)	73.8	74.4	74.8	73.8

Table 9 The Euro Area Banking System in Symmany

* total over previous 12 months

Source: European Central Bank

Finally, the Euro Area banking system supplies the broad money stock of a unique monetary area—one where a single currency was introduced into national economies, whose banking systems had developed for centuries along national lines. A decade after the introduction of the Euro, banking systems remain relatively diverse across the region, with most countries maintaining relatively large domestic banking systems (Table 10). The share of each banking system in total assets broadly matches the share of each country's GDP in the regional total. Among the major countries, France, Germany and the Netherlands have relatively large systems, while Italy's is relatively small (Table 10). Some of the smaller countries have banking systems that are vast relative to their national economies (e.g., Luxembourg and Ireland).

⁵² Note that this does not include off-balance sheet items.

⁵³ The US banking system's assets were the equivalent of €8.3 trillion at the end of 2009 (see Table 5, Chapter 3).

Table 10

Euro Area: Banking Sector by Country

				Average			
	Number		as % of	Asset Size	Share of	Nominal	Share of
	of Credit	Total Assets	National	(€ billion	Euro-16	GDP	Euro-16
	Institutions	(€ billion)	GDP	per bank)	Total Assets	(€ billion)	GDP
Austria	803	1,071.9	380%	1.335	3.4%	281.9	3.0%
Belgium	105	1,276.3	370%	12.155	4.0%	344.7	3.7%
Cyprus	163	118.1	685%	0.725	0.4%	17.2	0.2%
Finland	357	396.2	215%	1.110	1.2%	184.2	2.0%
France	728	7,710.6	395%	10.591	24.2%	1,950.1	21.1%
Germany	1,989	7,892.7	316%	3.968	24.7%	2,495.8	27.0%
Greece	66	464.5	194%	7.038	1.5%	239.1	2.6%
Ireland	501	1,731.5	952%	3.456	5.4%	181.8	2.0%
Italy	818	3,687.7	235%	4.508	11.6%	1,567.9	16.9%
Luxembourg	153	1,271.8	3232%	8.312	4.0%	39.3	0.4%
Malta	23	42.3	743%	1.839	0.1%	5.7	0.1%
Netherlands	302	2,231.5	374%	7.389	7.0%	595.9	6.4%
Portugal	175	482.1	290%	2.755	1.5%	166.4	1.8%
Spain	362	3,409.4	313%	9.418	10.7%	1,088.5	11.8%
Slovakia	26	65.5	101%	2.519	0.2%	64.8	0.7%
Slovenia	25	49.0	132%	1.960	0.2%	37.1	0.4%
Euro Area (16)	6,596	31,901.1	344%	4.836	100%	9,260.4	100%

Source: European Central Bank

The region's banking system—which was the sum of the individual parts at the onset of monetary union—was relatively large at the outset of the union. In the first decade of the Euro, it grew relatively rapidly. Bank lending to the private sector was relatively vigorous, averaging about 8 percent per year between 1999 and September 2008, even though this included a difficult recession and debt-deflation phase (2001-03; Chart 22).


In the post-Lehman period, however, the Euro Area bank lending environment has changed dramatically. Credit had been up 8.8 percent in the year through September 2008. In the year through October 2009, it was down 1.3 percent. At the same time as this 10 percentage point reversal in bank credit growth, Euro Area nominal GDP changed course. It contracted 3 percent in 2009, having risen by 2.8 percent in 2008.

There has recently been some sign of improvement, consistent with the hesitant signs of revival in the Euro Area economy. Lending to households has begun to rise again, and the lending to businesses has stopped contracting (Chart 23). These developments highlight that swings in nominal bank lending remain highly reflective of swings in underlying economic activity.

Euro Area Bank Lending to Private Sector percent change over latest 6m, saar 14 Pre-Euro Average Post-Euro Average Growth Rate (to September 2008) = 8.1% 12 Growth Rate = 5.3% 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 Source: European Central Bank

Chart 23

Euro Area: Bank Credit to Households and Businesses *percent, 3m/3m saar*



Euro Area banks have improved their capital positions, through a combination of capital raising activities (including state injections) and, in 2009, through a reduction in risk-weighted assets. From December 2007 through December 2009, Euro Area banks' aggregate total regulatory capital ratio rose from 10.6% of risk-weighted assets to 12.5%

of risk-weighted assets, while the aggregate Tier 1 capital ratio rose from 7.7% to 9.4% of risk-weighted assets. By way of reference, Euro Area real GDP fell by a cumulative 3.5% in 2008-09, a performance that was about 6% points less than trend.

Specifics of Regulatory Change Scenario

In our quantitative work to date, we have focused on modeling those measures which have both a high level of clarity (albeit so far unquantified) and likelihood of occurrence (see Chapter 2). For the Euro Area, this means focusing on the proposed revisions to the Basel II framework (see Chapter 2). As part of the European Union, the Euro Area is likely to adopt any revisions to the Basel Accords in their entirety, since it is standard EU practice to embody the recommended regulatory approach of the Basel Committee into a Capital Requirements Directive, when then has the force of law across EU member states. For example, the EU was an early adopter of Basel II. The European Commission has launched a consultation for a new Directive ("CRD IV") which would incorporate the new Basel proposals into EU law⁵⁴.

In assessing the cumulative effects on the Euro Area economy, our specific assumptions are:

- 1) An increase in trading book capital at the end of 2010. Our estimate is that the Euro Area banking system held about €2.5 trillion in trading book assets at the end of 2009. This total has jumped since the end of 2007, when it was €1.8 trillion partly because Euro Area banks have brought trading assets on to their balance sheets previously held off balance sheet by special purpose vehicles. Based on industry estimates, we project the capital charge levied against these holdings to rise by about three fold, which we capture by raising the average risk weighting assigned to such trading book securities from 10% to 30% for securities of financial firms held in the trading book), and from 25% to 75% for securities of non-financial firms.
- 2) A two percentage point increase in the minimum Tier 1 and overall regulatory capital ratios, to 6% and 10%, respectively, to take place at the end of 2012. We assume that Euro Area supervisors will enforce broadly the same average ("fixed") buffers of actual capital over these regulatory minima in 2012-2020, as were applied to 2001-07. In 2001-07, the average buffer between total regulatory capital and the BIS minimum was 3.4 percentage points; for Tier 1, the average buffer was 4.4 percentage points.
- 3) Capital redefinition effects. Euro Area banks seem quite likely to be significantly affected by provisions to adjust the regulatory capital—notably the exclusion of minority interests and deferred tax assets from Tier 1 capital. To an extent, this

⁵⁴ See European Commission (2010)

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf

reflects the unique institutional structure of some key Euro Area systems, which is hard to fit into a "one size fits all" structure⁵⁵. While there is considerable uncertainty about how much these possible deductions amount to in the aggregate, we have estimated them to total €180 billion (which amounts to about 15% of core Tier 1 equity as of December 2009). We thus project that about €180 billion of what is currently eligible to be counted as Tier 1 capital is re-classified (as Tier 2 capital) over a 3 year horizon from 2012 to 2014 (i.e., €60 billion per year).

- 4) No countercyclical buffer. In principle, we would expect regulators to introduce a one percentage point counter-cyclical ("variable") capital buffer in the midst of the next cyclical upswing. For the Euro Area, however, we judge growth prospects to be sufficiently muted over coming years, that it is hard to project any enthusiasm among policy makers to introduce such an additional "variable" buffer. Of course, policy makers will not know this ex ante, so they might well go ahead and introduce such a restriction anyway. But, for now, we have left this out of our Euro Area regulatory change scenario.
- 5) Higher holdings of liquid assets as a result of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The Liquidity Coverage Ratio will require that banks hold sufficient liquid assets to ensure that they can survive a period of extreme stress. In the base scenario, the LCR is not a binding constraint. But in our regulatory change scenario, we adjust the overall liquid asset ratio (the ratio of cash and government bonds held to total assets), in an effort to allow banks to meet the LCR through the projection horizon in the regulatory change scenario. Our dilemma in the Euro Area framework is that we find it very difficult to set a plausible path for liquid assets that allows the Euro Area banking system, in aggregate, to hit the minimum 100% LCR through the projection horizon (see next section).
- 6) A greater reliance on longer-term over short-term wholesale funding, as a result of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The new liquidity provisions will also apply on the liabilities' side of banks' balance sheets. We assume that the NSFR will be introduced in 2012, and that this will have the effect (in the 2010-2012 period) of shifting banks' wholesale funding to longer-term debt. Once again, however, we find it hard to see how the Euro Area banking system can achieve the mandated 100% NSFR through the projection horizon (see next section).
- 7) A region-wide bank levy. Proposals are developing for a region-wide bank levy to pre-fund a Bank Resolution fund. Current details are sketchy, but we assume this will amount to an annual tax of €5 billion from 2012 onwards.

⁵⁵ Austrian and French banks seem likely to be particularly hard hit by the minority interest deduction (see Davies et al (2010)).

The Results in Outline

Based on our framework, the Euro Area economy could be hit quite hard by projected changes. For 2011-2020 as a whole, average annual growth would be reduced by about 0.5 percentage points per year, which would compound to a cumulative loss of about 4.5 percentage points (Table 11). Nominal GDP would end up about €853 billion lower by the end of the decade (Chart 24). In turn, this would imply a trajectory for employment that would lead to about 4.8 million less jobs being created over the next 10 years or so than might otherwise be the case (Chart 25). It should be noted that most of these losses occur over the next 5 years.

The Euro Area would thus appear to be quite vulnerable to the impact of regulatory reform. Intuitively, this should not be too surprising, since the Euro Area banking system is large both relative to the economy (about 350%) *and* as source of debt financing for the economy (about 75% of total debt financing), and this all in an economy where financial structures are relatively heavily geared to debt rather than equity.





Chart 24

While the magnitude of these results is eye-catching in itself, their dynamic is also quite concerning. In our regulatory change scenario, restraint imposed on banks is sufficiently severe to keep the regional economy in or close to recession through 2014, during which time the main differential between the "base" and "regulatory" scenarios opens up (Charts 24 and 25). Through 2014, the loss in nominal income would be about €690 billion, which would imply a loss in tax revenue of about €300 billion, or about 3 percent of GDP.

Table 11 Euro Area: Cumulative Effec	ts Results											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Avg 2011-20
Real GDP (2010 = 100)												
Base	100.0	101.1	102.0	104.4	106.0	106.3	106.9	108.8	109.7	111.4	112.7	
Regulatory change	100.0	100.5	99.1	100.0	101.0	101.7	103.0	104.5	105.1	106.6	107.7	
Difference (%)	0.0	-0.6	-2.8	-4.2	-4.7	-4.3	-3.7	-3.9	-4.2	-4.3	-4.4	
Real GDP (%y/y)												
Base Regulatory change	1.0 1.0	1.1 0.5	1.0 -1.3	2.3 0.9	1.6 1.0	0.2 0.6	0.7 1.3	1.7 1.5	0.8 0.5	1.6 1.5	1.2 1.0	1.2 0.7
GDP deflator (2010 = 100)												
Base Regulatory change	100.0 100.0	101.4 101.3	102.9 102.2	105.0 103.6	107.4 105.2	109.6 107.0	111.7 109.0	114.0 111.3	116.3 113.5	118.7 115.9	121.2 118.3	
<i>o</i> , <i>o</i>	100.0	101.5	102.2	105.0	105.2	107.0	105.0	111.5	115.5	115.5	110.5	
SDP deflator (%y/y)	1 2	1.4	1 5	2.0	2.2	2.1	1.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.0
Base Regulatory change	1.2 1.2	1.4 1.3	1.5 1.0	2.0 1.3	2.3 1.6	2.1 1.7	1.9 1.9	2.1 2.1	2.0 2.0	2.1 2.1	2.1 2.1	1.9 1.7
Iominal GDP (€ trillion) Base	9.183	9.407	9.641	10.064	10.456	10.695	10.975	11.389	11.708	12.140	12.546	3.2
Regulatory change	9.183	9.338	9.303	9.510	9.760	9.988	10.373	10.683	10.950	11.342	11.694	2.4
Difference (€ bn)	-2	-69	-338	-554	-696	-708	-667	-706	-758	-798	-853	2.4
mployment (millions)												
Base	141.238	142.471	143.678	145.721	147.808	148.766	149.511	151.109	152.542	154.163	155.835	
Regulatory change Difference ('000)	141.225 -13	142.070 -401	141.615 -2064	141.934 -3787	143.100 -4708	144.084 -4682	145.365 -4146	147.041 -4069	148.167 -4375	149.550 -4613	151.009 -4825	
rivate sector credit (2010 =	100)											
Base	100.0	103.0	105.6	111.4	116.7	119.2	122.4	128.0	131.8	137.7	143.1	
Regulatory change	100.0	101.8	99.6	101.6	104.4	106.7	110.6	115.4	118.4	123.4	127.8	
rivate sector credit growth												
Base	3.1	3.0	2.5	5.6	4.8	2.1	2.7	4.6	3.0	4.4	3.9	3.7
Regulatory change	3.1	1.8	-2.2	2.1	2.7	2.2	3.6	4.4	2.5	4.3	3.5	2.5
ank assets (%y/y)	1.2	1.4	1.1	3.0	2.5	0.9	10	2.5	1.5	2.5	2.2	1.9
Base Regulatory change	1.3 2.0	3.9	2.2	5.0	2.5 1.3	1.0	1.3 2.0	2.5	1.5	2.5	2.2	2.4
isk-weighted assets (%y/y)												
Base	1.8	2.7	1.8	4.2	3.6	1.3	1.8	3.5	2.1	3.4	2.9	2.7
Regulatory change	2.0	8.1	-1.1	2.1	1.6	1.2	2.6	3.2	1.7	3.1	2.5	2.5
ank credit growth to the pr												
Base	2.8	2.6	2.0	5.4	4.5	1.7	2.2	4.3	2.6	4.2	3.5	3.3
Regulatory change	2.7	1.4	-3.1	1.6	2.3	1.7	3.3	4.1	2.0	4.0	3.1	2.0
ore equity shadow price (p Base	ercent) 17.7%	12.2%	11.4%	10.2%	7.8%	8.5%	9.8%	8.9%	8.6%	9.5%	8.4%	9.5%
Regulatory change	17.7%	12.2%	15.6%	17.2%	15.6%	15.1%	13.9%	13.2%	12.7%	12.5%	10.2%	13.8%
eal lending rate (percent)												
Base	3.9%	3.8%	4.1%	3.5%	3.1%	3.5%	3.7%	3.4%	3.5%	3.2%	3.1%	3.5%
Regulatory change Difference (bps)	3.9% 0	4.1% 28	5.5% 135	5.3% 183	4.9% 185	4.8% 137	4.5% 80	4.0% 65	4.1% 60	3.7% 50	3.5% 47	4.4% 97
		20	100	100	100	107	00	00	00	50		57
Regulatory capital ratio (% o	,	12 50/	12 (0/	12 40/	12 20/	17 40/	13 40/	17 10/	12.00/	11 00/	11 50/	12 201
Base Regulatory change	12.6% 12.6%	12.5% 12.3%	12.6% 13.1%	12.4% 13.6%	12.3% 14.2%	12.4% 14.6%	12.4% 14.7%	12.1% 14.6%	12.0% 14.7%	11.8% 14.3%	11.5% 14.2%	12.2% 14.0%
Core Tier 1 Capital (€ billion)												
Base	1272	1313	1362	1398	1432	1461	1484	1505	1525	1525	1525	
Regulatory change Difference	1274 2	1391 78	1435 73	1503 105	1578 146	1671 210	1786 303	1896 391	2003 479	2049 524	2093 568	
Core Tier 1 capital ratio (% o Base	f RWA) 8.2%	8.2%	8.4%	8.2%	8.1%	8.2%	8.2%	8.0%	8.0%	7.7%	7.5%	8.0%
Regulatory change	8.2%	8.2%	8.6%	8.8%	9.1%	9.5%	9.9%	10.2%	10.6%	10.5%	10.5%	9.6%
Return on bank equity (%)												
Base	5.8%	6.8%	9.4%	11.4%	10.4%	8.9%	9.9%	9.4%	8.4%	8.7%	8.6%	9.2%
Regulatory change	6.1%	5.0%	3.8%	5.3%	5.4%	5.7%	6.7%	6.3%	5.9%	6.5%	6.2%	5.7%

Sources: IIF Estimates



Euro Area Employment Implications of Regulatory Reform thousands

The main mechanism through which the regulatory change measures outlined above affect the economic outlook through our framework is via an increase in bank lending rates to the private sector. In turn, this rate rise is driven by a combination of an increase in the cost of funding to banks – explicitly as long-term funding rates rise, and implicitly as the "shadow cost" of equity rises as banks are required to issue substantial amounts of equity to meet new capital requirements and definitions (Chart 26). In our regulatory change scenario, banks are required to raise about €150 billion (relative to the base) by the end of 2014. Moreover, interest earnings are reduced by a requirement to hold lower yielding government debt as a way of achieving new liquidity requirements. The result is a rise in lending rates to the private sector, which peaks at about 185 basis points in 2014 (Chart 27). Note that the ECB is not well-positioned to provide any offset to this rising cost of bank intermediation over this time horizon, since it starts with rates at just 1%.

Given the Euro Area's bank dependency, the effect of such a rise in bank lending rates could be quite severe. The path of bank lending to the private sector could be quite weak through 2014 (Chart 28). Given the maturity structure of private sector lending, this would imply very weak *marginal* lending decisions. In Germany, for example, 17% of loans are short-term (one-year maturity of less), 14% are medium-term (one to five year maturity) and 69% long-term (5 year or more)⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ See Frenkel and Rudolf (2010).






Chart 27

Change in Real Lending Rate to Private Sector Borrowers *basis points*





Euro Area: Bank Credit to the Private Sector *percent, y/y*


It is certainly possible that private sector bank lending conditions will not be as weak as we project in a regulatory change scenario. It is also possible that the Euro Area economy will be able to grow with less credit.

Unfortunately, however, it is also possible that the outcome of the regulatory reform scenario for the economy could be bleaker. For one thing, our estimates show that the Euro Area banking system will, in aggregate, fall significantly short of achieving both the 100% Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the 100% Net Stable Funding Ratio in our regulatory change scenario even though that scenario embodies significant lending restraint (Chart 29). If banks were left with no alternative but to achieve these ratios, then there would be little option for them but to impose yet more severe restraint on bank lending to the private sector.

Banking Restraint against a Backdrop of Fiscal Restraint

A second source of downside risk to the economic projections in Table 11 is that the scenario for banking restraint is scheduled to play out at the same time as a significant and widespread effort to lower Euro Area government budget deficits, in an effort to hit the targets of the Stability and Convergence Pact—an effort that has been thrown into heightened significance by the recent turmoil surrounding Greece (Table 12).

Chart 29



Euro Area: Key Liquidity Ratios under Regulatory Reform Scenario percent

Table 12Stability and Convergence Programs: Government Deficitspercent of GDP

	2009	2010f	2011f	2012f	2013f	2014f
France	7.5	8.2	6.0	4.6	3.0	_
Germany	3.3	5.5	4.5	3.5	3.0	_
Greece	13.6	8.7	5.6	2.8	2.0	_
Ireland	14.3	11.6	10.0	7.2	4.9	2.9
Italy	5.3	5.0	3.9	2.7	_	_
Portugal	9.4	8.3	6.6	4.6	2.8	_
Spain	11.2	9.8	7.5	5.3	3.0	_

Source: European Commission

To an extent, the mandate for banks to boost holdings of liquid assets and improve riskweighted capital ratios is favoring bank lending to governments and, thus, somewhat reducing the pressure on governments to reduce deficits. In 2009, Euro Area banks' holdings of government debt rose by €238 billion, and we project them to rise by an average of €600 billion *per year* between 2009 and 2014 as banks strive to meet higher liquidity requirements. Of course, this greater allocation of bank lending towards governments crowds out lending to the private sector.


It should be noted that these substantially higher holdings of government debt—which are likely to have a national bias—may add to the riskiness of the banking sector in two important ways. First, it will increase the duration risk of banks, which are likely to want to hold higher yielding government bonds, the value of which could sink as bond yields rise. Second, and more concerning, banks would be exposing themselves more squarely to the liquidity and solvency risks of Euro Area governments. A year or two ago, that might have seemed a trivial risk, but the recent turmoil in Greek and some other smaller Euro Area government debt markets has served as a graphic reminder that the riskiness of Euro Area government debt may be significantly higher than previously believed⁵⁷.

Indeed, the recent sharp ratings downgrade of Greece (and possible downgrades of some other smaller Euro Area countries) raises interesting questions about how the new liquidity framework will handle sovereign ratings migrations. If banks were forced sellers of countries when they had been downgraded, then this could intensify sovereign credit difficulties.

It is also possible that an environment of significant bank lending restraint will also create a situation in which it is very difficult for governments to *achieve* budget deficit reductions. The government budget deficit is the mirror image of the financial imbalances of the private sector and external sector (Chart 30). Since 2007, the sharp rise in the budget deficit has had its main counterpart in a rise in the saving-investment surplus of the private sector—mainly as a result of the collapse in credit-driven investment spending. The Euro Area could engineer a massive swing in its external surplus, thus helping to reduce the budget deficit without a rise in domestic private investment relative to private saving. This would seem to be an unlikely development, however, absent a massive decline in the Euro. If this occurred, it could spark tensions between the Euro Area and some of its trading partners.

It is more likely, therefore, that any meaningful budget deficit reduction will be difficult without a reduction in the private sector financial surplus—i.e., a revival in private investment and/or reduction in private saving. It is difficult to see this happening without the Euro Area private sector feeling comfortable about increasing, rather than reducing its leverage and, absent the sudden creation of significant non-bank means of debt intermediation, this would require a revival in bank lending activity.

⁵⁷ This is, of course, an uncanny replay of the conditions which developed in the structured credit market in 2006-07, when previously highly-rated (and low spread) product slumped in value as perceptions of the creditworthiness of the underlying borrower shifted dramatically.



Cross-Border Lending Issues


A final source of downside risk relates to the external environment. In 2007-08, Euro Area growth was reduced by extreme weakness in Emerging Europe. Rapid growth in Emerging Europe had been an important source of buoyancy for the Euro Area in 2004-07, so the sudden reversal in fortunes for Emerging Europe was a blow to the West.

A contraction in credit flows from west to east was an important mechanism through which the subprime crises rippled through Emerging Europe. According to IIF estimates, net bank lending to eight large borrowing countries in Emerging Europe shifted from an *inflow* of \$172 billion in 2007 to an *outflow* of \$47 billion in 2009⁵⁸.

Emerging European countries were able to stabilize themselves quite well in 2009, however. In part, this reflected impressive policy adjustments in Emerging European economies, often helped by support from official creditors (especially the IMF). Emerging European stabilization was also helped by the commitment of many commercial banks based in the Euro Area to maintain strong support for local affiliates operating in Emerging European economies. Having fallen sharply between the middle

⁵⁸ See Suttle et al. (2010a). The 8 countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Excluding Russia, there were net *inflows* of \$106 billion in 2007 and net *outflows* of \$26 billion in 2009.

of 2008 and the early months of 2009, the consolidated claims of Euro Area banks on Emerging Europe began to rise again early in 2009 (Chart 31)⁵⁹.



As is well known, Austrian banks have disproportionately large exposure to Emerging Europe, mainly through the local lending activity of foreign affiliates (Chart 32). Other Euro Area countries with large absolute exposures include France, Germany and Italy. Greek banks also have relatively large exposures in Emerging Europe.

There must be some concern that the full imposition of the Basel III proposals would add a new negative twist to bank credit flows to Emerging Europe in the years ahead. Restraint could operate through two channels:


- The increase in capital requirement would imply greater charges allocated to credit extended to lower rated credits in Emerging Europe;
- Maintaining operations in Emerging Europe with minority interests from local partners would become more expensive.


The main concern is how the new regulations will affect the parent banks in the Euro Area and their ability to continue to provide funding to Emerging European affiliates. There is general understanding that foreign funding from parent banks will be much

⁵⁹ Note that Chart 35 shows the consolidated foreign claims of Euro Area banks on an ultimate risk basis (Table 9D, BIS (2010)). This measure includes both cross-border claims and local claims (in both foreign and local currency) of foreign affiliates.

more restricted than in the past and that, as a result, affiliates will have to increase reliance on local funding sources, mainly deposits.

Chart 32





Appendix: Euro Area Data Sources

Type of Data	Sources
Balance Sheet	European Central Bank - Aggregated balance sheet of Euro Area monetary financial institutions, excluding the Eurosystem http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/aggregates/bsheets/html/outst anding amounts 2010-03.en.html Liabilities of Eurosystem to Euro Area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations are used as a proxy for cash: Consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2010/html/fs100302.en.html BIS Quarterly Review, Table 9B Consolidated foreign claims by nationality of reporting banks, immediate borrower basis http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm
Capital	Estimated the composition of regulatory capital by using the capital ratios for Euro Area large and complex banking groups based on ECB Financial Stability Review 2004 – 2009 http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html
P&L Model	OECD Bank Profitability Statistics http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BPF1
Macroeconomic Data	Eurostat European Central Bank - Monthly Bulletins OECD Economic Outlook 86 database

Euro Area: Base Scenario

EUR billion							Ē	Projection period	eriod										
		2005	2006		2007	2008	2009	2010		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Bank Balanc	Bank Balance Sheet Model																		
			·	Current				[No new										
				nisk- weighting				_	risk- weighting										
Bank Assets		23634	25945	òo	29440	31837 466	31147	31546	òò	31994	32346	33303 272	34150	34474 3	34918	35795	36339 767	37245 270	38047
	Government honds	1432	1279	0% 2%	579 1197	1245	309 1483	1546	0.70 5%	1584	1617	300 1665	1708		349 1746	1790	200 1817	372 1862	1902
LIQ/TA	Liquid asset ratio	6.7%	5.6%	2	5.4%	5.3%	5.9%	6.0%	2	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%		6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%	6.0%
В	Domestic financial	7996	8612		9966	10835	10657	10600		10600	10600	10600	10600		10600	10600	10600	10600	10600
IB (TB)	Trading Book	652	732	10%	896	1016	1015	1000	10%	1000	1000	1000	1000		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
IB (BB)	Banking Book	7344	7880	25%	9070 6212	9820	9642 6006	9600	25%	9600	9600	9600	9600		9600 9620	9600	9600	9600	9600
CORP (TR)	Trading Book	552	0200 646	25%	953	1407	1498	1539	25%	1400	1350	1350	1350	I	0020 1350	0392 1350	3224 1350	3000 1350	3343 1350
CORP (BB)	Banking Book	4105	4639	100%	5259	5606	5498	5649	100%	5979	6178	6584	6944		7270	7642	7874	8258	8599
	%oya	7.7	13.0		13.4	6.6	-1.9	2.8		5.8	3.3	6.6	5.5		2.7	5.1	3.0	4.9	4.1
HH	Household	4182	4523	200/	4796	4889	4955	5092	1002	5227	5332 7760	5620	5875		6106 2050	6370	6533 2050	6806	7047
	Morrgages	1162	1200	20% 20%	3429 1967	1200	1406	00/0	%0C	00/5	3/00	3/80	3/90		383U 2766	3300	0680 0600	4000	4000
EXTA	External	3656	4337	0/00	4879	4754	4264	4319	% 00	4380	4429	4560	4676		4781	4901	4975	5099	5209
EXTA (HG)	High-grade	2815	3339	25%	3756	3501	3096	3136	25%	3180	3215	3310	3395		3471	3558	3612	3702	3782
EXTA (EM)	Risky (EM)	841	908	100%	1122	1253	1168	1183	100%	1200	1213	1249	1281		1310	1343	1363	1397	1427
	Fixed Assets	166	173	100%	206	212	219	222	100%	225	228	235	241		246	252	256	262	268
	Other Assets	1391	1563	100%	1806	2435	2204	2232	100%	2263	2288	2356	2416		2470	2532	2571	2635	2692
RWA	Risk-weighted assets	12699	14134		14385	15795	15302	15579		16006	16296	16984	17591		18142	18772	19162	19812	20388
	RWA/Total Assets	54%	54%		49%	50%	49%												
Bank Liabilities	lities	22319	24491		27757	30070	29231	29555		29957	30254	31165	31959		32637	33483	34000	34870	35663
M1	Retail	7374	8026		8994	9881	10160	10384		10637	10902	11380	11824		12410	12879	13239	13728	14187
M2	Domestic financial	5547	5938		6842	7686	7040	7195		7371	7555	7886	8193		8599	8924	9174	9513	9831
M3	Wholesale (non-capital)	3844	4234		4631 507	4848	4920	4708 471		4503	4166	3934 2027	3666		2942	2666	2320	2020	1714
	Dirt-term (> 1 year)	7875	3806		190	4215	490	014		4049	3746	381	3207		281 2645	202	2086	1817	15.41
EXTL	External	3526	3991		4538	4403	4098	4188		4291	4398	4590	4769		5006	5195	5340	5537	5723
	Other Liabilities	2027	2302		2751	3252	3013	3080		3155	3233	3375	3507	3587	3680	3820	3926	4071	4208
Capital		1215	1 15 1		1684	1767	1015	1001		8500	000	0120	1010	0060	1900	0210	0720	027E	7265
T2	Tier II	385	452		417	475	465	465		465	465	465	475	500	500	500	500	525	525
E	Tier I	1031	1134		1109	1358	1443	1493		1540	1594	1641	1684	1719	1748	1780	1807	1817	1827
TCE	Core	876	963		943	1155	1227	1272		1313	1362	1398	1432	1461	1484	1505	1525	1525	1525
T1-TCE	Non-core	155	170		166	204	216	221		227	232	242	252	258	264	274	282	292	302
REGCAP	Regulatory	1416	1586		1526	1834	1908	1958		2005	2059	2106	2159	2219	2248	2280	2307	2342	2352
REGADJ	Regulatory Adjustments	-101	-132		157	-66	2	33		33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	ŝ
Key Capital ratios	Iratios																		
REGCAP/RV BIG	REGCAP/RW/ Regulatory Capital Bis	11.2% 8.0%	11.2%		10.6% 8.0%	11.6%	12.5% 8.0%	12.6%		12.5%	12.6%	12.4% P 0%	12.3%	12.4% 1 8.0%	12.4%	12.1%	12.0%		11.5%
BUFCAP	National buffer (%nts)	3.2%	3.0%		2.6%	3.6%	4.5%	4.6%		4.5%	4.6%	4.4%				4 .1%	4.0%		3.5%
T1/RWA	Tier I	8.1%	8.0%		7.7%	8.6%	9.4%	%9.6		8.6%	8.6	6.7%				9.5%	9.4%		8.0%
TCE/RWA	Core Tier I	6.9%	6.8%		6.6%	7.3%	8.0%	8.2%		8.2%	8.4%	8.2%				8.0%	8.0%		7.5%
BIS(T1)	Reg	4.0%	4.0%		4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%		4.0%	4.0%	4.0%				4.0%	4.0%		4.0%
BUFCAP (T1)	2	4.1%	4.0%		3.7%	4.6%	5.4%	5.6%		5.6%	5.8%	5.7%				5.5%	5.4%	5.2%	5.0%
	Required buffer	4.4%	4.4%		4.4%	4.4%	4.4%	4.4%		4.4%	4.4%	4.4%				4.4%	4.4%		4.4%
PECHAI 90	Leverage ratio	16./	16.4		19.3	17.4	16.3	16.1		16.0	15./	15.8				15./	15.8		16.2
6							-												

Euro Area: Base Scenario

The contract of the cont						Ч	Projection period										
Ort Lought restantial Lensing restantis Lensing restantial Lensing restantial Lensing restantial Lensing	EUK billion	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Metadol and function Constrained	Key Liquidity ratios Liquidity coverage ratio						35.3	34.4	33.9	33.5	33.2	32.9	32.6	32.3	32.0	31.7	31.4
Biol Care Chard Skept / Model Bi	Net stable funding ratio Cash/Assets	0.66%	0.67%	1.29%	1.43%	1.18%	63.3 1.10%	62.1 1.05%	61.0 1.00%	59.7 1.00%	58.5 1.00%	57.5 1.00%	56.5 1.00%	55.4 1.00%	54.4 1.00%	53.3 1.00%	52.2 1.00%
Monthly Clashing house and the constants	Bank Core Capital Supply Model																
MCVIC Employee T <t< td=""><td>Total new Core Capital</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>46</td><td>41</td><td>48</td><td>36</td><td>34</td><td>30</td><td>22</td><td>21</td><td>20</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></t<>	Total new Core Capital						46	41	48	36	34	30	22	21	20	0	0
Click Loop Loop <thloop< th=""> Loop Loop <th< td=""><td>NEWTCE Required new issuance</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></th<></thloop<>	NEWTCE Required new issuance					1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Proprint intermediation Res	Red					Î	0	0	0	0 %7:0L	%8. <i>1</i> 0	%C.8	9.8% 0	8.9% 0	8.0% 0	9.5% 0	8.4% 0
Build Scince RM, Mola	PROFRET Retained income PROFRET/PRt % of profits retained						46 40%	41 30%	48 25%	36 15%	34 15%	30 15%	22 10%	21 10%	20 10%	0%0	%0 0
Intent antion 0 10	Banking Sector P&L Model																
FFUND Componentian 2003 2014	Interest earnings	903 2	1082 E	1352	1235 16	899	946	1014	1161 E	1178 E	1234 6	1311	1373	1376	1442	1428	1453
Control Control <t< td=""><td>Cas</td><td>5 2000 c</td><td>7082 C</td><td>3 8606</td><td>01 2 88%</td><td>0 2010 F</td><td>4 DO 4</td><td>11606</td><td>2 7004 F</td><td>2 2</td><td>0 1 75.0%</td><td>/ 000 6</td><td>0 050%</td><td>9 E006</td><td>01 075.06</td><td>1U 0 75%</td><td>01 07506</td></t<>	Cas	5 2000 c	7082 C	3 8606	01 2 88%	0 2010 F	4 DO 4	11606	2 7004 F	2 2	0 1 75.0%	/ 000 6	0 050%	9 E006	01 075.06	1U 0 75%	01 07506
D/D Dyramic modiati 338 377 3273 3773 3293 3773 3293 3773 3293 3773 3293 3783 3793	Gov	46	51	3.83.70 52	0.00% 49	45	47	55	64	666	67	% 00.2 69	69 69	666	689 88	64 64	999 999
Unstantiantial 19 31 34 33 31 34 33	1	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
BOND Top: Friendried 378 279 210	Domestic financial Trading Book	199	307 26	445 34	349 38	102 33	127 31	146 35	184 40	184 40	208 40	232 40	256 40	278 38	302 38	299 35	299 35
Finding Book 173 200 411 713 726 <t< td=""><td></td><td>3.38%</td><td>3.78%</td><td>4.23%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>3.27%</td><td>3.10%</td><td>3.50%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>3.75%</td><td>3.75%</td><td>3.50%</td><td>3.50%</td></t<>		3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
SPECA (GAM) Volumentary (Volumentary (Volum	Banking Book	178	280 2 7002	411	311	69 69	96 2 1002	111 2 5002	144	144	168 4 0002				264 2 75 02	264 2 5002	264 2 5002
Tomatic nortinated 123 233 371 77 72 73 73 74 </td <td></td> <td>-0.91%</td> <td>-0.10%</td> <td>4.23%0.62%</td> <td>-0.70%</td> <td>-2.55%</td> <td>-2.10%</td> <td>3.30% -2.34%</td> <td>4.00% -2.50%</td> <td>4.00% -2.50%</td> <td>4.00<i>%</i> -2.25<i>%</i></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>3.73% -1.00%</td> <td>3.30% -0.75%</td> <td>-0.75%</td>		-0.91%	-0.10%	4.23%0.62%	-0.70%	-2.55%	-2.10%	3.30% -2.34%	4.00% -2.50%	4.00% -2.50%	4.00 <i>%</i> -2.25 <i>%</i>				3.73% -1.00%	3.30% -0.75%	-0.75%
Transier Line Transier	Domestic non-financial	189	233 28	304 42	348 62	378 78	365 78	377 76	420 77	425 74	435 72	462 75	482 76	477 73	498 74	498 71	509 70
SPEED (COFP) Individual speed 08% 10% <td>10yr bond yield</td> <td>3.38%</td> <td>3.78%</td> <td>4.23%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>3.27%</td> <td>3.10%</td> <td>3.50%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>3.75%</td> <td>3.75%</td> <td>3.50%</td> <td>3.50%</td>	10yr bond yield	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
Thrond yeld Table of the second yeld Table of the yeld Table		0.86%	0.90%	1.05%	1.27%	2.13%	2.04 %	1.68%	1.63 %	1.49 %	1.36 %	1.53 %	1.65%	1.67%	1.72%	1.79%	1.70%
SPREAD (COPP) inding spread 0.66% 0.90% 1.05% 1.27% 2.13% 0.46 1.86% 1.67% 1.72% 1.72% 1.73% </td <td>barking book 10vr bond vield</td> <td>3.38%</td> <td>3.78%</td> <td>4.23%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>3.27 %</td> <td>3.10%</td> <td>3.50%</td> <td>342 4.00%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>300 4.00%</td> <td>4.00%</td> <td>404 3.75%</td> <td>424 3.75%</td> <td>421 3.50%</td> <td>4.30 3.50%</td>	barking book 10vr bond vield	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27 %	3.10%	3.50%	342 4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	300 4.00%	4.00%	404 3.75%	424 3.75%	421 3.50%	4.30 3.50%
Housening Float 102 201 250 261 291 201 203 335 316 315 315 316 315 315 316 315 315 316 315 315 316 317 315 316 315 316 317 316 317 316 317 316 317 316 317 317 316 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 <th< td=""><td></td><td>0.86%</td><td>%06.0</td><td>1.05%</td><td>1.27%</td><td>2.13%</td><td>2.04%</td><td>1.68%</td><td>1.63%</td><td>1.49%</td><td>1.36%</td><td>1.53%</td><td>1.65%</td><td>1.67%</td><td>1.72%</td><td>1.79%</td><td>1.70%</td></th<>		0.86%	%06.0	1.05%	1.27%	2.13%	2.04%	1.68%	1.63%	1.49%	1.36%	1.53%	1.65%	1.67%	1.72%	1.79%	1.70%
The control best in the contreconter best in the control best in the control best i	Household Mortrages	162	207 147	250 179	256 183	210 134	258 188	267 194	297 211	301 207	308 203	327 210	341 216	338 210	353 215	353 210	360
SPREAD (H) Lending spread 0.00% 1.07% 1.17% 1.30% 0.14% 1.68% 1.63% 1.63% 1.65% 1.65% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.2% 1.7% 1.2%	Ļ	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
Torring spread 10, roomd yied 3.38% 3.78% 4.23% 4.00% 3.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 3.75		0.60%	1.02% 61	%/ L. L 71	1.30% 73	0.54% 76	2.04% 71	1.68% 73	1.63% 86	1.49% 04	1.36%	1.53% 118	1.65% 125	1.6/% 128	1.72% 138	1.79%	1./0%
SPREAD (HH) Lending spread 0.86% 0.90% 1.07% 1.27% 2.13% 2.04% 1.65% 1.65% 1.67% 1.77% 1.79% <th1.79%< th=""> 1.79% <th1.79%< td="" th<=""><td>, 6</td><td>3.38%</td><td>3.78%</td><td>4.23%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>3.27%</td><td>3.10%</td><td>3.50%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>3.75%</td><td>3.75%</td><td>3.50%</td><td>3.50%</td></th1.79%<></th1.79%<>	, 6	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
Heal borrowing rate 2.29% 2.66% 3.17% 3.17% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.47% 3.1%	:	0.86%	0.90%	1.05%	1.27%	2.13%	2.04%	1.68%	1.63%	1.49%	1.36%	1.53%	1.65%	1.67%	1.72%	1.79%	1.70%
High grade 86 116 150 145 108 77 111 128 131 134 136 132 134 128 135 135 3.50%	Real borrowing rate External	2.29%	2.68 % 193	2.91%	3.12 % 216	4.30 %	3.94 % 145	3.81%	4.12 %	3.47%	3.06 %	3.47 % 214	3.71 % 216	3.36%	3.51 %	3.21 %	3.08%
Torr Torr <th< td=""><td>High grade</td><td>86</td><td>116</td><td>150</td><td>145</td><td>108</td><td><u>97</u></td><td><u>t</u> E</td><td>128</td><td>131</td><td>134</td><td>136</td><td>138</td><td>132</td><td>134</td><td>128</td><td>131</td></th<>	High grade	86	116	150	145	108	<u>97</u>	<u>t</u> E	128	131	134	136	138	132	134	128	131
Filsky (EM) 85 77 79 71 52 48 54 63 66 77 78 76 78 76 78 76 78 76 77 78 76 78 76 78 76 78 76 78 76 78 76 78 76 78 76 78 76 78 75 3.75% 3.10% 3.10% 3.50% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 2.00%	10yr bond yield	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
Tuyr born yead 3.38% 3.10% 3.20% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 2.00% 3.50%	Risky (EM)	85	77	62	71	52	48	54	63	68	76 76	11 17	78	76 76	78	76	78
The length of interest Earnings T/T 996 1/251 1/200 <t< td=""><td>-</td><td>3.38% 7 82%</td><td>3.78% 4 56%</td><td>4.23% 3 22%</td><td>2.00%</td><td>3.27%</td><td>3.10%</td><td>3.50%</td><td>4.00% 1 20%</td><td>4.00% 1.50%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>4.00%</td><td>3.75%</td><td>3.75%</td><td>3.50%</td><td>3.50%</td></t<>	-	3.38% 7 82%	3.78% 4 56%	4.23% 3 22%	2.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00% 1 20%	4.00% 1.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
ECB Key policy rate 2.02% 2.78% 3.85% 3.88% 1.25% 1.00% 1.16% 1.50% 1.50% 1.75% 2.00% 2.25% 2.50% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50% BUND 10yr bond yield 3.38% 3.78% 3.10% 3.10% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 3.75% 3.55% 3.50% Interest expenses 622 789 1041 929 509 615 657 734 732 786 857 902 953 1018 1018 Retail 129 199 311 347 105 82 101 140 145 180 2.36% 2.05% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.	Implied Interest Earnings	771	966	1291	1235	899	0/00:	0/00.1	0/07.1	0.00.1	2.00 /0	2.00 /0		· · · · · ·	0/ 00.7		0/ 00-7
Interest expenses 622 789 1041 929 509 615 657 734 732 786 857 902 953 1015 1018 Interest expenses 622 789 1041 929 509 615 657 734 732 786 857 902 953 1015 1018 Retail 129 199 311 347 105 82 11.16% 1.50% 1.56% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% Ray Dolocy rate 2.02% 2.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% 0.20% 2.05% 2.75% 2.75% RATEM1 Spread over official -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% 0.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%		2.02% 3.38%	2.78% 3.78%	3.85% 4 23%	3.88% 4.00%	1.25% 3.27%	1.00% 3.10%	1.16% 3.50%	1.50% 4.00%	1.50% 4.00%	1.75% 4.00%	2.00% 4.00%	2.25% 4.00%	2.50% 3.75%	2.75% 3.75%	2.75% 3.50%	2.75% 3.50%
Interest expenses 622 789 1041 929 509 615 657 734 732 786 857 902 953 1015 1018 Interest expenses 129 199 311 347 105 82 101 140 145 180 239 276 316 359 371 Retail 129 199 3.85% 1.25% 1.00% 1.16% 1.50% 1.75% 2.00% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% Ray Tetail -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% 2.05% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% RATEM1 Spread over official -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% 0.20% 0.00% <td< td=""><td></td><td>2000</td><td></td><td>0/07:1</td><td>200-t</td><td>0.13.0</td><td>20.0</td><td>0,00.0</td><td>0/00-t</td><td>2/00-t</td><td>0/00-+</td><td>0/00·t</td><td>0/00·t</td><td>0.070</td><td>0.0.0</td><td>0.00.0</td><td>0/00.0</td></td<>		2000		0/07:1	200-t	0.13.0	20.0	0,00.0	0/00-t	2/00-t	0/00-+	0/00·t	0/00·t	0.070	0.0.0	0.00.0	0/00.0
Netal 125 3.11 0.2<	Interest expenses	622	789	1041	929	509	615 82	657	734	732	786	857	902 776	953 216	1015 260	1018 274	1031
RATEM1 Spread over official -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% -0.20% 0.00%		2.02%	2.78%	3.85%	3.88%	1.25%	1.00%	1.16%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	2.00%	2.25%	2.50%	2.75%	2.75%	2.75%
	RATEM1	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Euro Area: Base Scenario

EUR billion						<u>a</u>	Projection period										
		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
RATEM2 RATEM3 RATEM4 RATEEXTL	Key policy rate Spread over official Wholesale (non-capital) Short-term Key policy rate Spread over official Long-term 10yr bond yield Spread over official External Average interest rate	2.02% 0.75% 209% 11 2.02% 1.00% 3.38% 2.61% 4.60%	2.78% 0.75% 234 15 2.78% 1.00% 2.78% 3.78% 2.22% 4.47% 803	3.85% 0.75% 303 305% 385% 1.00% 2.87% 2.87% 2.87% 2.87% 2.87% 3.49%	3.88% 0.75% 298 30 3.88% 1.00% 1.00% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 1.14	1.25% 0.75% 262 13 1.00% 249 3.27% 2.50% 2.50% 3.27%	1.00% 0.75% 263 10 1.00% 1.00% 2.53 3.10% 2.75% 3.50%	1.16% 0.75% 269 10 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 2.59 3.50% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50%	1.50% 0.75% 274 11 1.50% 1.00% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50%	1.50% 0.75% 2.56 1.00% 1.50% 1.00% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50%	1.75% 0.75% 0.75% 11 1.75% 1.00% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50%	2.00% 0.75% 0.75% 11 2.00% 1.00% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50%	2.25% 0.75% 0.75% 10 2.25% 1.00% 1.00% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50%	2.50% 0.75% 174 174 10 2.50% 1.00% 1.00% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50%	2.75% 0.75% 155 155 9 2.75% 1.00% 1.00% 1.146 3.75% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50%	2.75% 0.75% 130 2.75% 1.00% 1.00% 3.50% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50% 3.50%	2.75% 0.75% 112 7 2.75% 1.00% 3.50% 2.75% 2.75% 3.50% 3.50%
Net interest earnings	earnings	281	294	311	306	391	331	356	427	446	449	454	470	423	427	410	421
00E Oth NIC No	Other earnings Non-interest costs	237 337	296 357	291 373	254 347	270 354	276 354	282 356	289 358	302 366	314 373	321 374	329 376	342 383	351 386	364 393	377 398
Operating pr CREDLOS Cri	Operating profits (pre-credit losses) CREDLOS Credit Losses (-)	182 -30	233 -37	229 -48	214 -218	307 -245	253 -110	283 -111	359 -116	382 -80	389 -108	400 -154	423 -143	382 -113	392 -147	382 -125	400 -144
Income before tax Tax Net Income	ore tax IX	152 30 122	196 35 161	181 28 153	ΰ <u>0</u> 4	61 12 49	143 29 114	172 34 137	242 48 194	302 60 242	281 56 225	246 49 197	280 56 224	269 54 215	245 49 196	257 51 205	256 51 205
ROE ROA	Return on Equity Return on Assets	9.65% 0.54%	11.63% 0.65%	9.74% 0.55%	-0.22% -0.01%	2.65% 0.16%	5.84% 0.36%	6.82% 0.43%	9.39% 0.60%	11.42% 0.74%	10.38% 0.67%	8.86% 0.57%	9.88% 0.65%	9.36% 0.61%	8.43% 0.54%	8.71% 0.56%	8.60% 0.54%
Macroeconor	Macroeconomic Framework																
Nominal GDP growth Basidital	3DP growth Bosidinal	3.8	5.1	5.2	2.8	-3.0	2.2	2.4	2.5	4.4	3.9	2.3	2.6	3.8	2.8	3.7	3.3
RGDPG PGDPG	Real growth GDP deflator	1.8 2.0	3.1 2.0	2.8 2.4	0.5 2.2	-4.0 1.1	0.1	1.1 1.4	1.0 1.5	2.3 2.0	1.6 2.3	0.2 2.1	0.7 1.9	1.7 2.1	0.8 2.0	1.6 2.1	1.2 2.1
	Output gap	-0.5	1.0	1.9	0.7	-4.5	-4.3	-3.5	-2.8	-0.4	0.0	-0.3	-0.8	-0.3	-0.7	-0.1	0.1
	Employment (thousands) %oya	136958 2.4	139705 2.0	142478 2.0	144188 1.2	141860 -1.6	141238 -0.4	142471 0.9	143678 0.8	145721 1.4	147808 - 1.4	148766 1 0.6	149511 1 0.5	151109 - 1.1	152542 ⁻ 0.9	154163 - 1.1	155835 1.1
Risk-weighted %oya	ad %oya	11.5	11.3	1.8	9.8	-3.1	1.8	2.7	1.8	4.2	3.6	1.3	1.8	3.5	2.1	3.4	2.9
Bank assets	%oya	23634 10.7	25945 9.8	29440 13.5	31837 8.1	31147 -2.2	31546 1.3	31994 1.4	32346 1.1	33303 3.0	34150 2.5	34474 0.9	34918 1.3	35795 2.5	36339 1.5	37245 2.5	38047 2.2
Bank credit t	%GDP Bank credit to private sector %ova	290.3 8838 9.3	303.2 9807 11.0	326.9 11008 12.2	343.8 11901 8.1	346.6 11951 0.4	343.5 12280 2.8	340.1 12605 2.6	335.5 12860 2.0	330.9 13555 5.4	326.6 14169 4.5	322.3 14404 1.7	318.2 14726 2.2	314.3 15362 4.3	310.4 15757 2.6	306.8 16413 4.2	303.3 16996 3.5
Nonbank cre	%وتاله Nonbank credit to private sector	2037 2037	114.6 2153 5.7	2139 2139	2217 2217	133.0 2327 5.0	133./ 2443 5.0	134.0 2562 4.0	133.4 2680 4.6	134.7 2849 6.0	3015 3015	134.7 3148 11	134.2 3296 4 7	134.9 3485 5 7	134.6 3655 4.0	3862 5 5 2	4069 4069
Private secto	%oya %GUA Private sector (EUR billion) %oya	3.9 25.0 10874 8.2	5.7 25.2 11960 10.0	-0.6 23.8 13147 9.9	3.7 23.9 14118 7.4	5.0 25.9 14278 1.1	5.0 26.6 14723 3.1	4.9 27.2 15168 3.0	4.6 27.8 15540 2.5	0.3 28.3 16403 5.6	2.8 28.8 17184 4.8	4.4 29.4 17552 2.1	4.7 30.0 18022 2.7	3.7 30.6 18847 4.6	4.9 31.2 19412 3.0	31.8 31.8 20276 4.4	5.4 32.4 21065 3.9
86 Nominal GDP	ē	8141	8558	9006	9259	8985	9183	9407	9641	10064	10456	10695	10975	11389	11708	12140	12546

Euro Area: Regulatory Change Scenario

								Projection period	riod										
EUR billion		2005	2006		2007	2008	2009	2010		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Bank Balance	Bank Balance Sheet Model						<u> </u>												
			s	Current risk- weighting					New risk- weighting										
Bank Assets		23634)	29440	31837	31147	31758)	33002	33734	35414	35860	36218	36956	37881	38408	39364	40166
GOV	Cash Government bonds	156 1432	174 1279	0% 5%	379 1197	456 1245	369 1483	397 1667	0% 5%	462 2508	506 3542	708 4604					960 4801		5021
LIQ/TA	Liquid asset ratio	6.7%	5.6%		5.4%	5.3%	5.9%	6.5 %		9.0%	12.0 %	15.0%	15.0% 1		15.0% 1	15.0% ·	15.0% ·	15.0% 1	15.0%
B A D	Domestic financial Trading Book	/990 650	2108	100%	9999 806	10835	10001	10600	300%	1000	10001	1000							
IB (BB)	Banking Book	7344	7880	25%	0206	9820	9642	9600	25%	0096	9600	0096	9550	9500	9500	9500	9500	9500	9500
CORP CORP TE	Domestic non-financial	4656 EEA	5285	020	6212	7012	6996	7185	760/	7283	7057	7166	7328	7456	7701	8015	8179 1750	8503	8768
CORP (BB)	I rading Book Banking Book	200 4105	040 4639	%C7 %001	933 5259	5606	1498 5498	1538 5647	%C/	5883	135U 5707	5816	135U 5978	6106	6351	135U 6665	135U 6829	1350 7153	7418
	%oya	7.7	13.0		13.4	6.6	-1.9	2.7		4.2	-3.0	1.9	2.8	2.1	4.0	4.9	2.5	4.7	3.7
НН	Household	4182 2011	4523	200%	4796 3420	4889 3400	4955	3750	500%	5159 3750	4999 3700	3700	5191 3750	5282 3800	5455 3850	3000	5794 3050	6023 4000	6210
CC	Other	1271	1320	50%	1367	1398	1405	1340	50%	1409	1299	1376	1441	1482	1605	1777	1844	2023	2210
EXTA	External	3656	4337		4879	4754	4264	4348		4423	4406	4504	4622	4730	4882	5060	5186	5372	5538
EXTA (HG) EXTA (EM)	High-grade Riskv (EM)	2815 841	3339 998	25% 100%	3756 1122	3501 1253	3096 1168	3157 1191	25% 100%	32/3 1150	3256 1150	3354 1150	3472 1150	3580 1150	3/0/ 1175	3860 1200	3961 1225	4122 1250	4263 1275
	Fixed Assets	166	173	100%	206	212	219	224	100%	232	238	249	253	255	260	267	271	277	283
	Other Assets	1391	1563	100%	1806	2435	2204	2247	100%	2335	2387	2505	2537		2614	2680	2717	2785	2842
RWA	Risk-weighted assets RWA/Total Assets	12699 54%	14134 54%		14385 49%	15795 50%	15302 49%	15611		16874	16685	17043	17312		17975	18542	18859	19442	19929
Bank Liahilitiac	i	<u> </u>	24491		97757	30070	20231	20765		30888	31517	33064					35608		37203
M1	Retail	7374	8026		8994	9881	10160	10381		10560	10519	10754		11294 1	11655 -		12382		13223
M2	Domestic financial	5547	5938		6842	7686	7040	7193		7317	7289	7452					8580		9163
M3	Wholesale (non-capital) Short-tarm (~1 wear)	3844 357	4234		4631 507	4848 633	4920 496	4924 196		5620 400	6345 400	7331	6961 400	6603 400	6399 400	6239 400	5979 400	5856 400	5652 400
	Long-term (> 1 year)	3487	3806		4034	4215	4424	4427		5220	5945	6931	6561	6203	5999	5839	5579	5456	5252
EXTL	External	3526	3991		4538	4403	4098	4187		4259	4243	4338	4452	4556	4701	4873	4995	5173	5334
	Other Liabilities	2027	2302		2751	3252	3013	3079		3132	3120	3189	3273	3350	3457	3583	3672	3804	3922
Capital		1315	1454		1684	1767	1915	1993		2114	2217	2350	2491	2590	2667	2736	2800	2820	2872
T2	Tier II	385	452		417	475	465	465		465	525	585	645	645	600	550	500	465	465 0075
TCE	Core	1031 876	963		943	1155	1227	1274		1391	1435	1503	1578	1912 1671	2005 1786	2 1 5 4 1 8 9 6	2003	2049	2093
T1-TCE	Non-core	155	170		166	204	216	221		225	224	229	235	241	248	257	264	273	282
REGCAP	Regulatory	1416	1586		1526	1834	1908	1960 20		2081 20	2184 22	2317	2458 20	2557	2635	2704	2767	2787	2840 20
REGADJ	Regulatory Adjustments	-101	-132		157	-99	~	33		33	33	33	33	g	ee S	33	ŝ	ee S	ŝ
Key Capital ratios REGCAP/RW# Regu	Key Capital ratios REGCAP/RW⊁Regulatory Capital	11.2%	11.2%		10.6%	11.6%	12.5%	12.6%			13.1%	13.6%							14.2%
BIS	Regulatory minimum	8.0%	8.0%		8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%			10.0%	10.0%		11.0% 1	11.0% 1		10.0% 1	10.0% 1	0.0%
BUFCAP T1 (D111)	National buffer (%pts)	3.2%	3.2%		2.6%	3.6%	4.5%	4.6%		4.3%	3.1%	3.6%							4.2%
	Core Tier I	8.1% 6.0%	8.U%		1.1% 6.6%	8.6%	9.4% 8.0%	9.0% 8.0%		9.0% 8.0%	9.9% 8,6%	%2.UL %8.8	0.1% 10.5%		۱۱.3% ا م ۵۵% ا	11.6% 10.0%	12.0%	11.9% 1	8.LL ام ج%
BIS(T1)	Reg	4.0%	4.0%		4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%		4.0%	6.0%	6.0%		7.0%					6.0%
BUFCAP (T1)	~	4.1%	4.0%		3.7%	4.6%	5.4%	5.6%		5.6%	3.9%	4.2%					6.0%		5.9%
LEVRAT	Heverage ratio	4.4% 16.7	4.4% 16.4		4.4% 19.3	4.4% 17.4	4.4% 16.3	4.4% 16.2		4.4% 15.9	4.4% 15.4	4.4% 15.3				4.4% 14.0	4.4% 13.9		4.4% 14.1
99	,																		

Euro Area: Regulatory Change Scenario

					đ	Decision posion										
EUR billion					<u> </u>											
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Key Liquidity ratios								-			1			-	•	
Liquidity coverage ratio Net stable funding ratio						3/./ 6/ 0	49.9 67 0	69.2 71 A	81.3 75.5	80.6 74.2	73.0	71 B	70.6	11.1 60 5	0.77 68.3	/6.4 67 3
Cash/Assets	0.66%	0.67%	1.29%	1.43%	1.18%	1.25%	1.40%	1.50%	2.00%	2.25%	2.50%	2.50%		2.50%	2.50%	
Bank Core Capital Supply Model																
						:						-			!	
Total new Core Capital					ľ	48	117	44	68	75	94	115	110	107	45	4
NEWICE Required new issuance					1	17 70/	10 00	09 15 50/	00 12 00		1 1 1 0					0 00
DEDEE Dodofinition official					ľ	<i>w</i>	0/2/21	%0.CI	%Z'1					0% / 721		0.2%
					1	48	0 67	-60	-00- 78	-00 85	94	115	110	107	0 45	o 44
PROFRET/PRt % of profits retained					1	40%	65%	65%	65%	65%	65%	65%	65%	65%	25%	25%
Banking Sector P&L Model																
Interest earnings	903	1082	1352	1235	898	948	1051	1289	1352	1420	1463	1501	1505	1563	1527	1541
Cash	e	5	11	16	5	4	5	7	6	13	17	21	23	26		27
FFUNDS 10yr bond yield	2.02%	2.78%	3.85%	3.88%	1.25%	1.00%	1.16%	1.50%	1.50%			2.25%				2.75%
Government bonds	46 2 2807	51 2 7807	52 1 0007	49	45	49	73 75	121	163	184	182	183	175 2 75 0/	179	170	174 2 500/
Domestic financial	0.00% 199	307	4.23%	4.00% 349	102	3.10% 127	3.30% 146	4.00% 184	4.00 % 184							296
Trading Book	22	26	34	38	33	31	35	40	40	40		40	38	38		35
BOND 10yr bond yield	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%							3.50%
Banking Book	178	280	411	311	69	96		144								261
TUYr bond yield SPRFAD (RANK) Viald curve soread	3.38% -0 91%	3.78% -0.10%	4.23% D.62%	4.00% -0 70%	3.27%	3.10% -2 10%	3.50% -	4.00% -2.50%	4.00% -2.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00% -1 75% -	3./5%	3.75%	3.50% -0	3.50% -0 75%
2	189	233	304	348	377	365		460								484
Trading Book	22	28	42	62	78	78	79	88	89							76
-	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%				3.75%			3.50%
SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Banking Book	0.86% 168	0.90% 205	1.05% 261	1.27% 286	2.12 %	2.04 % 287	1.85% 309	2.42% 372	2.59% 380	2.54 % 386	2.52% 394	2.40% 399		2.35% 2.411	2.28%	2.11%
10yr bond yield	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%		4.00%	4.00%				3.75%			3.50%
SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread	0.86%	0.90%	1.05%	1.27%	2.12%	2.04%		2.42%	2.59%							2.11%
Household	162	207	250	256 183	210	258 188	274	326	332							343
10vr bond vield	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%		4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%			3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
SPREAD (HH) Lending spread	0.60%	1.02%	1.17%	1.30%	0.54%	2.04%		2.42%	2.59%							2.11%
Other	53	61	71	73	76	71	74	87	88							119
SEPEAD (ULU) 1 200 Sield	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%
Real b	2.29%	2.68%	2.91%	3.12%	4.29%	3.95%	4.09%	5.46%	5.29%							3.54%
External	171	193	229	216	159	145	165	190	195							216
High grade	86	116	150	145	108	97	113	131	132							147
10yr bond yield	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%					3.75% :		3.50%
Risky (EM)	85	11	522.	71	52	48	53	60	63							69
-	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%							3.50%
SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread	7.82%	4.56% 006	3.22%	2.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.20%	1.50%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%
FCB Key policy rate	% 40 6	2 78%	3 85%	3 88%	1 25%	1 00%	1 16%	1 50%	1 50%	1 75%	2 00%	2 25%	2 50%	2 75%	2 75% S	2 75%
Δ	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%	3.10%	3.50%	4.00%	4.00%							3.50%
Interest exmenses	600	780	1011	000	508	601	5773	070	1063	1130	1160	1180	1000	1065	12/10	1067
Retail	129	199	311	347	105	82	121	184	186	218	251	287	326	367	378	391
Key policy rate	2.02%	2.78%	3.85%	3.88%	1.25%	1.00%	1.16%	1.50%	1.50%							.75%
RATEM1	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	0.00%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25% (0.25% (0.25%
Domestic financial	151	203	294	336	147	125	139	164	166							316

Euro Area: Regulatory Change Scenario

FLIR hillion						<u>a</u>	Projection period										
		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
RATEM2 RATEM3 RATEM3	Key policy rate Spread over official Wholesale (non-capital) Short-term Key policy rate Spread over official Long-term 10yr bond vield Spread over official	2.02% 0.75% 209 11 2.02% 3.38% 3.38%	2.78% 0.75% 234 15 2.78% 2.78% 3.78% 2.19	3.85% 0.75% 303 303 305 1.00% 4.278 2.87%	3.88% 0.75% 298 30 3.88% 1.00% 268 4.00%	1.25% 0.75% 262 13 1.25% 1.25% 249 3.27%	1.00% 0.75% 269 10 1.00% 1.00% 3.10% 259 3.10%	1.16% 0.75% 335 107 1.16% 1.00% 3.50% 3.25%	1.50% 0.75% 475 14 1.50% 2.00% 461 4.00%	1.50% 0.75% 561 14 1.50% 2.00% 4.00% 4.50%	1.75% 0.75% 572 15 1.75% 2.00% 4.00% 4.25%	2.00% 0.75% 541 541 2.00% 1.50% 4.00% 4.05%	2.25% 0.75% 502 14 2.25% 4.00% 4.00%	2.50% 0.75% 459 15 2.50% 1.25% 3.75% 3.75%	2.75% 0.75% 429 15 2.75% 1.00% 414 3.75% 3.50%	2.75% 0.75% 387 387 2.75% 15 1.00% 3.50% 3.50% 3.25%	2.75% 0.75% 376 15 2.75% 1.00% 3.50% 3.25%
RATEEXTL	External Average interest rate Implied Interest Expense	146 4.60% 635	168 4.47% 803	149 3.49% 1057	134 3.00% 1116	128 3.00% 642	3.50%	3.50%	3.50%	3.50%	154 3.50%	158 3.50%	162 3.50%	3.50%	3.50%	178 3.50%	184 3.50%
Net interest earnings	earnings	281	294	311	306	391	328	308	317	288	288	301	312	285	298	278	274
00E NIC No	Other earnings Non-interest costs	237 337	296 357	291 373	254 347	270 354	276 344	280 332	279 314	285 306	293 299	300 291	309 285	321 281	329 274	340 271	351 265
Operating pr CREDLOS Cre	Operating profits (pre-credit losses) CREDLOS Credit Losses (-)	182 -30	233 -37	229 -48	214 -218	307 -245	260 -111	256 -127	281 -172	268 -112	282 -113	310 -124	336 -109	324 -106	352 -140	348 -114	360 -133
Income before tax Tax o/w B8	ire tax .x o/w Bank Fund Levy	152 30	196 35	181 28	ο Υ	61 12	149 30	129 26	109 27 5	157 36 5	170 39 5	186 42 5	227 50 5	218 49 5	212 47 5	233 52 5	227 50 5
Net Income		122	161	153	4-	49	119	103	82	120	131	144	177	169	165	182	176
ROE ROA	Return on Equity Return on Assets	9.65% 0.54%	11.63 <i>%</i> 0.65 <i>%</i>	9.74% 0.55%	-0.22% -0.01%	2.65% 0.16%	6.10% 0.38%	5.02% 0.32%	3.80% 0.25%	5.27% 0.35%	5.40% 0.37%	5.66% 0.40%	6.72% 0.48%	6.27% 0.45%	5.95% 0.43%	6.47% 0.47%	6.19% 0.44%
Macroeconor	Macroeconomic Framework																
Nominal GDP growth Residual	àDP growth Residual	3.8	5.1	5.2	2.8	-3.0	2.2 -0.7	1.7 -0.4	-0.4	2.2	2.6	2.3	3.2	3.6	2.5	3.6	3.1
RGDPG PGDPG	Real growth GDP deflator	1.8 2.0	3.1 2.0	2.8 2.4	0.5 2.2	-4.0 1.1	1.0	0.5 1.3	-1.3 1.0	0.9 1.3	1.0 1.6	0.6 1.7	1.3 1.9	1.5 2.1	0.5 2.0	1.5 2.1	1.0 2.1
	Output gap	-0.5	1.0	1.9	0.7	-4.5	-4.3	-4.0	-5.5	-3.9	-2.3	-2.0	-1.1	-0.1	9.0-	-0.2	-0.2
	Employment (thousands) %oya	136958 2.4	139705 2.0	142478 2.0	144188 1.2	141860 -1.6	141225 -0.4	142070 0.6	141615 -0.3	141934 0.2	143100 0.8	144084 0.7	145365 0.9	147041 1.2	148167 0.8	149550 0.9	151009 1.0
Risk-weighted %oya	d %oya	11.5	11.3	1.8	9.8	-3.1	2.0	8.1	- 1.1	2.1	1.6	1.2	2.6	3.2	1.7	3.1	2.5
Bank assets Bank credit to Nonbank cred Private sector	Bank assets %oya %GDP Bank credit to private sector %GDP Nonbank credit to private sector %oya %OPA Private sector (EUR billion) %oya %oya	23634 10.7 290.3 8838 9.3 108.6 2037 2037 2037 2037 2037 2037 8.2 8.2	25945 9.8 907 11.0 114.6 2153 2153 2153 11.960 11.00	29440 13.5 326.9 11008 12.2 12.2 12.2 2139 2139 2139 2139 2139 2139 2139 213	31837 8.1 343.8 11901 8.1 11901 8.1 128.5 2217 3.7 23.9 14118 7.4	31147 -2.2 346.6 11951 0.4 133.0 2327 5.0 25.9 1.1	31758 2.0 345.9 12275 12275 133.7 133.7 2442 4.9 4.9 2442 4.9 2442 3.1 3.1	33002 3.9 3.53.4 1242 1.4 13.2 2546 2.546 2.3 2.3 13.2 2.3 1.3 2 1.3 2 1.3 1.3 2 1.3 12 13 12 13 12 13 12 14 12 12 14 12 14 12 14 12 14 12 14 12 14 12 14 12 14 12 12 14 12 12 14 12 14 12 12 14 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12	33734 2.2 362.6 -3.1 12055 -3.1 120.6 2598 2.0 27.9 14653 -2.2	35414 5.0 372.4 12243 1.6 128.7 2711 4.4 28.5 2.1	35860 1.3 367.4 12519 2.3 128.3 28.3 4.7 29.1 15358 29.1	36218 1.0 362.6 127.3 127.5 2965 4.5 29.7 29.7 2.2	36956 2.0 358.5 13156 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 5.2 5.2 30.3 30.3 30.3	37881 2.5 354.6 13693 4.1 128.2 3295 5.6 30.8 16988 4.4	38408 1.4 350.7 13973 2.0 127.6 3447 4.6 31.5 2.5	39364 2.5 347.1 14526 4.0 128.1 3639 5.6 5.6 4.3 4.3	40166 2.0 343.5 14978 3.1 128.1 3826 5.1 3826 5.1 3826 3.7 3826 3.7 332.7 332.7
Nominal GDP	٩	8141	8558	9006	9259	8985	9181	9338	9303	9510	9760	9988	10307	10683	10950	11342	11694

Euro Area: Historical Dataset

EUR billion

2009		369 369 1483 5.9% 10657	5000 9642 6996 1498 -1.9 -1.9	3550 1405 1264 1168 2219 2219 15302 49%	29231 10160 7040 4920 4926 4424 4098 3013 1915 1915 1227 1227 1227 1227 1227 1227 1227 12	12.5% 8.0% 9.4% 8.0% 4.4% 5.4% 16.3
2008		456 456 1245 5.3% 10835	5606 6.6 6.6 6.6	13490 1398 4754 3501 1253 212 2435 15795 15795 50%	30070 9881 7686 4848 633 4215 4215 4203 3252 3252 1767 1767 1758 1155 1155 1155 1155 1155 1155 115	11.6% 8.0% 3.6% 7.3% 4.6% 4.4%
2007		5.4% 5.4% 9966	896 896 6212 953 953 13.4 13.4 13.4	3429 3429 4879 3756 1122 206 1385 14385 49%	27757 8994 6842 6842 597 4034 4538 4538 4538 4538 2751 1109 943 1109 1109 1109 1526 157	10.6% 8.0% 7.7% 6.6% 3.7% 19.3
	Current risk- weighting	0% 5%	10% 25% 100%	50% 50% 100% 100%		
2006		5.6% 8612	732 732 5285 646 4639 13.0 4523	3203 1320 4337 3339 998 998 173 1563 14134 14134 54%	24491 8026 5938 4234 4234 3391 2302 1454 1454 1134 963 170 1586 -132	11.2% 8.0% 8.0% 6.8% 4.0% 4.4% 16.4
2005		156 156 1432 6.7% 7996	652 652 7344 7344 552 4105 7.7 4182 4182	2911 1271 3656 2815 841 166 1391 12699 12699	22319 7374 5547 3547 3526 3487 3526 2027 1315 2027 1315 385 1031 876 1315 1315 1315 1031 1416 1155 1115 1116	11.2% 8.0% 8.1% 6.9% 4.1% 4.1% 4.4%
2004		139 1300 6.7% 7645	627 627 4278 466 3812 4.3 3808 3808	2592 1217 2943 2266 677 160 11392 11392 53%	20153 6779 5386 3497 3497 3497 3497 3492 1676 1576 1203 351 924 1203 351 1203 351 1203 351 1275 1275	11.2% 8.0% 8.1% 6.9% 4.1% 4.1% 16.8
2003		114 1243 6.8% 7178	583 583 6595 4082 4082 3654 3.5 3521 3.5	2361 1160 2568 591 591 162 933 10578 10578	18650 6410 5014 3161 3161 3302 2606 1150 1150 326 978 978 978 978 1304 1304	12.3% 8.0% 9.2% 7.9% 4.0% 5.2% 4.4%
2002		129 129 1135 6.7% 6816	327 3327 3327 3327 3327	2189 1139 2460 1894 566 168 880 880 10113 54%	17706 6061 4670 2893 2895 2709 1389 1389 1105 300 901 766 1135 11201	11.9% 8.0% 3.9% 8.9% 4.0% 4.4% 15.7
2001		143 143 6.7% 6499	3798 3798 3798 336 336 336 3362 3146 3146	2026 1120 2403 553 168 933 933 935 9859 9859	17128 5867 4266 2883 2893 2687 1425 1425 1038	
	2001-06 risk- weighting	%0	10% 25% 100%	100% 25% 100% 100%		
Bank Balance Sheet Model		Cash Cash Liquid asset ratio Domestic financial	Trading Book Banking Book Domestic non-financial Trading Book Banking Book Woya Household	worgages Other External High-grade Risky (EM) Fixed Assets Other Assets Risk-weighted assets RWA/Total Assets	ties Retail Domestic financial Wholesale (non-capital) Short-term (<1 year) Long-term (>1 year) External External-term (>1 year) Core Other Liabilities Other Liabilities Tier II Tier II Tier II Regulatory Adjustments	Key Capital ratios REGCAP/RW/ Regulatory Capital BIS Regulatory minimum BUFCAP National buffer (%pts) T1/RWA Tier I TCE/RWA Core Tier I BIS(T1) Regulatory minimum BUFCAP (T1) Regulatory minimum BUFCAP (T1) Required buffer (%pts) BUFCAP (T1) Leverage ratio
Bank Balanc		LIQ GOV LIQ/TA IB	III (IIII) IIII (IIII) IIII (IIII) CORP (IIII) CORP (IIII) HH	MUHI EXTA (HG) EXTA (EM) EXTA (EM)	Bank Liabilities M1 Re M2 Do M3 Do M3 V M3 Capital T1 T1 T1 T1 T1-TCE T1-TCE T1-TCE T1-TCE T1-TCE T1-TCE T1-TCE T1-TCE T1-TCE	Key Capital ratios REGCAP/RW/ Regu BIS Rego BUFCAP T1/RWA Tierl T1/RWA Tierl T1/RWA Tierl BUFCAP (T1) Regu BUFCAP (T1) Regu

Euro Area: Historical Dataset

EUR billion

	1000	0000	0000		1000	0000	1000	0000	
Key Liquidity ratios Liquidity coverage ratio Net stable funding ratio	1002	2002	6002	1002	6002	0007	002	0002	6002
Cash/Assets Bank Core Capital Supply Model	0.78%	0.69%	0.57%	0.65%	0.66%	0.67%	1.29%	1.43%	1.18%
Total new Core Capital NEWTCE Required new issuance RROE Core equity shadow price REDEF Redefinition effects PROFRET Retained income PROFRET/PR% of profits retained									
Banking Sector P&L Model									
nterest earnings	1017	922	827	795	903	1082	1352	1235	868
Cash EELINDS 10th hand vield	70 BC 1	4 2 2 2 2 0 6	3 2 2606	300%	3000 0	5 2 78%	11 2 86%	16 З 88%	5 1 2606
Gov	4.60 %	53	49	52 52	46	51	52	3.00 % 49	45
BOND 10yr bond yield	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	4.07%	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
Domestic financial		23	161 20	173	199	307	445	349	102
Irading Book BOND 10vr hond viald	70 CA 1	700%	23	%2U 7 GZ	77. 77.	20% 3 78%	34	38	33 27%
-	0/ 70· F		138	148	178	280	411	311	69
	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	4.07%	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
SPREAD (BANK) Yield curve spread Domestic non-financial			-1.95% 186	-1.89% 186	-0.91% 189	-0.10% 233	0.62% 304	-0.70% 348	-2.55% 378
Trading Book			19	20	22	28	42	62	78
-	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	4.07%	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Banking Book			0.56% 167	0.38% 166	0.86% 168	0.90% 205	1.05% 261	1.27% 286	2.13% 300
	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	4.07%	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread			0.56%	0.38%	0.86%	0.90%	1.05%	1.27%	2.13%
Household			154	154	162	207	250	256	210
Inorigages 10vr bond vield	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	101	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
SPREAD (HH) Lending spread			0.31%	0.00%	0.60%	1.02%	1.17%	1.30%	0.54%
Other	27	54	54	53	53	61	71	73	76
6	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	4.07%	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
SPREAU (HH) Lenaing spread Real borrowing rate			0.00% 0.45%	0.38% 2.62%	0.80% 2 29%	0.90% 2.68%	0.15% %01.1	3 12%	2.13%
External		146	153	144	171	193	229	216	159
High grade		06	79	86	86	116	150	145	108
10yr bond yield	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	4.07%	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
Risky (EM)		56	74	58	85	77	62	71	52
-	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	4.07%	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread		5.28%	8.63%	5.01%	7.82%	4.56%	3.22%	2.00%	1.00%
ECB Key policy rate	4.28%	3.22%	2.26%	2.00%	2.02%	2.78%	3.85%	3.88%	1.25%
0	4.82%	4.79%	4.10%	4.07%	3.38%	3.78%	4.23%	4.00%	3.27%
interest expenses	762	650	555	521	622	789	1041	929	509
Hetail	1000	08L	128	119	129	199	311	347	105 105
RATEM1 Spread over official	-0.20%	%020- -0.20%	%02.0- -0.20%	%00.7 -0.20%	~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	-0.20%	3.02 <i>%</i> -0.20%	-0.20%	%02'U-
Don		177	146	143	151	203	294	336	147

Euro Area: Historical Dataset

EUR billion

		2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
RATEM2	Key policy rate Spread over official Wholesale (non-capital) Short-term	4.28% 0.75%	3.22% 0.75% 209	2.26% 0.75% 198 10	2.00% 0.75% 192 10	2.02% 0.75% 209 11	2.78% 0.75% 234 15	3.85% 0.75% 303 25	3.88% 0.75% 298 30	1.25% 0.75% 262 13
RATEM3	Key policy rate Spread over official Long-term	4.28% 1.00%	3.22% 1.00% 197	2.26% 1.00% 189	2.00% 1.00% 182	2.02% 1.00% 199	2.78% 1.00% 219	3.85% 1.00% 278	3.88% 1.00% 268	1.25% 1.00% 249
RATEM4 RATEEXTL	10yr bond yield Spread over official External Average interest rate Implied Interest Expense	4.82% 2.00% 3.00%	4.79% 2.60% 95 3.59% 661	4.10% 2.67% 94 3.63% 567	4.07% 1.99% 81 2.99% 534	3.38% 2.61% 146 4.60% 635	3.78% 2.22% 168 4.47% 803	4.23% 2.87% 149 3.49% 1057	4.00% 2.50% 134 3.00% 1116	3.27% 2.50% 128 3.00% 642
Net interest earnings	: earnings	255	273	272	274	281	294	311	306	391
00E NIC Of	Other earnings Non-interest costs	198 309	195 312	191 317	193 321	237 337	296 357	291 373	254 347	270 354
Operating p CREDLOS Cr	Operating profits (pre-credit losses) CREDLOS Credit Losses (-)	144 -47	156 -66	147 -57	146 -34	182 -30	233 -37	229 -48	214 -218	307 -245
Income before tax Tax Net Income	fore tax Tax ie	97 21 76	90 19 71	90 22 68	113 26 87	152 30 122	196 35 161	181 28 153	ΰo 4	61 12 49
ROE ROA	Return on Equity Return on Assets	7.31% 0.42%	6.64% 0.38%	6.04% 0.35%	7.40% 0.42%	9.65% 0.54%	11.63% 0.65%	9.74% 0.55%	-0.22% -0.01%	2.65% 0.16%
Macroecono	Vacroeconomic Framework									
Nominal GDP growth	aDP growth	4.4	3.5	3.0	3.9	3.8	5.1	5.2	2.8	-3.0
RGDPG PGDPG	estuar Real growth GDP deflator	1.9 2.4	0.9 2.6	0.8 2.2	2.0 1.8	1.8 2.0	3.1 2.0	2.8 2.4	0.5 2.2	-4.0 1.1
	Output gap	0.9	-0.2	-1.1	-0.8	-0.5	1.0	1.9	0.7	-4.5
	Employment (thousands) %oya	130456	131617 0.9	133080 1.1	133686 0.5	136958 2.4	139705 2.0	142478 2.0	144188 1.2	141860 -1.6
Risk-weighted %oya	ed %oya		2.6	4.6	7.7	11.5	11.3	1.8	9.8	-3.1
Bank assets	%oya %GDP	18166 256.7	18811 3.5 256.7	19800 5.3 262.2	21355 7.9 272.3	23634 10.7 290.3	25945 9.8 303.2	29440 13.5 326.9	31837 8.1 343.8	31147 -2.2 346.6
Bank credit 1	Bank credit to private sector %oya %CDD	6944 08 1	7223 4.0	7603 5.3	8086 6.4	8838 9.3	9807 11.0 114 6	11008 12.2 122 2	11901 8.1 128.5	11951 0.4
Nonbank cre	vouder Nonbank credit to private sector %ove	02	30.0 1795	1914 6.6	1961	2037	2153 5.7	2139 -0.6	2217 3.7	2327 5.0
Private sector	%GDF or (EUR billion) %oya	0.0 6944	24.5 9017 29.9	25.3 9516 5.5	25.0 10047 5.6	25.0 10874 8.2	25.2 11960 10.0	23.8 23.8 13147 9.9	23.9 14118 7.4	25.9 14278 1.1
Nominal GDP	Ъ	7078	7328	7550	7843	8141	8558	9006	9259	8985

Chapter 5

Impact on the Japanese Economy

Introduction and Summary

- Japan's relatively large and concentrated banking system stands out among the major economies as having been one of the most resilient through the latest crisis.
- There were no major banking failures in 2007-09: the number of banking institutions remained relatively stable through the crisis. The provision of emergency support to the domestic banking system through the crisis period was minimal. The disorder in Japan's money markets was nothing of the kind experienced in either the United States or Euro Area.
- There is, of course, a reason why Japan's banks, in aggregate, were able to avoid the troubles that many their US, Euro Area and UK counterparts encountered after July 2007. The sector had experienced over ten years of trauma, following the excessive lending boom in the 1980s.
- After the lost decade of the 1990s, the Japanese regulatory authorities launched various counter-measures to revive the financial sector. These measures could serve as a good road map for others to follow, especially subsequent developments showed that Japan's banks avoided the mistakes of other banking systems in the latest credit cycle—which was the first under this new regulatory regime.
- The Japanese economy will be adversely affected by changes projected under the reforms to Basel II, although not dramatically so. For 2011-2020 as a whole, average annual growth would be reduced by about two tenths, with the cumulative impact amounting to about 1.5% points through 2020. As with other jurisdictions, the dynamic of the hit from the regulatory change is quite adverse through 2013-14, which is when the maximum impact of higher capital charges (combined with negative redefinition effects) is felt.
- Moreover, these negative developments growth are apt to worsen two basic problems facing Japan: deflation and high budget deficits and public debt.
- One key unknown is whether Japanese banks will find investors will to buy the extra ¥15 trillion of Tier 1 (common) equity we project as necessary in the five

years through 2015. In our framework, equity issuance is possible, but at a price, which banks then pass on to their borrowing customers. If this is not possible, however, then banks would be forced to be more aggressive in cutting their balance sheets in the years ahead, adding yet further to downside deflation risks.

Resilient in the Latest Episode

Japan's relatively large and concentrated banking system stands out among the major economies as having been one of the most resilient through the latest crisis⁶⁰. This can be highlighted in a number of ways:

• There were no major banking failures in Japan in 2007-09: the number of banking institutions remained relatively stable through the crisis (Table 13);

The Japanese Banking System in Summary				
	Dec 06	Dec 07	Dec 08	Dec 09
Number of Banks (JBA measure)*	150	147	148	148
City Banks	6	6	6	6
Regional Banks	111	110	109	108
Other Banks	33	31	33	34
Total Assets (¥ trillion)	749	769	813	800
%oya	0.2	2.6	5.8	-1.6
%GDP	147.7	149.1	161.0	168.8
Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA, ¥ trillion)	550	561	592	556
%оуа	2.1	2.1	5.5	-6.1
Capital Ratios (all expressed as % of RWA)				
Regulatory Capital	7.3	7.6	7.7	9.6
Tier 1 Capital	5.4	5.6	5.6	6.8
Core Tier 1 Capital	3.3	3.3	3.3	4.1
Liquid Asset Ratio	12.9	11.5	12.5	16.0
Share of Banks in Credit Intermediation	41.3	50.1	52.6	52.6

* end March

Table 13

Sources: Bank of Japan, Japanese Bankers Association (JBA), Individual bank reports, IIF Staff estimates

- The provision of emergency support to the Japanese banking system through the crisis period was minimal (Charts 33 and 34). Some commitments of support were made, but there were no outright disbursements whether in the form of capital injections, asset purchases or guarantees. This is in stark contrast to most other G7 countries, especially the United States and United Kingdom.
- Credit losses reported by Japanese banks (and Asian bank more generally) have been relatively modest since the beginning of 2007 (Chart 35). Overall Asian credit

⁶⁰ Within the G7, the systems in Canada and Japan experienced least stress.

losses have been just 3.5 percent of those in the Americas, the overwhelming amount of which was in the United States.

- The disorder in Japan's money markets was significant, but nothing of the kind experienced in either the United States or Euro Area (Chart 36). As a result, the Bank of Japan was required to provide less in the way of liquidity support facilities and thus expanded its overall balance by far less than other major central banks.
- Finally, it should be noted that Japan's banking system became part of the solution in 2008Q4. The capital injection by MUFG into Morgan Stanley at the end of September is widely acknowledged to have been an important support, stopping the domino-like collapse of US investment banks⁶¹.





Chart 33

Source: Panetta et al. (2009)

⁶¹ See Paulson (2010), pp 271, 277 and 359-360.

Chart 34



Bank Rescue Package Commitments 2007-09

as percent of bank assets


Chart 35




*Includes writedowns and credit losses for banks/brokers, insurance companies and U.S. mortgage market GSEs. Losses since beginning of 2007.

Source: Bloomberg

Chart 36






Seen it, Done it

There is, of course, a reason why Japan's banks, in aggregate, were able to avoid the troubles that many their US, Euro Area and UK counterparts encountered after July 2007. The sector had experienced over ten years of trauma, following the excessive lending boom in the 1980s. A number of years passed between the bursting of the bubble (in 1989-90) and the first casualties in the banking system (1994). Once the financial system began to contact, however, a very painful 7 years ensued, during which time there was a major restructuring of the banking industry amid a phase of very poor financial performance (Chart 37)⁶².

Chart 37



Source: National sources and IIF estimates

After the lost decade of the 1990s, the Japanese regulatory authorities launched various counter-measures to revive the financial sector. It could be argued that this combination of measures would serve as a good road map for others to follow, especially subsequent developments showed that Japan's banks avoided the mistakes of other banking systems in the latest credit cycle—which was the first under this new regulatory regime⁶³. As illustrated above, the system has been quite resilient through the downturn, although the same cannot be said for the economy – which is an important

⁶² For more details, see Nakaso, H. (2001) and Ito, T. and Sasaki, Y.N. (1998).

⁶³ Another aspect of Japan's experience from the 1990s that is important is the likelihood that the tightening in regulation after 1994 contributed to Japanese banks' withdrawal from international lending which, in turn, contributed to the East Asia crisis. See Brana, S. and Lahet, D. (2009).

reminder that macro stability does not follow on automatically from banking sector stability. These measures included:

- The separation of non-performing loans from the balance sheet by imposing strict risk assessment;
- The introduction of safety nets such as deposit insurance;
- The introduction of far more rigorous supervision;
- The introduction of a bankruptcy resolution framework that insulated against the "too big too fail" problem.

Significantly, these measures were introduced ahead of subsequent measures to boost capital. Caution was also taken with regard to the implementation of stricter capital regulation (e.g. the improvement of the quality of capital) so that it would not undermine banks' ability to intermediate credit. Indeed, Japan's banks went into the latest crisis with both relatively low capital ratios (by global standards) and with a capital structure that would be viewed as poor quality.

Alongside these regulatory reforms, there were a whole host of mergers: some forced; others voluntary. The resulting banking system can be broken into two broad groups: several large "City" banks (often known as "mega-banks"), and a set of smaller regional banks (Table 13). Private banks account for about a half of the credit intermediation process in the economy, which broadly lies about half way between the United States and the Euro Area. These private banks can then be combined with co-operative-type private financial institutions to form the universe of private depository institutions⁶⁴. These private institutions then combine with relatively large public sector financial institutions (including, most prominently, Japan Post Bank) to make up the overall debt intermediation system.

While its relative recent stability has been important, there are two other, less encouraging aspects about the banking system that need bearing in mind when considering proposals for regulatory reform:

Japan's banking system is relatively unprofitable, even after taking into account the credit losses associated massive decade-long cleaning up operation following the collapse of the 1908s bubble⁶⁵. It should be noted that it is hard to blame poor cost control for Japanese bank profitability. Rather, the main challenge is the

⁶⁴ For a detailed schema, see The Japanese Bankers' Association


⁽http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/banks/principal/index.html).

⁶⁵ See Horiuchi, C. et al. (2009a) and (2009b), Oyama and Shiratori (2001) and Loukoianova (2008).

combination of the low interest rate environment (official short-term policy rates have been close to zero throughout the past decade), and the weak demand for credit resulting from the sustained massive financial surpluses in the private sector – primarily in the corporate sector. There has been a significant decline in the household saving ratio, but this has been accompanied by a reduction in (previously very large) household financial assets, rather than an increase in consumer borrowing. The outcome is very low net interest margins. Importantly, the weak profitability of Japan's banks, even in the good times, makes it both hard for Japan's banks to earn their way to higher capital through retained earnings, as well as raise common equity in public markets, as the return on equity is structurally low (see Chart 37).

• The post-bubble environment has been one of low money and bank credit growth. It has also been one where Japan's potential growth rate has been much weaker (Chart 38). The correlation of these two developments does not imply causality: low potential growth may have led to weak money and credit demands; or both might have been pushed lower by a common, third factor. It is hard to identify what occurred in the early 1980s—aside from a dramatic change in the credit environment—that could have led to such a dramatic change in Japanese growth performance over the subsequent 20 years.

Chart 38



Japan: Money Supply and Potential GDP Growth

Sources: Bank of Japan, OECD

Specifics of Regulatory Change Scenario

In our quantitative work to date, we have focused on modeling those measures which have both a high level of clarity (albeit so far unquantified) and likelihood of occurrence (see Chapter 2). For Japan, this means focusing on the Basel III proposals (see Chapter 2). In assessing the cumulative effects on the Japanese economy, our specific assumptions are:

- An increase in trading book capital at the end of 2010. Our estimate is that the Japanese banking system held about ¥88 trillion in trading book assets at the end of 2009, the overwhelming proportion of which were interbank claims. Based on industry estimates, we project the capital charge levied against these holdings to rise by about three fold, which we capture by raising the average risk weighting assigned to such trading book securities from 10% to 30% for securities of financial firms held in the trading book), and from 25% to 75% for securities of non-financial firms.
- 2) A two percentage point increase in the minimum Tier 1 and overall regulatory capital ratios, to 6% and 10%, respectively, to take place at the end of 2012. In our other country models, we have assumed that supervisors will enforce broadly the same "fixed" buffers of actual capital over these regulatory minima in 2012-2020, as were applied historically. In Japan, however, bank capital ratios were generally too low in the 1990s through 2007, so we assume instead that it is the 2009 buffers which are broadly maintained in 2012-20 in both scenarios. These 2009 buffers are 1.6 percentage points over total regulatory capital and 2.8 percentage points over the Tier 1 minimum.
- 3) Redefinition effects. Japanese banks will be significantly affected by redefinition effects which exclude a series of components that hitherto banks have been able to count as capital. Historically, Japanese banks had relied on unrealized capital gains on asset holdings, especially equities, but the sustained weakness in Japanese equity prices after 1990 underlined how quickly such valuations could disappear. In more recent years, however, other components of capital have become more prominent, the most significant of which are minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries. While there is considerable uncertainty about how much these possible deductions amount to in the aggregate, we have estimated them to total ¥12 trillion (which amounts to about 30% of Tier 1 equity as of December 2009). We project that this amount is re-classified (as Tier 2 capital) over a 3 year horizon from 2012 to 2014 (i.e. ¥4 trillion per year). This allows Tier 2 capital to be sustained at current levels, even though redefinition effects and rule changes which will make Tier 2 instruments less attractive both to banks and investors might otherwise reduce it.
- 4) *No countercyclical buffer*. In principle, we would expect regulators to introduce a one percentage point counter-cyclical capital buffer in the midst of the next cyclical upswing. As with the Euro Area, however, we judge Japanese growth

prospects to be sufficiently muted over coming years in the regulatory change scenario, that it is hard to project any enthusiasm among policy makers to introduce such an additional buffer. Of course, policy makers will not know this ex ante, so they might well go ahead and introduce such a restriction anyway. But, for now, we have left this out of our regulatory change scenario.

- 5) Higher holdings of liquid assets as a result of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The Liquidity Coverage Ratio will require that banks hold sufficient liquid assets to ensure that they can survive a period of extreme stress. In the base scenario, the LCR is not a binding constraint. But in our regulatory change scenario, we adjust the overall liquid asset ratio (the ratio of cash and government bonds held to total assets), in an effort to allow banks to meet the LCR through the projection horizon in the regulatory change scenario. At the end of 2009, Japanese banks held about 16% of total assets in the form of liquid assets (cash plus government bonds). In our regulatory change scenario, we project banks to lift this ratio to 18%, which allows banks to meet the 100% LCR minimum.
- 6) A greater reliance on longer-term over short-term wholesale funding, as a result of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The new liquidity provisions will also apply on the liabilities' side of banks' balance sheets. We assume that the NSFR will be introduced in 2012, and that this will have the effect (in 2010-2012) of shifting banks' wholesale funding to longer-term debt. Japan's banks shift their wholesale issuance towards longer-term debt through the regulatory change projection.

The Results in Outline


Based on our framework, the Japanese economy will be adversely affected by projected changes, although not dramatically so. For 2011-2020 as a whole, average annual growth would be reduced by about two tenths, with the cumulative impact amounting to about 1.5% points through 2020 (Table 14).

As with other jurisdictions, the dynamic of the hit from the regulatory change is quite adverse through 2013-14, which is when the maximum impact of higher capital charges (combined with negative redefinition effects) is felt. In 2013, the difference between nominal GDP in the regulatory reform and base scenarios amounts to about ¥15 trillion (Chart 39).

Table 14 Japan: Cumulative Effects Re	sults											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Avg 2011-20
Real GDP (2010 = 100)												
Base	100	102.0	103.6	105.0	105.7	107.2	108.7	110.1	111.6	113.0	114.5	
Regulatory change	100	101.9	102.6	102.4	104.3	105.2	106.6	109.1	110.3	111.5	112.8	
Difference (%)	0.0	-0.1	-0.9	-2.5	-1.3	-1.9	-1.9	-1.0	-1.2	-1.4	-1.5	
Real GDP (%y/y)												
Base	3.4	2.0	1.6	1.4	0.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4
Regulatory change	3.4	1.9	0.7	-0.2	1.9	0.8	1.4	2.3	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2
GDP deflator (2010 = 100)	100	00 F	00.4	00.0	00.5	00.2	07.0	07.4	07.4	06.0	06.4	
Base Regulatory change	100 100	99.5 99.5	99.1 99.0	98.9 98.6	98.5 98.1	98.2 97.7	97.8 97.3	97.4 97.1	97.1 96.8	96.8 96.4	96.4 96.1	
GDP deflator (%y/y)												
Base	-0.8	-0.5	-0.3	-0.2	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4
Regulatory change	-0.8	-0.5	-0.4	-0.5	-0.4	-0.5	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4
Nominal GDP (¥ trillion)												
Base	486	494	500	505	506	512	517	522	527	532	537	
Regulatory change	486	493	494	491	498	500	505	515	519	523	527	
Difference (¥ trillion)	0	-1	-5	-15	-8	-12	-13	-7	-8	-9	-10	
Employment (millions)	62.0	62 F	63 7	62.0	(2.0	63 7	62.0	62.0	62.0	62.0	62.0	
Base Regulatory change	62.0 62.0	62.5 62.5	62.7	62.8	62.8 62.1	62.7	62.8 62.2	62.8 62.4	62.9	63.0	63.0 62.6	
Regulatory change Difference ('000)	62.0 -4	62.5 -18	62.5 -134	62.3 -480	-608	62.2 -460	62.2 -578	-463	62.6 -319	62.6 -378	62.6 -427	
	100)											
Private sector credit (2010 = 1 Base	100) 100	102.1	103.7	105.2	104.7	106.0	107.2	108.4	109.6	110.6	111.8	
Regulatory change	100	102.1	103.7	99.3	104.7	100.0	107.2	105.5	105.0	106.9	107.8	
rivate sector credit growth (%y/y)											
Base	3.4	2.1	1.6	1.5	-0.5	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1
Regulatory change	3.4	1.9	-0.3	-2.2	2.1	-0.2	1.1	3.2	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8
3ank assets (%y/y)												
Base	3.6	0.4	1.3	1.2	-0.6	0.4	0.9	0.2	0.9	0.1	0.8	0.6
Regulatory change	3.5	1.6	2.3	-2.3	1.8	-0.3	0.9	2.8	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.8
Risk-weighted assets (%y/y)												
Base Regulatory change	3.7 3.7	1.8 4.9	1.4 -0.4	1.3 -2.8	-0.9 1.9	1.1 -0.5	1.0 0.9	0.9 3.2	0.9 0.5	0.8 0.4	0.9 0.6	0.9 0.9
		101 1										
Bank credit growth to the priv Base	vate sector 3.6	(%y/y) 2.1	1.6	1.4	-0.7	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.1
Base Regulatory change	3.6	2.1 1.9	-0.6	-2.7	-0.7	-0.4	1.1	3.3	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.7
Core equity shadow price (pe	(rcent)											
Base	9.8%	6.3%	6.8%	6.3%	6.4%	5.2%	4.8%	4.7%	4.6%	4.5%	4.4%	5.4%
Regulatory change	9.8%	6.4%	12.1%	22.2%	13.8%	14.8%	13.8%	7.5%	7.1%	7.7%	7.5%	11.3%
Real lending rate (percent)												
Base	1.3%	1.0%	0.9%	0.7%	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%
Regulatory change	1.4%	1.1%	1.4%	2.2%	1.8%	2.1%	2.0%	1.3%	1.3%	1.4%	1.4%	1.6%
Difference (bps)	2	6	56	151	67	99	89	24	29	37	38	60
Regulatory capital ratio (% of												
Base	9.3%	9.3%	9.2%	9.2%	9.3%	9.2%	9.1%	9.1%	9.0%	9.0%	8.9%	9.1%
Regulatory change	9.3%	9.4%	10.2%	10.5%	10.6%	11.8%	11.9%	11.6%	11.6%	11.5%	11.5%	11.1%
Core Tier 1 Capital (¥ trillion)		22	22	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	
Base Regulatory change	23 23	23 25	23 30	24 30	24 32	24 38	24 40	24 40	24 40	24 40	24 40	
Difference	23	25	30 7	30 6	32	38 15	40 16	40 16	40 16	40 16	40 16	
Core Tier 1 capital ratio (% of	RWA)											
Base	4.0%	3.9%	3.9%	3.9%	3.9%	3.9%	3.9%	3.8%	3.8%	3.8%	3.7%	3.9%
Regulatory change	4.0%	4.2%	5.0%	5.1%	5.4%	6.5%	6.6%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	6.3%	5.8%
Return on bank equity (%)												
Base	-1.7%	-1.4%	0.6%	1.8%	3.0%	2.9%	3.3%	3.6%	3.8%	4.0%	4.2%	2.6%
Regulatory change	-1.8%	-1.3%	3.7%	-0.7%	6.2%	7.3%	6.9%	4.3%	4.5%	4.9%	5.0%	4.1%


Sources: IIF Estimates

Chart 39



The employment implications of regulatory reform are also modestly negative, especially through 2014 (Chart 40). In the regulatory reform scenario, the level of employment is about 610k lower in 2014 than in the base scenario, which amounts to about 1 percent of 2010 employment levels.

Chart 40



The significance of these negative developments is not so much that they are large in an absolute sense, but they seem to be quite a significant price to pay for an economy where the banking system did not perform poorly through the recent crisis, or reveal itself to be a source of global systemic risk, relatively low levels of capital notwithstanding⁶⁶.

This is particularly the case, since these negative developments are apt to worsen two basic problems facing Japan:

- Weaker growth in credit and nominal income will further intensify deflation risks in Japan. The path for prices is a relatively weak one in both our base and regulatory change scenarios, with prices falling throughout the next 10 years in both scenarios. The regulatory change environment is modestly weaker, however, which goes against the grain of everything that the Bank of Japan is otherwise trying to achieve. From a perspective of both national and global financial stability, it is far from clear that a policy change that adds to the downside risks to deflation is a particularly appropriate one.
- Lower growth in nominal income will weaken tax revenue growth and compound the Japanese government's budget deficit and debt difficulties. The path of regulatory reform implies a nominal income loss which averages about ¥12 trillion in 2013-16, which would translate to loss in tax revenue of about ¥3 trillion, or about 0.6% of GDP.


The Key Unknown: How Much of a Market in Japanese Bank Equity?

In tracing both the effects of regulatory change on the economy, as well as calibrating their likely scale, a key variable in our Japan framework (as in our other models) is the "shadow price" of equity – effectively the charge that the capital allocation part of the banking system makes to the lending departments which, in turn, is passed on to borrowers in the form of a higher lending rate spread. In our Japan model, this lending spread averages about 60 basis points higher through the next decade in a regulatory reform scenario, although it peaks a high as 150bp in the period of maximum stress for banks—in 2013—when their capital raising activities are at their highest (Chart 41).

In order to meet higher regulatory norms, banks are projected to issue an extra ¥15 trillion of Tier 1 (common) equity in the five years through 2015. This may not sound like a large amount (it is about 3% of current GDP), but it will be quite a challenge for two simple reasons. First, the low profitability of Japanese banks makes such instruments relatively unattractive to investors, especially global equity investors. Japanese equity

⁶⁶ Japan's 6 "mega banks" would also seem to have many of the "too big to fail" characteristics which have seemingly become anathema. As noted, however, they were more of a source of global stability than systemic risk in the recent episode.

investors are assumed to have different expectations than their global peers in our framework. In our shadow price of equity equation for Japan, we assume that the core rate of return on bank equity that investors aspire to is 5%, in contrast to the United States (12.5%) and Euro Area (10%). Second, Japanese investors have a bias to debt instruments (bonds and bank deposits) relative to equity. This is one important reason why Japanese banks have their specific capital structure (relatively low common equity component and more significant component made up of subordinated debt). The overall capitalization of the Japanese equity market is about ¥307 trillion, or \$3 trillion, which is about 15% of the size of US equity market.



In order to meet these new challenges, it seems likely that bank behavior will change in three ways:

- There will be a focus on boosting profitability. Banks will cut costs (including employment) and will attempt to widen loan spreads. They will also look to boost fee incomes (e.g. higher guarantee fees) and require additional charges to cover costs for financial operations, including depositary services.
- Banks will most likely take more risks, choosing to expose themselves to businesses and financial transactions that can draw higher returns compared to traditional

banking activities, but with greater risks. It is plausible that Japan would be left with a more, not less risky banking system⁶⁷.

 Perhaps most likely, banks could choose to reduce the size of their balance sheets more aggressively than our current projections assume, with banks reducing repos, trading assets, loans, securities, and off-balance sheet items (such as commitments, acceptances, and letters of credit). With this new behavior by the banks in place, pricing in several key markets might be negatively affected.

Taking all this into consideration, banks seem quite likely to reduce risk assets – possibly by more than either of our scenarios suggest. Any consequent negative effects on economy are harder to assess, however. The non-bank private sector in Japan has been running a substantial net financial surplus for a number of years, and thus has had limited net borrowing needs. Reflecting this, latest BoJ lending surveys show that weak bank lending has been mainly the result of weak demand, rather than constrained supply.

⁶⁷ It should be noted that Japanese officials have made the same point about the leverage ratio: see Sato (2009).

Appendix: Japan Data Sources

Type of Data	Sources
Balance Sheet	Bank of Japan – Financial Institutions Accounts (FA)
Capital	Bank of Japan – Financial Institutions Accounts (FA) Financial statements of individual banks IMF Global Financial Stability Report April 2010 <u>http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/index.htm</u>
P&L Model	Japanese Bankers' Association, Financial Statements of all Banks http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/stats/year2_01/index.html IMF Global Financial Stability Report April 2010 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/index.htm
Macroeconomic Data	Bank of Japan Japan Cabinet Office OECD Economic Outlook 86 database

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¥ trillion		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Projection period 2010	00	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Bank Balance Sheet Model	JF																	
							ž	No new risk- weighting										
Bank Assets	-	747.994	749.391	768.602			828.827											876.534 0.701
GOV	Casn Government bonds	8.098 96.695	7.996 88.346	8.041 80.727	8.441 93.566 1	120.279	8.288 124.324	0%0	8.323 116.519 1	8.432 118.047 1	8.534 119.471 1	8.484 118.772 1	8.517 114.986 1	8.595 116.036 1	8.612 111.951 1	680.8 112.904	8.695 108.693 1	607.8 109.567
LIQ/TA	Liquid asset ratio	14.0%	12.9%	11.5%			16.0%											13.5%
j B	Domestic financial	84.032	83.380	100.089		96.885	100.000									1		00.00
IB (IB) IB (BB)	Irading Book Banking Book	75.512 8.520	73.909 9.471	89.231 10.857	89.249 10.325	87.539 9.346	90.000 10.000	10% 25%	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000
CORP	Domestic non-financial	382.101	389.051				399.263		- 1	7	- 1	- 1					- 1	443.575
CORP (TB) CORP (BR)	Trading Book Banking Book	0.009 382_092	0.013 389.038	0.019 385.389	0.019 395.896 3	0.022	0.023 399.240	25% 100% 4	0.021 407.642 4	0.021 413.999 4	0.021 419.923 4	0.021 417.015 4	0.021 422.263 4	0.021 426.825 4	0.021 431.105 4	0.021 435 429 4	0.021 439 401 4	0.021 443 554
	%oya	2.3	1.8		-		3.6		F									0.9
HH 	Household	113.207	110.745			_	118.666			-							1	131.836
MORT	Mortgages Other	56.603 56.603	55.372 55.372	55.815 55.815	57.797 57.797	57.251 57.251	58.000 60.666	50% 100%	60.000 61.162	62.000 61.052	64.000 60.813	66.000 57.948	67.000 58.508	68.000 58.864	69.000 59.136	71.000 58.421	72.000 58.602	73.000 58.836
EXTA	External	2.654	2.816	3.278	3.184	2.354	2.438								2.533	2.554		2.578
EXTA (HG)	High-grade	2.469	2.602	3.000	2.906	2.148	2.224	25%	2.234	2.263	2.290	2.277	2.286	2.307	2.311	2.331	2.334	2.352
EXTA (EM)	Risky (EM)	0.185	0.213	0.278	0.278	0.206	0.213	100%	0.214	0.217	0.220	0.218	0.219	0.221	0.222	0.224	0.224	0.226
	Fixed Assets	7.286	7.031	6.745 70.604	6.655	6.688 66 5 46	6.927	100%		7.047				7.183	7197	7.258		70,000
RWA	Utner Assets Rick-weinhted accetc	538.690	020.020 549 780	/2.084 561 211	90.301 592 122 E	040.00	577 029	_	687.246 5	605.501 6	/U.901 603 126 5	707.892 6	/ U.820 604 511 6	<i>a</i>	/1.010 615.853 F	12.219 321.138 6	12.300 625.889 F	12.888 631 422
Bank Liabilities		710.696	709.091				775.078	7										820.150
1M 2	Retail	541.691	544.356			587.313	602.690	ę	0		e		Ű					665.409
M2 M3	Uomestic rinancial Wholesale (non-capital)	42.808 44.397	61.983 19.927	64.160 19.659		/1.49/ 17.832	73.369 27.003		/4.44/ 19.624	/5.358 21.585		/ 0.385 16.323	ر / 212.// 11.679	77.990 11.961	/ 8. / 40 6.290	/ 9.509 6.236	80.247 0.153	81.004 -0.173
	Short-term	30.423	13.789	14.842	13.641	13.410	20.307					12.275		8.995	4.730	4.689	0.115	-0.130
EXTL	Long-term External	13.973 18.728	6.137 17.504	4.817 21.596	4.223 20.479	4.422 17.725	6.696 18.189			5.353 18.682		4.048 18.937		2.966 19.335	1.560 19.523	1.546 19.712	0.038 19.895	-0.043 20.082
	Other	63.072	65.320	61.798	72.594	52.454	53.827		53.827	53.827	53.827	53.827	53.827	53.827	53.827	53.827	53.827	53.827
Capital TO	Tior II	37.297 10.025	40.301	42.692 11 475	45.422	53.449 15.688	53.749 15 600		54.372 16.000	- 1	55.396 16.000	55.427 16.000	55.599 16.000	55.760 16.000	55.916 16.000	56.075 16.000	56.228 16.000	56.384 16.000
11	Tier I	27.272	29.468	31.217	33.213	37.761	38.149								39.916	40.075	40.228	40.384
TOE T1-TCE	Core Non-core	17.803 9.470	18.366 11 103	18.637 12 580	19.462 13.751	22.940 14 821	22.940 15.209		22.940 15.432	23.092 15.621	23.593 15 803	23.593 15.834	23.593	23.593 16 167	23.593 16.323	23.593 16 482	23.593 16.635	23.593 16 791
REGCAP	Regulatory	37.297	40.301	42.692	45.422	53.449	53.749		54.372	54.713	55.396	55.427		55.760	55.916	56.075	56.228	56.384
REGADJ	Regulatory Adjustments	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Key Capital ratios REGCAP/RWA	Regulatory Capital	6.9%	7.3%	7.6%	7.7%	9.6%	9.3%		9.3%	9.2%	9.2%	9.3%	9.2%	9.1%	9.1%	9.0%	9.0%	8.9%
BIS	Regulatory minimum	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%		8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%
BUFCAP 74 /m///	National buffer (% pts)	-1.1%	-0.7%	-0.4%	-0.3%	1.6%	1.3%		1.3%	1.2%	1.2%	1.3%	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	0.9%
TCE/RWA	ner i Core Tier I	9 3.3%	0.4% 3.3%	o.o% 3.3%	3.3%	0.8% 4.1%	0.0% 4.0%		0.5% 3.9%	0.5% 3.9%	0.5% 3.9%	0.0% 3.9%	0.0% 3.9%	0.5% 3.9%	0.3% 3.8%	0.5% 3.8%	0.4% 3.8%	0.4% 3.7%
BIS(T1)	Regulatory minimum	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%		4.0 %	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0 %	4.0%	4.0 %	4.0%	4.0%
BUFCAP (11)	National buffer (% pts) Required buffer	1.1%	1.2%	1.6% 1.2%	1.6% 1.2%	2.8%	2.6%		2.5%	2.5% 1.2%	2.5% 1.2%	2.6% 1.2%	2.6% 1.2%	2.5% 1.2%	2.5%	2.5%	2.4%	2.4%
LEVRAT	Leverage ratio	20.1	18.6	10.6	10.5	10.2	15.4		15.3	15.4	15.4	15.3	15.3	15.4	15.4	15.5	15.5	15.5
0						_												

Japan: Base Scenario

2007 2008 2009 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 4.0% 4.7% 12.7% 1.062 0.000 0.000 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 1.055 1.334 1.361 1.555 1.351 1.628 1.755 1.345 1.34% 1.55% 1.45% 1.34% 1.55% 1.45% 1.34% 1.55% 1.45% 1.34% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.11% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.51% 0.40% 0.75% 0.557 0.40% 0.75% 0.557 0.40% 0.75% 0.557 0.40% 0.75% 0.557 0.40%							ז	Proiection period										ĺ
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Liquidity coverage ratio 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% Pipply Model Net stable funding ratio 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% Pipply Model Care equity shadow price 1.8% 2.1% 4.0% 4.7% 12.7% Required new issuance 2.102 1.699 1.062 0.000 0.000 % of profits retained 50%	trillion																	
Liquidity coverage ratio Apply Model 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% Apply Model 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% Apply Model 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0			2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Ore Caprial Supply Model Der Caprial Supply Model E Required new issuance ET Required new issuance ET Required new issuance Sector P&L Model 1.8% ET Readinition effects Sector P&L Model 1.1809 Sector P&L Model 1.38% Conservations 2.102 Sector P&L Model 1.38% Conservations 2.102 Sector P&L Model 1.38% Trading Book 0.1600 Dimestic mon-financial 1.36% Distributing for earture 1.36% Distributing for earture 1.36% Distributing for earture 1.36% Distributing for earture 1.36% Sector PAL Model 1.34% Distributing for earture 1.36% Distributing for earture 1.36% Distributing for eartur	ey Liquidity ratios	Liquidity coverage ratio Net stable funding ratio Cash/Assets	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	90.1 81.9 1.0%	86.2 81.4 1.0%	85.7 81.2 1.0%	85.4 81.1 1.0%	86.9 81.5 1.0%	85.0 81.3 1.0%	84.9 81.2 1.0%	83.2 81.1 1.0%	83.1 81.0 1.0%	81.5 80.9 1.0%	81.5 80.9 1.0%
Rev Corre Capital Der Corre carity shadow price 1.8% 2.1% 4.0% 4.7% 12.7% ET/PROF Corre equity shadow price 1.8% 2.1% 4.0% 4.7% 12.7% ET/PROF % of profits retained 5.0%	ank Core Capital Supp	ily Model																
g Sector P&L Model 11.609 13.020 0.47% 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.008 S Rate of return 0.000 0.010 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.048 0.1145 0.031 0.048 0.1414 1.548 1.1744 1.567 1.528 0.567 0.1498 0.1145 0.036 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0	otal new Core Capita EWTCE ROE EDEF ROFRET ROFRET/PROF	Red Red Rets	1.8% 2.102 50%	2.1% 1.699 50%	4.0% 1.062 50%	4.7% 0.000 50%	12.7% 0.000 50%	0.000 0.000 9.8% 0.000 0.000 50%	0.000 0.000 6.3% 0.000 0.000 50%	0.152 0.000 6.8% 0.000 0.152 50%	0.501 0.000 6.3% 0.000 0.501 50%	0.000 0.000 6.4% 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 5.2% 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 4.8% 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 4.7% 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 4.6% 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 4.5% 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 4.4% 0.000 0.000 0.000
At earnings 11.609 13.200 0.010 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.008 0.116 S Rate of return 0.000 0.011 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.011 S Rate of return 0.000 0.113% 0.153% 0.137% 0.47% 0.66% 0.114% Government bonds 1.365 1.872 1.974 1.865 1.45% 1.45% 0.161 JGBAyled 0.360% 0.50% 0	anking Sector P&L Mo	del																
SS Tata of return Casin 0.000 US 0.000 US 0.003 US 0.000 US	tterest earnings	-	11.609	13.020	14.332	13.229	13.147	11.644		11.568	11.554				12.107	12.156	12.211	12.252
Comment bonds 1.316 1.534 1.334 1.361 1.614 JGB yield 1.36% 1.755 1.744 1.60% 1.34% JGB yield 1.36% 1.755 1.744 1.62% 1.34% Domestic financial 1.36% 1.755 1.744 1.628 Trading Book 0.162 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% Banking Book 0.162 0.50% 0.70% <td< td=""><th>FUNDS</th><td>Cash Rate of return</td><td>0.000 0.00%</td><td>0.010 0.13%</td><td>0.038 0.47%</td><td>0.039 0.46%</td><td>0.008 0.11%</td><td>0.10% 0.10%</td><td></td><td>0.008 0.10%</td><td>0.008 0.10%</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.022 0.25%</td><td>0.022 0.25%</td><td>0.022 0.25%</td><td>0.022 0.25%</td></td<>	FUNDS	Cash Rate of return	0.000 0.00%	0.010 0.13%	0.038 0.47%	0.039 0.46%	0.008 0.11%	0.10% 0.10%		0.008 0.10%	0.008 0.10%				0.022 0.25%	0.022 0.25%	0.022 0.25%	0.022 0.25%
Domestic financial 1.605 1.872 1.974 1.951 1.8095 Trading Book 1.443 1.670 1.755 1.744 1.628 Spread over JGBs 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% Banking Book 0.182 0.201 0.219 0.207 0.181 Rate of return 1.36% 1.74% 1.65% 1.45% 1.34% D(BANK) Spread over JGBs 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% Spread over JGBs 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% D(CORP) Dending spread 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.47% 0.11% D(CORP) Lending spread 0.00% 0.13% 0.40% 0.75% D(CORP) Lending spread 0.08% 0.25% 0.40% 0.75% D(CORP) Lending spread 0.08% 0.21% 0.47% 0.46% 0.11% D(CORP) Lending spread 0.03% 0.21% <th>GB</th> <td>Government bonds JGB yield</td> <td>1.316 1.36%</td> <td>1.534 1.74%</td> <td>1.334 1.65%</td> <td>1.361 1.45%</td> <td>1.614 1.34%</td> <td>1.590 1.30%</td> <td>1.686 1.40%</td> <td>1.759 1.50%</td> <td>1.781 1.50%</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1.710 1.50%</td> <td>1.686 1.50%</td> <td>1.662 1.50%</td> <td>1.637 1.50%</td>	GB	Government bonds JGB yield	1.316 1.36%	1.534 1.74%	1.334 1.65%	1.361 1.45%	1.614 1.34%	1.590 1.30%	1.686 1.40%	1.759 1.50%	1.781 1.50%				1.710 1.50%	1.686 1.50%	1.662 1.50%	1.637 1.50%
D (BANK) Spread over JGBs 0.50% <th></th> <td>Domestic financial Tradina Book</td> <td>1.605 1.443</td> <td>1.872 1.670</td> <td>1.974 1.755</td> <td>1.951 1.744</td> <td>1.8095 1.628</td> <td>1.772 1.598</td> <td></td> <td>0.650 0.450</td> <td>0.650 0.450</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>0.650 0.450</td> <td>0.650 0.450</td> <td>0.650 0.450</td> <td>0.650 0.450</td>		Domestic financial Tradina Book	1.605 1.443	1.872 1.670	1.974 1.755	1.951 1.744	1.8095 1.628	1.772 1.598		0.650 0.450	0.650 0.450				0.650 0.450	0.650 0.450	0.650 0.450	0.650 0.450
Tarating for return 1.36% 1.74% 1.65% 1.45% 1.34% Faderage over JGBS 0.50% 0.11% Understand 0.00	OND	Spread over JGBs Banking Book	0.50% 0.162	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%		0.50%	0.50%				0.50%	0.50%	0.50% 0.200	0.50%
Domestration 0.00% 0.13% 0.41% 0.000 0.013% 0.13%		Rate of return	1.36%	1.74%	1.65%	1.45%	0.101 1.34%	1.30%		1.50%	1.50%				1.50% 0.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%
Trading Book 0.000		Domestic non-financial	5.432	7.671	8.440	7.237	8.172 8.2020	7.033		7.947	7.938				8.300	8.367 8.000	8.441 8.000	8.503
Lending spread 0.08% 0.25% 0.40% 0.75% Banking Book 5.432 7.671 8.439 7.237 8.172 Banking Book 5.432 7.671 8.439 7.237 8.172 Banking Book 5.432 7.671 8.439 7.237 8.172 Banking Spread 0.08% 0.25% 0.353% 0.40% 0.75% Household 0.0865 0.4251 1.1143 0.9783 0.9842 Mortgages 0.00433 0.2125 0.5571 0.4892 0.4921 Overnight rate 0.003% 0.213% 0.47% 0.46% 0.11% Using spread 0.03% 0.213% 0.2175 0.5577 0.489 0.492 Chen 0.03% 0.213% 0.2176 0.5577 0.489 0.11% Chen 0.03% 0.213% 0.2175 0.5577 0.489 0.11% Chen 0.03% 0.213% 0.2176 0.5577 0.489 0.1492		Irading book Overnight call money ra	0.00%	0.13%	0.47%		0.11%	u.uuu 1.30%		u.uuu 1.50%	u.uuu 1.50%				u.uuu 1.50%	u.uuu 1.50%	u.uuu 1.50%	u.uuu 1.50%
Torr bond yield 1.36% 1.14% 1.65% 1.45% 1.34% Lending spread 0.08% 0.25% 0.39783 0.342% Household 0.08% 0.257 0.4892 0.3942 Mortgages 0.08% 0.2125 0.5571 0.4892 0.4921 Overnight rate 0.008% 0.13% 0.47% 0.4892 0.4921 Overnight rate 0.008% 0.213% 0.37783 0.3942 Overnight rate 0.008% 0.213% 0.47% 0.4995 0.11% Chen 0.013 0.215 0.557 0.489 0.11% Chen 0.013 0.213 0.557 0.489 0.71% Chen 0.02% 0.13% 0.47% 0.489 0.75% Chen 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.46% 0.75% Chen 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.46% 0.75% Reading spread 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.669 0.65%	PREAD (CORP)	Lending spread Banking Book	0.08% 5.432	0.25% 7.671	0.53% 8.439		0.75% 8.172	0.49 % 7.033		0.43% 7.946	0.40% 7.937				0.43% 8.299	0.43% 8.367	0.43% 8.440	0.43% 8.502
Andrages 0.0433 0.2125 0.5571 0.4892 0.4921 Overnight rate 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.46% 0.11% Lending spread 0.08% 0.25% 0.5571 0.4892 0.4921 Overnight rate 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.46% 0.11% Lending spread 0.043 0.213 0.557 0.489 0.492 Migh grade 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.46% 0.11% Fxtemal 1.24% 1.34% 1.56% 0.55% 0.55% High grade 0.054 0.056 0.065 0.059 0.051 Rate of return 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% A) L	PREAD (CORP)	10yr bond yleld Lending spread Household	1.36% 0.08% 0.0865	1.74% 0.25% 0.4251	1.65% 0.53% 1 1143		1.34% 0.75% 1 9842	1.30% 0.49% 0.6914	1.40% 0.41% 0.6116	1.50% 0.43% 0.6523	1.50% 0.40% 0.6242			-	1.50% 0.43% 0.8731	1.50% 0.43% 0.8772	1.50% 0.43% 0.835	1.50% 0.43% 0.8869
Lending spread 0.08% 0.25% 0.53% 0.40% 0.75% Other 0.043 0.213 0.557 0.489 0.492 Overnight rate 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.485% 0.495 Overnight rate 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.485% 0.419 Overnight rate 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.46% 0.13% Detroing spread 0.00% 0.13% 0.55% 0.49% 0.75% High grade 0.008% 0.254 0.65 0.669 0.059 High grade 0.048 0.651 0.056 0.059 0.051 Rate of return 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% Rate of return 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% A) Lending spread 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 2.00%		Mortgages Overnicht rate	0.0433	0.13%	0.5571 0.47%		0.4921	0.10%		0.3259 0.10%	0.3173 0.10%			-	0.4691 0.25%	0.25%	0.4859 0.25%	0.25%
Advertight rate 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.46% 0.11% Lending spread 0.08% 0.25% 0.33% 0.40% 0.75% Real borrowing rate 0.08% 0.25% 0.33% 0.40% 0.75% High grade 0.08% 0.25% 0.34% 1.34% 1.40% 0.75% High grade 0.048 0.051 0.065 0.069 0.051 High grade 0.048 0.051 0.056 0.059 0.051 Risky (EM) 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.008 Risky (EM) 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.008 A) Lending spread 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% A) Lending spread 1.51 1.451 1.367 1.50% 1.50%	PREAD (HH)	Lending spread Other	0.08% 0.043	0.25% 0.213	0.53% 0.557		0.75% 0.492	0.49% 0.350		0.43% 0.326	0.40% 0.307				0.43% 0.404	0.43% 0.400	0.43% 0.398	0.43% 0.397
Real borrowing rate 1.24% 1.34% 1.76% 1.62% 1.84% External 0.054 0.058 0.065 0.069 0.059 High grade 0.054 0.058 0.056 0.059 0.051 High grade 0.048 0.051 0.056 0.059 0.051 Rate of return 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% Risky (EM) 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.008 Rate of return 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% Lending stread 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% Earnings residual 3.115 1.451 1.367 1.50% 0.500	PREAD (HH)	Overnight rate Lending spread	0.00% 0.08%	0.13% 0.25%	0.47% 0.53%		0.11% 0.75%	0.10% 0.49%		0.10% 0.43%	0.10% 0.40%				0.25% 0.43%	0.25% 0.43%	0.25% 0.43%	0.25% 0.43%
Rate of return 2.00% Earning stread 1.50% 1.50		Real borrowing rate External Hiah arade	1.24% 0.054 0.048	1.34% 0.058 0.051	1.76% 0.065 0.056		1.84% 0.059 0.051	1.35% 0.050 0.044	1.03% 0.051 0.045	0.87% 0.051 0.045	0.74% 0.052 0.046		1.10% 0.052 0.046	1.06% 0.053 0.046	1.04% 0.053 0.046	1.02% 0.053 0.046	1.03% 0.053 0.047	1.03% 0.054 0.047
Rate of return 2.00%		Rate of return Riskv (EM)	2.00% 0.006	2.00% 0.007	2.00% 0.009		2.00% 0.008	2.00% 0.006		2.00% 0.006	2.00% 0.007				2.00% 0.007	2.00% 0.007	2.00% 0.007	2.00% 0.007
3.115 1.451 1.367 1.595 0.500	PREAD (EXTA)	Rate of return Lending spread	2.00% 1.50%	2.00% 1.50%	2.00% 1.50%		2.00% 1.50%	1.30% 1.50%		1.50% 1.50%	1.50% 1.50%				1.50% 1.50%	1.50% 1.50%	1.50% 1.50%	1.50% 1.50%
0.47% 0.46% 0.11% (1.65% 1.45% 1.34%	N OND	Earnings residual Overnight call money rate 10yr bond yield	3.115 0.00% 1.36%	1.451 0.13% 1.74%	1.367 0.47% 1.65%	1.595 0.46% 1.45%	0.500 0.11% 1.34%	0.500 0.10% 1.30%	0.500 0.10% 1.40%	0.500 0.10% 1.50%	0.500 0.10% 1.50%	0.500 0.25% 1.50%		0.500 0.25% 1.50%	0.500 0.25% 1.50%	0.500 0.25% 1.50%	0.500 0.25% 1.50%	0.500 0.25% 1.50%
Interest expenses 2.864 4.5323 5.740 4.526 2.681 Partail 2.265 3.722 4.749 3.522 2.086	iterest expenses	Retail	2.265 2.265	4.5323 3.722	5.740 4.749	4.526 3.522	2.681 2.086	2.247 1.785		2.433 1.846	2.464 1.868				3.576 2.897	3.593 2.925		3.623 2.980
rerright call money rt 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.46% 0.11% read over official 0.42% 0.56% 0.38% 0.15% 0.25% tread over official 0.09 0.17 0.42 0.46 0.20	ATEM1	Overnight call money ra Spread over official Domestic financial	0.00% 0.42% 0.09	0.13% 0.56% 0.17	0.47% 0.38% 0.42	0.46% 0.15% 0.46	0.11% 0.25% 0.20	0.10% 0.20% 0.181	0.10% 0.20% 0.185	0.10% 0.20% 0.187	0.10% 0.20% 0.189	0.25% 0.20% 0.305	0.25% (0.20% (0.307	0.25% 0.20% 0.310	0.25% 0.20% 0.313	0.25% 0.20% 0.317	0.25% 0.20% 0.320	0.25% 0.20% 0.323

Japan: Base Scenario

						<u> </u>	Projection period										
¥ trillion		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
RATEM2	Overnight call money ra Spread over official Wholesale (non-capital) and	0.00% 0.19% 0.875	0.13% 0.21% 1.172	0.47% 0.19% 1.064	0.46% 0.15% 0.946	0.11% 0.15% 0.778	0.10% 0.15% 0.663	0.10% 0.15% 0.733	0.10% 0.15% 0.782	0.10% 0.15% 0.788	0.25% 0.15% 0.800	0.25% 0.15% 0.771	0.25% 0.15% 0.760	0.25% 0.15% 0.746	0.25% 0.15% 0.732	0.25% 0.15% 0.716	0.25% 0.15% 0.700
RATEM3	Short-term Key policy rate Spread over official Lono-term	-0.001 0.00% 0.00%	0.028 0.13% 0.00% 1.144	0.067 0.47% 0.00% 0.997	0.065 0.46% -0.01% 0.882	0.014 0.11% 0.00%	0.017 0.10% 0.00% 0.646	0.018 0.10% 0.00% 0.715	0.015 0.10% 0.00% 0.766	0.017 0.10% 0.00% 0.771	0.037 0.25% 0.00% 0.763	0.026 0.25% 0.00% 0.745	0.022 0.25% 0.00%	0.017 0.25% 0.00% 0.729	0.012 0.25% 0.00%	0.006 0.25% 0.00%	0.000 0.25% 0.00% 0.700
RATEM4	10yr bond yield Spread over official	1.36% -0.21%	1.74% -0.20%	1.65% -0.21%	-0.22%	1.34%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	1.50% -0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	-0.20%	1.50% -0.20%	1.50% -0.20%
RATEEXTL	External Average interest rate Expenses residual	0.10% 0.10% -0.381	0.10% 0.10% -0.554	0.10% 0.10% -0.510	0.10% 0.10% -0.422	0.10%	0.108 0.10% -0.400	0.10% -0.400	0.10% 0.10% -0.400	0.10% 0.10% -0.400	0.10% -0.400	0.10% 0.10% -0.400	0.10% 0.10% -0.400	0.10% -0.400	0.10% -0.400	0.10% 0.10% -0.400	0.10% -0.400
Net interest earnings		8.745	8.488	8.592	8.704	10.466	9.398	8.442	9.135	9.090	8.987	8.570	8.499	8.531	8.563	8.603	8.629
00E NIC	Other earnings Non-interest costs	6.417 10.412	6.159 10.336	6.834 11.976	5.718 16.032	2.574 14.000	2.641 12.967	2.680 11.861	2.713 11.412	2.745 10.404	2.750 9.384	2.780 9.017	2.808 8.657	2.835 8.524	2.863 8.394	2.889 8.262	2.916 8.133
Operating profits (pre-credit losses) CREDLOSS Credit Losses Other		4.750 1.178 0.000	4.312 0.428 0.000	3.450 -0.049 0.000	-1.610 0.312 0.000	-0.960 0.092 0.000	-0.928 0.000 0.000	-0.738 0.000 0.000	0.435 0.000 0.000	1.430 0.000 0.000	2.353 0.000 0.000	2.333 0.000 0.000	2.650 0.000 0.000	2.842 0.000 0.000	3.032 0.000 0.000	3.230 0.000 0.000	3.413 0.000 0.000
Income before tax Net Income	Tax Extraordinary gains, net	5.928 1.725 0.000 4.203	4.739 1.341 0.000 3.399	3.401 1.276 0.000 2.125	-1.298 0.698 0.000 -1.996	-0.868 0.217 0.000 -1.084	-0.928 0.000 0.000 -0.928	-0.738 0.000 0.000 -0.738	0.435 0.131 0.000 0.305	1.430 0.429 0.000 1.001	2.353 0.706 0.000 1.647	2.333 0.700 0.000 1.633	2.650 0.795 0.000 1.855	2.842 0.853 1.989	3.032 0.910 0.000 2.122	3.230 0.969 0.000 2.261	3.413 1.024 0.000 2.389
ROE ROA	Return on Equity Return on Assets	11.40% 0.56%	8.76% 0.45%	5.12% 0.28%	-4.53% -0.25%	-2.19% -0.13%	-1.73% -0.11%	-1.37% -0.09%	0.56% 0.04%	1.82% 0.12%	2.97% 0.19%	2.94% 0.19%	3.33% 0.22%	3.56% 0.23%	3.79% 0.25%	4.03% 0.26%	4.24% 0.27%
Macroeconomic Framework	∋work																
Nominal GDP growth	lou loised	0.7	1.1	1.6	-2.0	-6.1	2.6 0.5	1.5	1.2	1.2	0.2	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9
RGDPG PGDPG	neoroda Real growth GDP deflator	1.9 1.2	2.0 -1.0	2.3 -0.8	-1.2 -0.8	-5.2 -1.0	3.4 0.8	2.0 -0.5	1.6 -0.3	1.4 -0.2	0.6 -0.4	1.5 -0.4	1.4 -0.4	1.3 -0.4	1.3 -0.3	1.3 -0.4	1.3 -0.4
	Output gap	0.4	1.7	3.5	2.3	-3.3	-0.2	1.5	3.0	3.8	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.8
	Employment (thousands) %oya	63560 0.4	63820 0.4	64120 0.5	63850 -0.4	62820 -1.6	61978 -1.3	62469 0.8	62669 0.3	62774 0.2	62754 0.0	62698 -0.1	62785 0.1	62849 0.1	62904 0.1	62952 0.1	62997 0.1
Risk-weighted assets	%oya	3.2	2.1	2.1	5.5	-6.1	3.7	1.8	1.4	1.3	-0.9	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9
Bank assets	%oya %CDD	748 1.1	749 0.2	769 2.6	813 5.8	800 -1.6	829 3.6	832 0.4	843 1.3	853 1.2	848 -0.6	852 0.4	860 0.9	861 0.2	868 0.9	870 0.1	877 0.8 162 2
Bank credit to private sector	sector	495 495	500 500	497 497 -0.6	512 512	500 500	518 3.6	529 529	537 537	545 1 A	541 541 -07	548 548	554 554	559 1 0	565 1 0	570 570	575 0 0
Other credit	%GDP	98.7 98.7	98.5 97.1	-0.0 96.4 043	2.5 101.3 844	-23 105.4 844	о.с 106.5 872	2.1 107.1 890	1.0 107.5 904	1.4 107.8 017	-0.7 106.8 014	107.0 107.0	1.1 107.1 037	0.1 107.1 948	1.0 107.2 058	0.9 107.1 068	0.9 107.1 978
	%oya %GDP	-2.6 201.2	-3.5 -3.5 191.9	-3.2 183.0	-10.4 167.2	0.0	3.3 3.3 179.3	2.0 180.3	1.6 180.9	1.5 181.5	-0.3 180.5	1.3 1.3 181.0	1.2 1.2 181.3	1.1	1.1 181.8	1.0 181.9	1.1 182.2
Private sector credit	¥ trillion %oya	1505 -0.9	1474 -2.1	1440 -2.3	1356 -5.8	1344 -0.9	1390 3.4	1419 2.1	1441 1.6	1462 1.5	1455 -0.5	1474 1.3	1491 1.1	1507 1.1	1523 1.1	1538 1.0	1554 1.0
Nominal GDP		501.883	507.473	515.352	505.066	474.049	486.460	493.612	499.647	505.463	506.462	511.960	517.103	522.114	527.175	532.067	537.084

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¥ trillion		2005		2000	BUUC		Projection period	DOL	++00	0FU0	5100	V FUC	2015	2016	2100	8100	0100	
Rank Balance Sheet Model	14	0004	0004	2001	0007	0004	2027		- 07	2012	0.04	100	2 04	0 07	107	0	202	2020
	5						L	ſ										
							ž	No new risk- weiahtina										
Bank Assets		747.994	749.391						841.634 86	860.726 84	841.206 8(884.644 8		893.217 8	898.539
LIQ LIQ	Cash Government honde	8.098 06.605	7.996			7.765	8.283	0%0	8.416 106.045 1/	8.607	8.412	8.560	8.531 146.006 17	8.606	8.846		8.932	8.985 160 760
LIQ/TA	Liquid asset ratio	30.030 14.0%	12.9%	11.5%			16.0%								-			18.0%
В	Domestic financial	84.032	83.380	100.089		96.885	100.000		-			Ľ.			Ľ.	Ľ.,		100.000
IB (TB) IB (BB)	Trading Book Banking Book	75.512 8.520	73.909 9.471	89.231 10 857	89.249 10.325	87.539 9.346	90.000 10.000	30% 9 25% 1	90.000 5 10.000 1	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 5 10.000 1	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000	90.000 10.000
CORP	Domestic non-financial	382.101	389.051				398.953	4	4			4	4		4		11	425.476
CORP (TB) CORP (BR)	Trading Book Banking Book	0.009 382_092	0.013 389 038	0.019 385.389	0.019 395,896 3	0.022	0.023 398.930	75% 100% 40	0.021 406.603 40	0.021 404.306 35	0.021 393.387 40	0.021 401.687 40	0.021 400.037 40	0.021 404.215 4	0.021 417.683 4	0.021	0.021	0.021 425 455
	%oya	2.3					3.6											0.7
HH	Household	113.207 55.500				_	118.574	-	-									126.457
MUHI	Mortgages Other	56.603 56.603	55.372	55.815 55.815	57.797 57.797	57.251	58.000 60.574	50% 6 100% 6	60.854 5	62.000 6 58.171 5	64.000 6	66.000 6			69.000 55.147	/1.000 53.990	/2.000 53.572	/3.000 53.457
EXTA	External	2.654	2.816	3.278		2.354	2.436										2.627	2.643
EXTA (HG)	High-grade	2.469	2.602	3.000	2.906	2.148	2.223			2.310	2.257		2.289	2.309	2.374	2.388	2.397	2.411
EXIA (EM)	Hisky (EM)	0.185	0.213	0.278	0.278	0.206	0.213		112.0	0.222	7 12.0	0.220	0.220	0.222	0.228	0.229	0.230	0.231
	rixed Assets Other Assets	7.200 53.921	60.026	72.684	0.361	0.000 66.546	0.922 68.876	100% 6					70.939 7			73.984	74.275	74.718
RWA	Risk-weighted assets	538.690	549.780		Ŋ		576.576		9	Ŋ		596.729 59	0	G		-	-	627.988
Bank Liabilities	:	710.696					774.543	76			779.824 79					817.852 8		326.421
M1	Retail	541.691				-	602.474 70.040	6.				616.969 6	U		637.780 6		647.682 6	653.080 50.770
M3 M3	Wholesale (non-capital)	42.808 44.397	01.963 19.927	04.10U 19.659	84.19/ 17.864	/1.49/ 17.832	13.342 26.736	- 0	72.160 / 29.540 4	/U.180 44.366 3	32.081 32		26.833 2	03.438 27.925			60.074 40.123	38.773 41.049
	Short-term	30.423	13.789	14.842		13.410	18.715	- ·									8.025	8.210
EXTL	Long-term External	13.973 18.728	6.137 17.504	4.817 21.596	4.223 20.479	4.422 17.725	8.021 18.183	~ -	11.816 1 18.435 1	19.964 18.482	16.040 18.350	20.112 18.620	16.100 1 18.681 1	18.151 18.866	27.464 19.248	30.107 19.407	32.099 19.547	32.840 19.710
	Other	63.072	65.320	61.798		52.454	53.808	τ							53.808	53.808	53.808	53.808
Capital		37.297	40.301	42.692		53.449	53.743	τ							71.732	71.864	71.982	72.118
T2 T1	Tier II Tier I	10.025 27 272	10.832 20.468	11.475 31 217	12.209 33 213	15.688 37 761	15.600 38.143		16.000 1 10.854 /	16.000 15.403	16.000 - 15.382	16.000 - 17.541 F	16.000 1 54.032 F	16.000 55.412	16.000 55 732	16.000 55 864	16.000 55 082	16.000 56.118
TCE	Core	17.803	18.366	18.637		22.940	22.940								39.638	39.638	39.638	39.638
T1-TCE	Non-core	9.470 27.207	11.103	12.580	13.751	14.821	15.203	u	15.414 1 56.057 6	15.454	15.343 -	15.569 -	15.620 1	15.774	16.094 71 722	16.226 71 064	16.344 74 000	16.480 72.440
REGADJ	Regulatory Adjustments	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000								0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Key Capital ratios		200)00 F	200 F		200									100	200	1	
RIS BIS	Hegulatory Capital Reculatory minimum	8.0% 8.0%	7.3% 8.0%	/.6% 8.0%	8.0%	9.6% 8.0%	9.3% 8.0%		9.4% 8.0% 1	10.2%		10.6%	10.0%		10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%
BUFCAP	National buffer (% pts)	-1.1%	-0.7%	-0.4%	-0.3%	1.6%	1.3%								1.6%	1.6%	1.5%	1.5%
T1/RWA	Tier I	5.1%	5.4%	5.6%	5.6%	6.8%	6.6% 4.6%		6.8%	7.5%	7.7%	8.0%	9.1%	9.2%	9.0%	9.0%	9.0%	8.9%
I UE/HWA BIS(T1)	Core ner i Regulatory minimum	3.3% 4.0%	3.3% 4.0%	3.3% 4.0%	3.3% 4.0%	4.0%	4.0%			0.0%	o.1% 6.0%	5.4% 6.0%	0.0%	0.0% 6.0 %	0.4% 6.0%	0.4% 6.0%	0.4% 6.0%	0.3% 6.0%
BUFCAP (T1)	National buffer (% pts)	1.1%	1.4%	1.6%	1.6%	2.8%	2.6%		2.8%	1.5%	1.7%	2.0%	3.1%	3.2% 1.2%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	2.9%
12 LEVRAT	Leverage ratio	20.1	18.6	10.6	10.5	10.2	15.4			14.0	13.7	13.5	12.2	12.1	12.3	12.4	12.4	1.2.%

Japan: Regulatory Change Scenario

						Ċ											ĺ
¥ trillion						<u> </u>	Projection period										
		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Key Liquidity ratios	Liquidity coverage ratio Net stable funding ratio Cash/Assets	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	90.8 82.2 1.0%	92.1 82.8 1.0%	102.7 85.0 1.0%	106.3 86.0 1.0%	107.1 86.4 1.0%	110.7 87.4 1.0%	111.9 87.8 1.0%	112.1 88.1 1.0%	113.5 88.5 1.0%	115.1 89.0 1.0%	115.5 89.1 1.0%
Bank Core Capital Supply Model	lph Model																
Total new Core Capital NEWTCE RROE REDEF PROFRET PROFRET/PROF	tal Required new issuance Core equity shadow price Redefinition effects Retained income % of profits retained	1.8% 2.102 50%	2.1% 1.699 50%	4.0% 1.062 50%	4.7% 0.000 50%	12.7% 0.000 50%	0.000 0.000 9.8% 0.000 0.000 50%	2.500 2.500 6.4% 0.000 0.000 50%	4.599 7.500 12.1% -4.000 1.099 50%	0.000 4.000 222.2% -4.000 0.000 50%	1.933 4.000 13.8% -4.000 1.933 50%	6.440 4.000 14.8% 1 0.000 2.440 50%	1.225 0.000 13.8% 0.000 1.225 25%	0.000 0.000 7.5% 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 7.1% 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 7.7% 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 7.5% 0.000 0.000 0.000
Banking Sector P&L Model	lodel																
Interest earnings	C.a.b.	11.609	13.020	14.332	13.229	13.147	11.719		14.193	18.102	-				•		4.575
FFUNDS	casn Rate of return	0.00%	0.13%	0.47%	u.u39 0.46%	0.11%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.25% (0.021 0.25% C	0.25% 0	0.25% 0	0.25% (0.25%	0.25%
JGB	Government bonds JGB yield	1.316 1.36%	1.534 1.74%	1.334 1.65%	1.361 1.45%	1.614 1.34%	1.589 1.30%		2.044 1.50%	2.170 1.50%							2.284 1.50%
	Domestic financial Trading Book	1.605 1.443	1.872 1.670	1.974 1 755	1.951 1 744	1.8095 1.628	1.772 1.598		0.650 0.450	0.650 0.450							0.650 0.450
BOND	Spread over JGBs	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%		0.50%	0.50%							0.50%
	Banking Book Rate of return	0.162 1.36%	0.201 1.74%	0.219 1.65%	0.207 1.45%	0.181 1.34%	0.174 1.30%		0.200 1.50%	0.200 1.50%							0.200 1.50%
SPREAD (BANK)	Spread over JGBs	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%		0.50%	0.50%							0.50%
	Domestic non-financial	5.432	7.671	8.440	7.237	8.172	7.091		9.733	12.628							9.742
	Trading Book Overnight call money ra	0.00 0.00%	0.000 0.13%	0.000 0.47%	0.000 0.46%	0.000 0.11%	0.000 1.30%		0.001 1.50%	0.001 1.50%							0.000 1.50%
SPREAD (CORP)	Lending spread	0.08%	0.25%	0.53%	0.40%	0.75%	0.51%		%06.0	1.67%							0.80%
	Banking Book 10vr bond vield	5.432 1.36%	7.671 1.74%	8.439 1.65%	7.237 1.45%	8.172 1.34%	7.090 1.30%		9.732 1.50%	12.627							9.742 1.50%
SPREAD (CORP)	Lending spread	0.08%	0.25%	0.53%	0.40%	0.75%	0.51%	0.46%	0.90%	1.67%							0.80%
	Mortgages	0.0433	0.2125	0.5571	0.4892	0.4921	0.3506		0.6102	1.1125 (0.9220	1.0848 1				0.7576 (.7596
SPREAD (HH)	Overnight rate Lending spread	0.00% 0.08%	0.13% 0.25%	0.47% 0.53%	0.46% 0.40%	0.11% 0.75%	0.10% 0.51%	0.10% 0.46%	0.10% 0.90%	0.10% 1.67%							0.25% 0.80%
	Other Overnight rate	0.043	0.213	0.557	0.489 0.46%	0.492	0.358		0.595	0.981							0.561
SPREAD (HH)	Lending spread	0.08%	0.25%	0.53%	0.40%	0.75%	0.51%		0.90%	1.67%							0.80%
	Real borrowing rate	1.24 %	1.34%	1.76%	1.62%	1.84 %	1.37% 0.050		1.43%	2.24%							1.41%
	High grade	0.048	0.051	0.056	0.059	0.051	0.044		0.046	0.046							0.048
	Rate of return	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%		2.00%	2.00%							2:00%
	Hisky (EM) Bata of raturn	0.006 2 00%	2 00.00	0.009 2 00%	010.0	0.008	0.006		0.007 1 50%	0.007 1 50%							0.007
SPREAD (EXTA)	Lending spread	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%							
NO	Earnings residual	3.115	1.451	1.367	1.595 0.46%	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500							0.500
BOND	Overingnit can moriey rate 10yr bond yield	0.00% 1.36%	0.13% 1.74%	0.47 <i>%</i> 1.65%	0.40% 1.45%	0.11% 1.34%	1.30%	0.10% 1.40%	0.10% 1.50%	1.50%	1.50%						1.50%
Interest expenses		2.864	4.5323	5.740	4.526	2.681	2.371	2.690	3.046								4.746
1	Retail Overninht call money r:	2.265	3.722 0 13%	4.749 0.47%	3.522 0.46%	2.086 0.11%	1.785 0.10%	1.820 0 10%	1.835 0.10%								2.927
RATEM1	Overnight call money to Spread over official	0.42%	0.56%	0.38%	0.15%	0.25%	0.20%	0.20%	0.20%	0.20%	0.20% (0.20% 0	0.20% 0	0.20% 0	0.20% (0.20%	0.20%

Japan: Regulatory Change Scenario

¥ trillion						<u>a</u>	Projection period										
	Domestic financial	2005 0.09	2006 0.17	2007 0.42	2008 0.46	2009 0.20	2010 0.181	2011 0.182	2012 0.178	2013 0.172	2014 0.268	2015 0.263	2016 0.256	2017 0.253	2018 0.249	2019 0.243	2020 0.238
	Overnight call money r	0.00%	0.13%	0.47%	0.46%	0.11%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%
RATEM2	Spread over official Wholesale (non-capital) and Short-term	0.19% 0.875 -0.001	0.21% 1.172 0.028	0.19% 1.064 0.067	0.15% 0.946 0.065	0.15% 0.778 0.014	0.15% 0.788 0.016	0.15% 1.070 0.018	0.15% 1.415 0.021	0.15% 1.636 0.020	0.15% 1.478 0.041	0.15% 1.652 0.034	0.15% 1.622 0.026	0.15% 1.751 0.027	0.15% 1.886 0.027	0.15% 1.933 0.023	0.15% 1.962 0.020
RATEM3	Key policy rate Spread over official	0.00% 0.00%	0.13% 0.00%	0.47% 0.00%	0.46% -0.01%	0.11% 0.00%	0.10% 0.00%	0.10% 0.00%	0.10% 0.00%	0.10% 0.00%	0.25% 0.00%						
RATEMA	Long-term 10yr bond yield Snread over official	0.877 1.36% -0 21%	1.144 1.74% -0.20%	0.997 1.65% -0.21%	0.882 1.45% -0 22%	0.763 1.34%	0.772 1.30% 0.00%	1.051 1.40% 0.25%	1.394 1.50% 0.50%	1.616 1.50% 0.75%	1.438 1.50% 0.50%	1.618 1.50% 0.75%	1.596 1.50% 0.75%	1.724 1.50% 0.75%	1.858 1.50% 0.75%	1.910 1.50% 0.75%	1.941 1.50% 0.75%
RATEEXTL	External Average interest rate Expenses residual	0.020 0.10% -0.381	0.018 0.10% -0.554	0.020 0.10% -0.510	0.021 0.10% -0.422	0.10%	0.018 0.10% -0.400	0.018 0.10% -0.400	0.018 0.10% -0.400	0.018 0.10% -0.400	0.018 0.10% -0.400	0.019 0.10% -0.400	0.019 0.10% -0.400	0.019 0.10% -0.400	0.019 0.10% -0.400	0.019 0.10% -0.400	0.020 0.10% -0.400
Net interest earnings		8.745	8.488	8.592	8.704	10.466	9.347	8.423	11.147	14.845	11.551	12.583	12.252	9.594	9.593	9.863	9.829
00E NIC	Other earnings Non-interest costs	6.417 10.412	6.159 10.336	6.834 11.976	5.718 16.032	2.574 14.000	2.640 12.961	2.677 11.845	2.684 10.691	2.665 9.545	2.704 8.731	2.713 8.323	2.740 7.989	2.795 7.952	2.818 7.818	2.839 7.679	2.862 7.551
Operating profits (pre-credit losses) CREDLOSS Credit Losses Other	credit losses) Credit Losses (-) Other	4.750 1.178 0.000	4.312 0.428 0.000	3.450 -0.049 0.000	-1.610 0.312 0.000	-0.960 0.092 0.000	-0.973 0.000 0.000	-0.745 0.000 0.000	3.140 0.000 0.000	7.964 -8.412 0.000	5.524 0.000 0.000	6.973 0.000 0.000	7.002 0.000 0.000	4.437 0.000 0.000	4.593 0.000 0.000	5.022 0.000 0.000	5.140 0.000 0.000
Income before tax Net Income	Tax Extraordinary gains, net	5.928 1.725 0.000 4.203	4.739 1.341 0.000 3.399	3.401 1.276 0.000 2.125	-1.298 0.698 0.000 -1.996	-0.868 0.217 0.000 -1.084	-0.973 0.000 0.000-0-0.973	-0.745 0.000 0.000 -0.745	3.140 0.942 0.000 2.198	-0.448 0.000 0.000 -0.448	5.524 1.657 0.000 3.866	6.973 2.092 0.000 4.881	7.002 2.101 0.000 4.901	4.437 1.331 0.000 3.106	4.593 1.378 0.000 3.215	5.022 1.507 0.000 3.516	5.140 1.542 0.000 3.598
ROE ROA	Return on Equity Return on Assets	11.40% 0.56%	8.76% 0.45%	5.12% 0.28%	-4.53% -0.25%	-2.19% -0.13%	-1.82% -0.12%	-1.35% -0.09%	3.71% 0.26%	-0.73% -0.05%	6.19% 0.46%	7.31% 0.57%	6.93% 0.57%	4.34% 0.36%	4.48% 0.36%	4.89% 0.39%	4.99% 0.40%
Macroeconomic Framework	swork																
Nominal GDP growth		0.7	1:1	1.6	-2.0	-6.1	2.6 0.5	1.4	0.3	-0.7	1.5	0.3	1.0	2.0	0.8	0.7	0.8
RGDPG PGDPG	resignal Real growth GDP deflator	0. L- 2. L-	2.0 -1.0	2.3 -0.8	-1.2 -0.8	-5.2 -1.0	0.9 3.4 -0.8	1.9 -0.5	0.7 -0.4	-0.2	1.9 -0.4	0.8 -0.5	1.4 -0.4	2.3 -0.3	1.1 -0.3	1.1 -0.3	-0.4
	Output gap	0.4	1.7	3.5	2.3	-3.3	-0.2	1.5	2.2	1.9	2.3	2.0	2.5	3.6	3.2	2.9	2.7
	Employment (thousands) %oya	63560 0.4	63820 0.4	64120 0.5	63850 -0.4	62820 -1.6	61974 -1.3	62450 0.8	62535 0.1	62294 -0.4	62146 -0.2	62238 0.1	62207 -0.1	62386 0.3	62585 0.3	62575 0.0	62570 0.0
Risk-weighted assets	%oya	3.2	2.1	2.1	5.5	-6.1	3.7	4.9	-0.4	-2.8	1.9	-0.5	0.9	3.2	0.5	0.4	0.6
Bank assets	%oya %GDP	748 1.1 149.0	749 0.2 147 7	769 2.6 149 1	813 5.8 161 0	800 -1.6 168.8	828 3.5 170.3	842 1.6 170 7	861 2.3 174 1	841 -2.3 171 4	856 1.8 171 9	853 -0.3	861 0.9 170.6	885 2.8 171 8	890 0.6 171 4	893 0.4 170.9	899 0.6
Bank credit to private sector	sector %oya %CDD	495 2.9	500 0.9	497 -0.6	512 2.9	500 -2.3	518 3.6	527 1.9	524 -0.6	510 -2.7	521 2.1	519 -0.4	524 1.0	542 3.3 405 2	546 0.7	548 0.5	552 0.7
Other credit		30.7 1010	974 974	943 943	844	844	872 872	888	886	869 869	886 886	886	896 896	923	931 931	937 937	945
Private sector credit 125	%oya %GDP ¥ trillion %oya	-2.0 201.2 1505 -0.9	-5.5 191.9 1474 -2.1	-3.2 183.0 1440 -2.3	- 10.4 167.2 1356 -5.8	0.0 178.1 1344 -0.9	 179.3 1389 3.4	1.9 1416 1.9	-0.2 179.3 1411 -0.3	-2.0 177.0 1379 -2.2	2.0 178.0 1408 2.1	-0.1 177.3 1405 -0.2	177.6 1420 1.1	3.0 179.3 1465 3.2	0.0 179.4 1476 0.8	0.7 179.2 1485 0.6	0.9 179.3 1497 0.8
Nominal GDP		501.883	507.473	515.352	505.066	474.049	486.286	493.035	494.296	490.757	497.986	499.609	504.545	514.783	519.014	522.776 5	527.133

Dataset
Historical
Japan:

¥ trillion

		Currant																	
		risk- weighting																	
Bank Assets			739.021						_									800.269	
LIQ	Cash	%0	13.471															7.765	
GUV LID/TA	Government ponds Liquid asset ratio	0%0	33.2U9 6.4%	31.304 5.9%	30.007 5.6%	29.620	31.200 3 5.5%	5.3% 7	7.2% 10.	10.1% 10.1%	10.0% 11.	11.1% 14.0%	982 102.133 0% 15.0%	133 90.093 0%	920 88.340 12.9%	40 80.727 % 11.5%	33.200	16.0%	
с П Ш	Domestic financial		64.429															96.885	
IB (TB)	Trading Book	10%	53.152															87.539	
IB (BB)	Banking Book	25%	11.277															9.346	
CORP	Domestic non-financial		458.675															385.251	
CORP (TB)	Trading Book	25%	0.019															0.022	
	Banking Book	%001	400.904	401.0/3 4				•										227.095	
H	Mouya Household		103 467															114 501	
MORT	Mortages	50%	51.734															57.251	
80	Other	100%	51.734															57.251	
EXTA	External		3.915						_									2.354	
EXTA (HG)	High-grade	25%	3.643															2.148	
EXTA (EM)	Risky (EM)	100%	0.271															0.206	
	Fixed Assets	100%	7.327	_														6.688	
	Other Assets	100%	54.229															66.546	
HWA	Hisk-weighted assets		607.133	000.8/9				-				.,						//1.900	
Bank Liabilities			695.843															746.821	
Σ1	Retail		430.713					47						~	4,	47	4,	587.313	
M2	Domestic financial		67.046															71.497	
M3	Wholesale (non-capital)		66.769															17.832	
	Short-term		11.624															13.410	
EVTI	Long-term		55.144 45.047	54.804														4.422	
	Other		86.268		79.087	80.163 10	101.011 10	105.359 96	96.268 87.	87.596 74	74.731 53.	53.320 61.713	713 63.458	458 63.072	72 65.320	20 61.798	8 72.594	52.454	
Capital			43.178	44.173	44.171													53.449	
T2	Tier II		11.606	11.873	11.873													15.688	
11	lier I		31.5/2	32.300	32.298													37.761	
T1-TCF	Core Non-core		13.413 18.150	13.762 18.538	18.304	14.001	13.460 13		23.521 23. 10.586 11	23.381 23	23.493 19. 19.245 10	19.501 18./ 10.095 8.3	3./1 C0/.81 8.336 0.0	596 17.803	18.300 70 11103	00 18.03/ 12 12 580	19.462	22.940	
BEGCAP	Begulatory		43 178	44 173	44 171													53 449	
REGADJ	Regulatory Adjustments		0.000	0.000	0.000			0.000	_				000 0.000					0.000	
Key Capital ratios																			
REGCAP/RWA	Regulatory Capital		7.1%	7.3%	7.0%														
BIS	Regulatory minimum		8.0%	8.0%	8.0%				-									-	
BUFCAP	National buffer (%pts)		-0.9%	-0.7%	-1.0%				-			·							
T1/RWA	Tier I		5.2%	5.3%	5.2%														
TCE/RWA	Core Tier I		2.2%	2.3%	2.2%														
BIS(T1)	Regulatory minimum		4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0% 4	4.0% 4.	4.0% 4.	4.0% 4.	4.0% 4.0	4.0% 4.0%	0% 4.0%	% 4.0%	% 4.0%	4.0%	4.0%	
BUFCAP (11)	National buffer (% pts)		1.2%	1.3%	1.2%														
	l avaged maile		0%7.1	1.670	%7'I														
.26					2														

Japan: Historical Dataset

¥ trillion

Include containing the second secon	Turnel industry concentration 1.8% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2% Bar Core Capital Supply Moot CapityAssense 1.8% 1.6% 1.7% 1.5% 1.2% Bar Core Capital Supply Moot CapityAssense 0.0% 0.		1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Interface of the control state of th	Bark Core Capital Supply Model Telatrone Capital Telatrone Capital Refine Core capital Re	Liquidity coverage ratic Net stable funding ratio Cash/Assets		1.6%	1.6%	1.7%	1.5%	1.2%	1.4%	1.1%	1.1%	1.3%	1.3%	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	.
Tentor contact Tentor Tentor <th< td=""><td>Total new Core Capital NEWTCE Total new Core Capital REDE Total new Core 10.3% 10.3% 11.3% 2 REDEE REDE</td><td>Model</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></th<>	Total new Core Capital NEWTCE Total new Core Capital REDE Total new Core 10.3% 10.3% 11.3% 2 REDEE REDE	Model																
Manual monome and protection Manual monome and protection <th< td=""><td>FLOFET Redunt neture (0) 000</td><td>equired new issuance Core equity shadow pri</td><td>6 <u>C</u></td><td></td><td>8.0%</td><td>12.3%</td><td>10.3%</td><td>14.7%</td><td>21.1%</td><td>30.0%</td><td>7.0%</td><td>11.8%</td><td>5.0%</td><td>6.7%</td><td>1.8%</td><td>2.1%</td><td>4.0%</td><td>4</td></th<>	FLOFET Redunt neture (0) 000	equired new issuance Core equity shadow pri	6 <u>C</u>		8.0%	12.3%	10.3%	14.7%	21.1%	30.0%	7.0%	11.8%	5.0%	6.7%	1.8%	2.1%	4.0%	4
Bundling Sector Pat, Mono Bandling Sector Pat, Mono Ba	Benking Sector P&L Model Interest certings FUNDS Cash FUNDS Cash EUNDS Cash Cash Demonstruction Cash Domo Spread over /GBs BoND SPREAD (GNR) SPREAD (CORP) SPREAD (CORP) Cash Domestic non-financial Domestic non-financial Domestic non-financial Domestic non-financial Domestic non-financial SPREAD (CORP) SPREAD (CORP)	edefinition effects stained income % of profits retained		0.079 50%	0.000 50%	0.000 50%	0.000 50%	0.000 50%	0.797 50%	0.000 50%	0.000 50%	0.000 50%	0.000 50%	0.647 50%	2.102 50%	1.699 50%	1.062 50%	0.0 5
Intertationistic 33.50 56.30 26.71 21.36 14.37 14.30 14.37 14.30 14.37 14.30 14.37 14.30	Interesternings 36.339 56.358 56.340 2.611 2.189 FUNDS Cash Cash Cash Cash 2.612 2.189 UGB Cash Cash </td <td>-</td> <td></td>	-																
FUND Cali Construction Construction <th< td=""><td>FUNDS Cash Set of return JGB Orest Germment bonds Germment bonds Germment bonds BDND Spread over JGB8 BDND Spread over JGB8 BDND Spread over JGB8 BERKID (BANN) Spread over JGB8 Barking Book SPREAD (CORP) Trading Book Trading Strada Trading Strada Tradi</td><td></td><td>38.539</td><td>36.358</td><td>36.840</td><td>32.678</td><td>26.812</td><td>21.898</td><td>18.737</td><td>16.013</td><td>14.127</td><td>12.062</td><td>10.913</td><td>10.652</td><td>11.609</td><td>13.020</td><td>14.332</td><td>13.2</td></th<>	FUNDS Cash Set of return JGB Orest Germment bonds Germment bonds Germment bonds BDND Spread over JGB8 BDND Spread over JGB8 BDND Spread over JGB8 BERKID (BANN) Spread over JGB8 Barking Book SPREAD (CORP) Trading Book Trading Strada Trading Strada Tradi		38.539	36.358	36.840	32.678	26.812	21.898	18.737	16.013	14.127	12.062	10.913	10.652	11.609	13.020	14.332	13.2
Concortion Concort	Trotuce Garman return JGB Garman return JGB Cast yead JGB Domestic montellist ENUD Spread over JGBs BREAD (CORP) Brand over JGBs Domestic mon-financial Entime SPREAD (CORP) Brand over JGBs Domestic mon-financial Entime SPREAD (CORP) Branding Book SPREAD (CORP) Lending Book SPREAD (CORP) Lending Book SPREAD (CORP) Lending soread Domestic mon-francial Entime SPREAD (CORP) Lending soread SPREAD (CORP) Lending soread Montgages Montgages SPREAD (CORP) Lending soread SPREAD (HH) Lending soread Montgages Montgages SPREAD (HH) Lending soread <td>Cash Data of minus</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>0.009</td> <td>0.005</td> <td>0.000</td> <td>0.000</td> <td>0.000</td> <td>0.000</td> <td>0.010</td> <td>0.038</td> <td>0.0</td>	Cash Data of minus								0.009	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.038	0.0
GB Displation 173 133 133 137 136 136 1	JGB JGB JGB yeld Dumestic financial Trading Book BOND Book Bond over JGBs Bong over offals SPREAD (EANN) Bong book Bong and over JGBs Bong book Bong and over JGBs Domestic northancial Trading Book Banking Book Banking Book Overnight sate SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Trading pread Trading pread Trading pread Trading pread Trading pread Trading pread Domestic northancial Trading pread Demetic northancial Trading pread Trading pread Tr	Government bonds								0. I 1 % 1.202	0.893 0.893	%00.006	0.952	u.uu% 1.533	u.uu% 1.316	0.13% 1.534	0.47% 1.334	5 T
Manual condition Table	BOND Example of the manual man	JGB yield								1.75% 1.601	1.33%	1.25%	1.01%	1.50% 1.747	1.36% 1.605	1.74%	1.65%	4 4
D/D Banking Box, Banking Box, SPELO (BANK) Dool and fail and fa	BOND Speed over JGBs Banking Book Rate of return SPREAD (SANI) Speed over JGBs Speed over JGBs Spread over JGBs Spread over JGBs Spread over JGBs Spread over JGBs Spread over JGBs Trading spread Overnight call money rate Banking spord Overnight call money rate Banking spread Household Mortgages SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield Banking spread Mortgages SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield Banking spread Mortgages SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield Banking spread High grade Dor onther SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield Banking spread High grade Dor Overnight call money rate SPREAD (HH) Uor bond yield SPREAD (STA) UO UO UO (STA) UO UO (STA) UO (S	Trading Book								1.342	1.106	1.198	1.161	1.575	1.443	1.670	1.755	
Sheed (BAN) Bate of return Table of return	SPREAD (BANK) Rate of return Spread over JGBs Spread over JGBs Spread over JGBs Domestic non-financial Trading Book Trading Book Spread (HH) Overnight call money rate Lending spread Spread (HH) Unyr bond yield Nortgages Mortgages Mortgages Mortg	Spread over JGBs Banking Book								0.50% 0.2495	0.50% 0.198	0.50% 0.174	0.50% 0.134	0.50% 0.172	0.50% 0.162	0.50% 0.201	0.50% 0.219	0.50
SPREAD (EAM) Spread (Eas) Comparision Comparision <thcomparision< th=""> <thcomparision< th=""></thcomparision<></thcomparision<>	SPREAD (GANK) Spread over JGBS SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Trading Book SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Mortgages SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Household SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate Coming spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Mortgage	Rate of return								1.75%	1.33%	1.25%	1.01%	1.50%	1.36%	1.74%	1.65%	1.45
Taring Book Taring Book Taring Book Total Taring Taring Book Total Taring Tarin	SPREAD (CORP) Trading Book Lending spread Banking Book SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Banking Book SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Lending spread SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Banking Book Trading spread SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Banking Book Trading spread Banking Book Townight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Rate of return Rate of return Rate of return <t< td=""><td>Spread over JGBs Domestic non-financial</td><td>_</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.50% 0.000</td><td>0.50% 9.068</td><td>0.50% 8.156</td><td>0.50% 4.737</td><td>0.50% 6.192</td><td>0.50% 5.432</td><td>0.50% 7.671</td><td>0.50% 8.440</td><td>0.50</td></t<>	Spread over JGBs Domestic non-financial	_							0.50% 0.000	0.50% 9.068	0.50% 8.156	0.50% 4.737	0.50% 6.192	0.50% 5.432	0.50% 7.671	0.50% 8.440	0.50
SPREAD (COFP) Consentific all money rate Correngi (rati) Correng (rati) <thcor< td=""><td>SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Lending Boxk SPREAD (CORP) Lending Boxk Banking Boxk 10yr bond yield SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate Dowenight rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate Covernight rate Dvernight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Spread Mortgages Spread No Overnight rate SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread High grade High grade Rate of return Rate of return Sisty (EM) Rate of return Rate of return 2.35% Interest expenses 2.35% Interest expenses 2.33% RATEM Spread over official</td><td>Trading Book</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.000</td><td>0.000</td><td>0.000</td><td>0.000</td><td>0.000</td><td>0.000</td><td>0.000</td><td>0.000</td><td>0.0</td></thcor<>	SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Lending Boxk SPREAD (CORP) Lending Boxk Banking Boxk 10yr bond yield SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate Dowenight rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate Covernight rate Dvernight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mortgages Spread Mortgages Spread No Overnight rate SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread High grade High grade Rate of return Rate of return Sisty (EM) Rate of return Rate of return 2.35% Interest expenses 2.35% Interest expenses 2.33% RATEM Spread over official	Trading Book								0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.0
The Current Current Bis for the Current Bis	PREAD (CORP) Banking Boread Toyr bond yield Ranking Boread Nordgages Toyr bond yield SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Mordgages SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Nordgages SPREAD (HH) Coremight rate Lending spread SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Read Coremight rate Coremight rate Coremight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread SPREAD (HH) Lending spread SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Rate of return Factor High Rate of return SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread Coremight call 2.35% ND Dornoy Saft (EM) Rate of return Rate of return 2.35% Rate of return 4.24% Rate of return 2.35% Rate of return 2.35% <t< td=""><td>Overnight call mon</td><td>iey rate</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.11%</td><td>0.06%</td><td>0.00%</td><td>0.00%</td><td>0.00%</td><td>0.00%</td><td>0.13%</td><td>0.47%</td><td>0.46</td></t<>	Overnight call mon	iey rate							0.11%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.47%	0.46
Preprint Light bond yeld 1,33% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 1,73% 0,73% <td>PREAD (CORP) 10yr bond yield Rending spread Houening spread Houening spread Houening spread Nortgage Overnight rate Overnight rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Read borrowing rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Read borrowing rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Read borrowing rate Stread High grade High grade Risky (EM) Rate of return Risky (Rix Rate of return Risky (Rix Rate of return</td> <td>Leriuing spreau Banking Book</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>9.068</td> <td>0.70% 8.156</td> <td>4.737</td> <td>0.13% 6.192</td> <td>0.00% 5.432</td> <td>7.671</td> <td>0.33% 8.439</td> <td>7.2 7.2</td>	PREAD (CORP) 10yr bond yield Rending spread Houening spread Houening spread Houening spread Nortgage Overnight rate Overnight rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Read borrowing rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Read borrowing rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Read borrowing rate Stread High grade High grade Risky (EM) Rate of return Risky (Rix Rate of return Risky (Rix Rate of return	Leriuing spreau Banking Book									9.068	0.70% 8.156	4.737	0.13% 6.192	0.00% 5.432	7.671	0.33% 8.439	7.2 7.2
SPEED (CORF) Lending spread Mortgages Cu00% C/73% C/207% C/207% C/207% C/203% C/23% C/23% <thc 23%<="" th=""> <thc 23%<="" th=""> <thc 23%<="" th=""></thc></thc></thc>	SPREAD (CORP) Lending spread Household Morgages Overnight rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Morgages Overnight rate Covernight rate Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Real borrowing rate External High grade Acternal Fish grade Acternal Rate of return Rate of return Rate of return Rate of return Rate of return Acternal OND Londing spread ON Covernight call money rate SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread Rate of return Rate of return Rate of return 2.35% Rate of return </td <td>10yr bond yield</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1.33%</td> <td>1.25%</td> <td>1.01%</td> <td>1.50%</td> <td>1.36%</td> <td>1.74%</td> <td>1.65%</td> <td>1.4</td>	10yr bond yield									1.33%	1.25%	1.01%	1.50%	1.36%	1.74%	1.65%	1.4
Mortgage Mortgage G073 G.3671 G.073 G.033 G.033 <thg.033< th=""> G.033 G.033</thg.033<>	PREAD (HH) Mortgages Covernight rate Covernight rate Covernight rate Covernight rate Covernight rate Covernight rate Covernight rate Covernight rate Covernight rate Covernight rate External External Covernight cell Covernight cell	Lending spread Household								0.00% 0.1040	0.73% 0.7644	0.70%	0.20%	0.15% 0.1588	0.08% 0.0865	0.25%	0.53% 1.1143	0.40
Presed Overnight rate 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% Presed(HH) Lending spread 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.	SPREAD (HH) Overnight rate Lending spread Other Other Other Overnight rate Chen SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Other Overnight rate Chen SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Real borrowing rate External A SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread ON Dvernight call money rate ON Overnight call money rate BOND Overnight call money rate ATEM1 Spread over official	Mortgages								0.0520	0.3822	0.3504	0.1036	0.0794	0.0433	0.2125	0.5571	0.4
SPREAD (HH) Lending spread 0.00% 0.73% 0.70% 0.73% 0.75% 0.53% </td <td>SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Other Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Derending spread Other Overnight rate External External External External Brisky (EM) Rate of return Rate of return 2.35% Information 2.33% Information 2.33% Information 2.33% Information 2.33% Information 2.33% Information 2.33%</td> <td>Overnight rate</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>0.11%</td> <td>0.06%</td> <td>%00.0</td> <td>%00.0</td> <td>0.00%</td> <td>0.00%</td> <td>0.13%</td> <td>0.47%</td> <td>4.0</td>	SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Other Overnight rate SPREAD (HH) Derending spread Other Overnight rate External External External External Brisky (EM) Rate of return Rate of return 2.35% Information 2.33% Information 2.33% Information 2.33% Information 2.33% Information 2.33% Information 2.33%	Overnight rate								0.11%	0.06%	%00.0	%00.0	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.47%	4.0
Dering trace Dering trace<	SPREAD (HH) Ownight rate Lending spread SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Real borrowing rate External Eacl borrowing rate Rate of return SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread Branings resteration 2.35% ON Overnight call money rate BOND 20.50% Interest expenses 29.319 Retail 29.319 Covernight call money rate 21.937 Retail Overnight call money rate	Lending spread Other								0.00% 0.052	0.73% 0.382	0.70% 0.350	0.20% 0.104	0.15% 0.079	0.08% 0.043	0.25% 0.213	0.53%	4.0
SPREAD (HH) Lending spread 0.00% 0.73% 0.70% 0.15% 0.06% 0.25% 0.55% </td <td>SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Real borrowing rate External High grade Figh grade High grade Rate of return Rate of return SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread CN Downight call money rate ON Overnight call money rate BOND Overnight call money rate Retat 29.319 Covernight call money rate 29.319 Covernight call money rate 29.319 Covernight call money rate 29.319 Retail Overnight call money rate ATEM1 Spread over official</td> <td>Overnight rate</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>0.11%</td> <td>0.06%</td> <td>0.00%</td> <td>0.00%</td> <td>0.00%</td> <td>0.00%</td> <td>0.13%</td> <td>0.47%</td> <td>, 0</td>	SPREAD (HH) Lending spread Real borrowing rate External High grade Figh grade High grade Rate of return Rate of return SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread CN Downight call money rate ON Overnight call money rate BOND Overnight call money rate Retat 29.319 Covernight call money rate 29.319 Covernight call money rate 29.319 Covernight call money rate 29.319 Retail Overnight call money rate ATEM1 Spread over official	Overnight rate								0.11%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.47%	, 0
Entranom	Retend Figh grade High grade High grade Rate of return Rate of return ON Overnight call money rate 2.35% BOND 10yr bond yield 4.24% A339% 3.13% 2.6636 Retail Overnight call money rate ATEM1 Spread over official	Lending spread Beal horrowing rate								0.00% 1 78%	0.73% 2.09%	0.70% 2 22%	0.20% 1 85%	0.15% 1 19%	0.08% 1 24%	0.25% 1.34%	0.53% 1 76%	0 r 7 0
High grade High grade 0.051 0.062 0.063 0.047 0.041 0.051 0.056 Rate of return Rate of return 2.00%	High grade Rate of return Fisky (EM) Rate of return SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread ON Overnight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% Earnings residual ON Overnight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% 8.151% 0.50% 0.50% 1.51% 1.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.37% 1.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.37% 1.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.37% 1.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.37% 1.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 1.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 1.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 1.51% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50%	External								0.058	0.071	0.071	0.056	0.053	0.054	0.058	0.065	0.0
Hate of return 2.00%	Hate of return Risky (EM) Hate of return Risky (EM) SPREAD (EXTA) Landing spread Ration Spread 2.35% ON Overnight call money rate ON 10yr bond yield Interest expenses 4.24% Retail 29.319 26.636 21.937 Retail Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 21.937 16.765 Retail Spread over official Spread over official 29.319 26.636 21.937 16.765 12.252	High grade								0.051	0.062	0.063	0.050	0.047	0.048	0.051	0.056	0.0
The start of the content in the origin of the content in the content of the content in the cont	Read 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% CN Dornight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% CN Overnight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% DND 10yr bond yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.31% 2.36% 1.51% Interest expenses 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 Retail Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 RATEM1 Spread over official Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252	Biology (CDA)								2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.00%	2.0
SPREAD (EXTA) Lending residual 2.00% 2	SPREAD (EXTA) Lending spread CN Lending spread ON Overnight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% ON Overnight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% BOND 10yr bond yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.39% 3.11% 2.36% 1.51% Interest expenses Retail 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 ATEM1 Spread over official Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252	HISKY (EIVI) Bata of raturn								/nn.n	2 00%	2 000%	000.0	000.0	000.0 %00.0	2 00%	2 00 %	5.0
Earnings residual 2.022 0.857 3.666 0.968 3.115 1.451 1.367 ON Overnight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.13% 0.47% DND 10yr bond yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.31% 2.15% 1.51% 1.77% 1.75% 1.30% 1.36% 0.13% 0.47% BOND 10yr bond yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.31% 2.1676 12.15% 1.51% 1.75% 1.33% 1.25% 1.01% 1.50% 1.45% 1.65% 1.65% 0.47% Interst expense Retail 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 9.030 6.627 4.48 2.690 1.968 4.532 5.740 Retail Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 21.937 16.765 12.252 9.030 6.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.74% 7.409 0.47% Retail Oven	Earnings residual 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% CN Overnight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% BOND 10yr bond yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.39% 3.11% 2.36% 1.51% Interest expenses 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 Retail Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 RATEM1 Spread over official Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252	Lending spread								1.50%	2.00% 1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.5
ON Overright call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% 0.06% 0.11% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.13% 0.47% BOND 10yr bond yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.39% 3.11% 2.36% 1.51% 1.77% 1.75% 1.33% 1.50% 1.36% 1.74% 1.65% BOND 10yr bond yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.31% 2.36% 1.51% 1.77% 1.75% 1.33% 1.50% 1.36% 1.74% 1.65% Interest expenses Retail 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 9.030 6.627 4.448 2.690 1.963 2.864 4.5323 5.740 Interest expenses Retail 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 9.036 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.74% 7.40 Paratice Retail 0.066% 0.00% 0.00%	ON Overnight call money rate 2.35% 1.75% 1.04% 0.50% 0.37% BOND 10yr bond yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.39% 3.11% 2.36% 1.51% Interest expenses 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 Retail Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 RATEM1 Spread over official Overnight call money rate 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252	Earnings residual									2.022	0.857	3.666	0.968	3.115	1.451	1.367	÷.
BUNU 10/7 Pond year 4.24% 4.35% 3.35% 3.11% 2.36% 1.51% 1.7% 1.5% 1.33% 1.25% 1.01% 1.50% 1.56% 1.74% 1.65% 1.65% 1.67% 1.65% 1.7% 1.55% 1.7% 1.55% 1.7% 1.55% 1.74% 1.55% 1.67% 1.65% 1.5% 1.7% 1.55% 1.74% 1.55% 1.5%% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.3%% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.3%% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.3%% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.3%% 1.7%% 1.55% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.3%% 1.3%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%% 1.5%% 1.3%%	BUNU 107 Dong yield 4.24% 4.39% 3.39% 3.11% 2.30% 1.51% Interest expenses Retail 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 Overnight call money rate ATEM1 Spread over official	Overnight call money re		1.75%	1.04%	0.50%	0.50%	0.37%	0.06%	0.11%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.47%	4.0
Interest expenses 29.319 26.536 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 9.030 6.627 4.448 2.690 1.963 2.864 4.5323 5.740 Retail 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% RATEM1 Spread over official 0.87% 0.60% 0.38% 0.24% 0.42% 0.56% 0.38%	Interest expenses 29.319 26.636 26.003 21.937 16.765 12.252 Retail Overnight call money rate Spread over official Spread over official	TUYr bond yleid	4.24%	4.39%	3.39%	3.11%	2.30%	%10.1	1.//%	%c/.l	1.33%	%GZ L	%L0.1	%DC.1	1.30%	1./4%	%co.1	4
Hetall Hetall Covernight call money rate 3.722 4.749 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 0.87% 0.60% 0.38% 0.24% 0.56% 0.38%	Het RATEM1	:	29.319	26.636	26.003	21.937	16.765	12.252	9.030	6.627	4.448	2.690	1.908	1.963	2.864	4.5323	5.740	4 0
RATEM1 Spread over official 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.28% 0.38% 0.38%	RATEM1	Hetail Overnight call mone	ev rate							4.924 0 11%	3.366 0.06%	2/6.L	7.452 0 00%	0.00 0 0	2.265 0 00%	3.722 0 13%	4.749 0 47%	3.5 0.46
		Spread over official	I							0.87%	0.60%	0.38%	0.28%	0.24%	0.42%	0.56%	0.38%	0.15

Japan: Historical Dataset

	¥ trillion	

	RATEM2 RATEM3 RATEM4 RATEEXTL	Net interest earnings	00E NIC	Operating profits (CREDLOSS	Income before tax Net Income	ROE ROA	Macroeconomic Framework	Nominal GDP growth	RGDPG PGDPG			Risk-weighted assets	Bank assets Bank credit to private sector Other credit Private sector credit Nominal GDP
	Overnight call money rate Spread over official Wholesale (non-capital) and Other Short-term Key policy rate Spread over official Long-term I Ury bond yield Spread over official Extemal Average interest rate Expenses residual	sbu	Other earnings Non-interest costs	Operating profits (pre-credit losses) CREDLOSS Credit Losses (-) Other	K Tax Extraordinary gains, net	Return on Equity Return on Assets	amework	wth Decidied	residual Real growth GDP deflator	Output gap	Employment (thousands) %oya	ets %oya	%oya %GDP ate sector %oya %GDP %GDP %GDP it ¥ trillion
1993		9.219		0.000	1.514 0.712 0.000 0.803				0.1 0.5	0.0	64500		739 736 750 -0.4 1.9 152.8 150.7 151.5 562 566 574 562 566 574 0.7 115.8 115.4 116.2 115.8 115.9 965 906 953 1142 1422 192.5 1427 1472 1527 1427 3.2 3.7 483.7475 488.7448 495.2133
1994		9.723		0.000	0.800 0.643 0.000 0.157	0.36%		1.0	0.9 0.1	-0.7	64530 0.0	0.0	736 -0.4 150.7 566 0.7 115.8 185.4 1472 3.2 3.2
1995		10.837		0.000	-2.907 1.170 0.000 -4.077	-9.23%		1.3	1.8 -0.5	-0.4	64570 0.1	3.3	
1996		10.741		0.000	0.145 0.237 0.000 -0.092	-0.22% -0.01%		2.1	2.7 -0.6	1.0	64860 0.4	1.5	754 0.5 149.2 578 0.7 114.4 991 196.0 1569 156.0 1569 2.7 505.4123 5
1997		10.047		0.000	-4.369 0.548 0.000 -4.917	-12.42% - -0.64%		2.1	1.5 0.5	1.3	65570 1.1	3.4	788 4.5 152.7 6.80 6.80 0.3 1172 8.2 8.2 8.2 1072 8.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
1998		9.646		0.000	-6.937 0.615 0.000 -7.552	-20.69% -0.96%		-2.2	-2.2 0.0	-1.8	65140 -0.7	-0.4	779 -1.2 154.3 569 -1.7 1074 1074 0.2 212.8 1643 1643 -0.5
1999		9.706		000.0	2.342 0.749 0.000 1.593	3.98% 0.21%		-1.3	0.0 -1.4	-2.8	64620 -0.8	-5.0	768 -1.3 544 544 -4.5 109.2 109.2 109.2 109.2 1629 -0.9 -0.9
2000	0.11% 0.24% 1.954 0.020 0.01% 1.75% -0.135% 0.019 0.019 0.019	9.387	7.113 16.054	0.446 -0.36 0.000	0.086 0.262 0.000 -0.175	-0.37% -0.02%		1:1	2.8 -1.7	-1.0	64460 -0.2	-4.5	759 -1.2 543 543 -0.2 107.8 1100 1.4 218.5 1643 0.9 0.9
2001	0.06% 0.21% 1.250 0.011 0.00% 1.239 1.33% -0.18% 0.020 0.10%	9.679	5.707 21.089	-5.703 -0.309 0.000	-6.012 -1.814 0.000 -4.199	-8.73% -		-1.1	0.2 -1.3	-1.9	64120 -0.5	-0.2	759 0.0 152.5 530 -2.4 106.4 106.4 -3.4 213.5 -3.4 213.5 -3.0 -3.0 497.891
2002	0.00% 0.19% 0.894 -0.001 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.25% 0.25% 0.226 0.10%	9.372	5.729 19.910	-4.809 -0.159 0.000	-4.968 -0.115 0.000 -4.853	-10.86% -0.65%		-1.3	0.3 -1.5	-2.5	63300 -1.3	-7.7	732 -3.6 -3.6 507 -4.3 103.1 1073 0.9 218.3 1580 -0.8 491.494
2003	0.00% 0.18% 0.575 0.575 0.00% 0.577 1.01% 0.577 0.01% 0.020 0.10%	9.005	6.645 15.138	0.513 0.479 0.000	0.992 1.772 0.000 -0.779	-2.01% -0.11%		-0.2	1.5 -1.6	-2.2	63160 -0.2	-3.8	736 0.5 150.0 487 -3.9 99.3 1042 -2.9 212.4 1529 -3.2 -3.2
2004	0.00% 0.18% 0.940 -0.00% 0.01% 0.944 1.52% 0.22% 0.021 0.10%	8.689	6.267 13.053	1.902 0.702 0.000	2.604 1.309 0.000 1.294	3.52% 0.18%		1.6	2.7 -1.0	-0.6	63290 0.2	-0.9	740 0.6 148.5 481 -1.1 96.6 1037 -0.5 208.0 1518 1518 1518 498.456
2005	0.00% 0.19% 0.875 -0.001 0.00% 0.877 0.877 0.21% 0.221% 0.020 0.10%	8.745	6.417 10.412	4.750 1.178 0.000	5.928 1.725 0.000 4.203	11.40% 0.56%		0.7	1.9 -1.2	0.4	63560 0.4	3.2	748 1.1 1.9.0 495 2.9 88.7 1010 -2.6 201.2 1505 -0.9 501.883
2006	0.13% 0.21% 1.172 0.028 0.13% 1.144 1.74% -0.20% 0.018 0.018	8.488	6.159 10.336	4.312 0.428 0.000	4.739 1.341 0.000 3.399	8.76% 0.45%		11	2.0 -1.0	1.7	63820 0.4	2.1	749 0.2 147.7 500 0.9 98.5 974 191.9 1474 -2.1
2007	0.47% 0.19% 1.064 0.067 0.47% 0.097 1.65% 0.020 0.10% 0.10%	8.592	6.834 11.976	3.450 -0.049 0.000	3.401 1.276 0.000 2.125	5.12% 0.28%		1.6	2.3 -0.8	3.5	64120 0.5	2.1	769 2.6 497 497 -0.6 96.4 96.4 943 -3.2 183.0 1440 1440 -2.3 515.352
2008	0.46% 0.15% 0.946 0.065 0.46% 0.46% 0.46% 0.01% 0.01% 0.021 0.10%	8.704	5.718 16.032	-1.610 0.312 0.000	-1.298 0.698 0.000 -1.996	-4.53% -0.25%		-2.0	-1.2 -0.8	2.3	63850 -0.4	5.5	813 5.8 5.10 5.12 5.12 2.9 101.3 814.4 -10.4 -10.4 167.2 1356 -5.8
2009	0.11% 0.15% 0.778 0.014 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.019 0.019 0.10%	10.466	2.574 14.000	-0.960 0.092 0.000	-0.868 0.217 0.000 -1.084	-2.19% -0.13%		-6.1	-5.2 -1.0	-3.3	62820 -1.6	-6.1	800 -1.6 500 500 -2.3 105.4 0.0 178.1 1344 -0.9 474.049

Chapter 6

Impact on Emerging Economies

Introduction and Summary

- Large emerging economies should be an important part of discussions on global banking sector reform. After decades of turbulence, emerging market banking sectors were relatively stable in the latest episode. They may have lessons to teach.
- The total banking sector assets of a sample of large emerging economies was about \$20.6 trillion at the end of 2009, which is more than 174% of the size of the US banking system, and about 145% of the combined GDP of these economies. This aggregate is dominated by China, where rapid growth in the banking system over the past couple of years has made it the single largest national banking system in the world.
- In assessing the direct impact of the unfolding regulatory reforms on emerging economies, we do not have the same quantitative framework used to assess the impact in large mature banking systems. Our assessment is thus more qualitative.
- Based on this assessment, it seems as though it is economic conditions in Emerging Europe that are most likely to be adversely affected by the current regulatory reform agenda. This broadly matches the message from the mature economies, where the largest impact falls on the European banking system.
- Most emerging market banking systems are relatively well capitalized and maintain ratios of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets well above the current 8% minimum of the Basel II requirements.
- This is not to say that the new BIS rules will not affect most emerging market banking systems, however. One concern about the new capital regime is the possibility that they do not fully incorporate the features of emerging capital markets and that, as a result, significant amounts of what might now be countable as Tier 1 capital might not be treatable as such in the future. Another is how local supervisors will choose to react to an increase in the internationally agreed minima in setting the appropriate local buffers for actual capital ratios. Maintaining existing buffers and thus directly passing through the increase in the minima would probably be unduly harsh.

- Excluding minority interests from capital would also raise operating costs for many mature market banks with businesses in emerging economies. The minority interest issue is a particularly important one in the emerging economies, as many have benefitted from infusion of foreign equity from mature economies into local banking systems, which has brought with it new practices to improve local banking efficiency and competition. Current Basel III proposals would significantly increase the cost of maintaining, let alone increasing, such local emerging market presence for banks based in mature countries.
- Most emerging market banking systems will be challenged by the liquidity proposals. For one thing, most domestic long-term bank funding markets are relatively thin. In some cases (especially East Asia), the supply of eligible liquid assets is also limited.
- The direct negative economic effects on emerging economies from regulatory reform will be compounded by indirect effects, which will operate mainly through the transmission mechanism of cross-border capital flows. Unused trade finance facilities would become far more expensive under the leverage ratio proposals. These indirect effects could be most adverse for Emerging Europe, but economies in Latin America and Emerging Asia would probably also be adversely affected.
- A survey of our largest emerging market member banks broadly confirms these results. Bankers generally see the implications of reform as negative, with local lending conditions likely to tighten modestly, but international banking markets expected to tighten significantly, in the aftermath of regulatory reform.

Emerging Market Banking Systems should be a Focus

Banking systems in emerging economies should be an important part of the current discussions on global banking sector reform. The reforms of Basel I and Basel II were negotiated among, and largely shaped for, banks operating in mature economies. With the current round of reforms being designed to deliver a more stable global banking system for the next credit cycle, there are many reasons for emphasizing emerging markets.

The first is their existing scale. The total banking sector assets of a sample of 16 leading emerging economies was about \$20.6 trillion at the end of 2009, which is more than 174% of the size of the US banking system, and about 145% of the combined GDP of these economies (Table 15). This aggregate is dominated by China, where rapid growth in banking system over past couple of years has made it the single largest national

banking system in the world⁶⁸. While China dominates the EM aggregate (in banking as in most other areas), the absolute scale of assets in a number of other economies is notable, both absolutely and relative to GDP. For example, Brazilian bank assets have climbed to about \$1.5 trillion, while Korea's and India's are about \$1.4 trillion⁶⁹.

	% of 2009 GDP	\$ billion
Total EM (16)	145.1	20640.1
Emerging Asia	11011	2001011
China	251.7	12354.3
India	99.9	1354.7
Indonesia	44.8	266.1
Korea	170.6	1419.9
Emerging Europe		
Czech Republic	118.3	225.8
Hungary	139.4	197.5
Poland	92.6	428.9
Russia	74.4	963.0
Turkey	83.6	534.8
Africa/Middle East		
South Africa	139.8	401.4
Saudi Arabia	99.0	365.9
Latin America		
Argentina	33.3	103.6
Brazil	98.6	1551.4
Chile	119.6	193.5
Colombia	22.0	50.3
Mexico	26.1	229.0

Sources: IIF Estimates from various National sources

Table 15

Second, 11 emerging markets are now formally part of the G20 process, and are thus members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board⁷⁰. As such, they have active seats at the table and are able to influence directly negotiations on reform proposals, unlike Basel I and Basel II.

Third, while banking systems in some emerging economies had been subject to multiple, and often violent, periods of crisis and turbulence over recent decades, there was a much reduced incidence of EM banking sector turmoil in the latest episode. Bankers,


⁶⁸ Note that this does not include the "offshore" assets of banks based in Hong Kong.

⁶⁹ For some context, that puts Brazil slightly behind both Belgium and Luxembourg, which vie to be the sixth largest banking system (by assets) in the Euro Area (see Table 10, page 81).

⁷⁰ The G20 consists of 19 countries and the European Union (which, in turn, is a grouping including many economies from Emerging Europe). The 11 emerging market G20 members are: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.

regulators and supervisors in emerging economies may thus have lessons to teach their counterparts in the mature economies. Indeed, this relative resilience of EM banking systems was an important global stabilizer in the 2008-09 global recession. Credit growth in emerging economies slowed but did not collapse (Chart 42). The slowing was most pronounced in Emerging Europe, which was the region most affected in 2007-09, and Latin America (Chart 43). By contrast, credit growth accelerated in Emerging Asia in 2009, largely thanks to China.

Chart 42



Sources: IIF Estimates from National Monetary Surveys, Bloomberg, Datastream

Emerging Economies: Bank Lending to Private Sector


Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, it seems clear that whatever part emerging market banking systems may play in the global economy today, that role will become increasingly important in the future, and probably quite quickly. One reflection of this is the equity market capitalization of leading emerging banks: three of the five largest banks in the world by market capitalization (as at the end of 2009) were Chinese (while a fourth—HSBC—has extensive links to China); and 7 of the top 20 banks (by market capitalization) were in emerging market economies. Emerging market banking systems are thus important not only from a national systemic perspective, but now also globally.

The scope for banks in emerging economies to grow is largely domestic. Emerging economies have enjoyed relatively rapid nominal GDP growth in recent years, and this seems likely to persist, even as nominal income growth in mature economies is expected to remain quite anemic. While asset growth in many systems has been rapid even relative to high nominal GDP growth, there is still plenty of room for many banking systems to grow as banking services penetrate the economy more broadly. It is this potential for growth that has attracted a lot of foreign investment into local emerging market banking systems, especially in Latin America and, more recently, Emerging Europe.

For most countries, the relatively small size of their banking sector to the economy is legacy of past instability; for some, it was a reflection of suppression and controls, although these constraints have become a lot less binding in recent years. Unlike mature economies, where there is scope for other forms of debt intermediation to supplant traditional commercial banking activity, many emerging economies are at the stage of financial development where the share of banks in financial intermediation is rising, in part because banks are replacing more traditional (and often very high cost) sources of informal credit.

Chart 43

Emerging Economies: Bank Lending to Private Sector percent change over a year ago (both scales)



Source: IIF Estimates from National Monetary Surveys, Bloomberg, Datastream

This stage of financial development presents bankers and regulators in emerging economies with a special challenge: they need to permit relatively rapid rates of credit growth to promote economic and social development (including support for both small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as large infrastructure needs), while maintaining sufficiently robust regulatory regimes to ensure financial soundness and stability.

A final way in which the global significance of emerging market banks is likely to rise in coming years is that they are almost certain to become more globally active, increasing cross-border activity. This is not to say that Chinese banks, for example, are apt to increase suddenly their appetite for foreign assets (although this did occur in the case of Japan in the 1980s). Commercial banks tend to follow their non-financial customers abroad, however, and the rising world trade share of producers based in emerging

economies will naturally promote more extensive international links. Moreover, one of the most interesting developments of recent years has been the tendency for firms located in emerging economies to undertake foreign direct investment in other countries (both mature and emerging), which is likely to promote more internationalization of emerging market banking systems (Chart 44).




Chart 44

Applicability of Basel Reforms to Emerging Economies

In assessing the impact of likely global regulatory reforms on emerging market banking systems and their economies, one issue is how relevant these globally agreed standards are to the local banking systems across the emerging world.

As noted above, large emerging economies are party to the discussions on the revised rules on capital and liquidity now underway. More countries than just this group of 11 are likely to adopt these agreements, however. Current compliance rates with the Basel Committee Core Principles on Banking Supervision are generally around two-thirds across the emerging world (Chart 45). Compliance with the Core Principles is a much broader requirement than just meeting internationally agreed minimum requirements on capital. Indeed, capital adequacy is one of 25 core principles⁷¹. By region, current compliance rates with Basel Core Principles are highest in Emerging Europe and the

⁷¹ See BIS (2006b)

Middle East and lowest in Emerging Asia. Looking ahead, it seems reasonable to expect that regulators and supervisors in major banking systems in the emerging world will strive to meet and stay ahead of regulations that were initially established for their counterparts in the mature world.




Chart 45

A Qualitative Impact Assessment of the Reform Proposals

In assessing the potential direct impact of the unfolding reforms on emerging economies, it should be emphasized that we do not have the same quantitative framework used to assess the impact in large mature banking systems (see Chapters 3-6). Our assessment is thus more qualitative. In what follows below, we assess a series of effects. In an effort to combine these effects and assess their relative importance, we have developed a simple scoring matrix (Table 16). In this matrix, we "score" various effects according to whether they are likely to be insignificant in (economic) impact (0); negative in impact (- ; -- implies significantly negative); or positive in impact (+). Five of these effects are what might be termed "direct" effects (i.e., the economic effect resulting from the application of the regulatory change to the system in question); one summarizes "indirect" effects (i.e., economic changes resulting from the application of regulatory change elsewhere).

Table 16

			Direct			Indirect	Overall Assessment
		Capital		Liquidity	Other Factors	Capital Flows	
	Higher Core Ratios	Buffers	Redefinition Effects				
Emerging Asia	-	0	0	-	-	0	0
Latin America	0	-	-	-	-	0	-
Africa/Middle East	0	0	0	-	0	0	0
Emerging Europe	0	-		-	0		

Qualitative Assessment of Potential Impact of Regulatory Reform on Growth Outlook

Source: IIF Estimates

The right hand column is an overall assessment based on the previous six columns. Based on this assessment, it seems as though it is economic conditions in Emerging Europe that are most likely to be adversely affected by the current regulatory reform agenda. This broadly matches the message from the mature economies, where the relatively largest impact falls on the European banking system.

Direct Effects

Capital

Most emerging market banking systems are relatively well capitalized and maintain ratios of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets well above the current 8% minimum of the Basel II requirements (Table 17). Capital ratios are typically higher in countries that have had a (relatively) recent history of banking sector and broader economic instability: Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.

• An increase in the minimum requirement of two percentage points, to 10% of riskweighted assets would not appear to be a significant burden on EM banking systems that are currently quite well capitalized, at least at face value. Higher core capital ratios would probably require banks in Emerging Asia to step up their alreadysignificant capital raising activities somewhat. Depending on how global capital markets reacted, this could act as a modest tightening in regional financial conditions⁷².

⁷² Increased capital demands by Emerging Asian banks – especially Chinese banks – could have negative spillover effects elsewhere. Rates of return on emerging market bank equity are quite attractive, and global investors might well prefer to hold such "growth" stocks in the future, relative to equities issued by banks in mature economies. What amounts to crowding out in a global market place for bank equity could thus act as an additional drag on banks operating in low (nominal) growth mature economies, especially Japan and parts of the Euro Area. These crowding out worries are symmetric: emerging

What is more of an issue for most emerging market banking systems is how local supervisors choose to react to an increase in the internationally agreed minimum in setting the appropriate local buffer of actual capital ratios over the minimum. It would probably be an unduly harsh reaction to maintain existing buffers and thus directly pass through the increase in the minima, although we believe that supervisors in Latin America and Emerging Europe are somewhat apt to do this. The argument for maintaining lower buffers would simply be that emerging market banking systems had adjusted to a riskier world earlier than their mature market counterparts, mainly because of their own traumatic experiences of the 1990s⁷³. Putting on an extra layer of capital to compensate for similar mistakes made more recently in mature economies would imply a double adjustment⁷⁴.

Table 17

Emerging Market Banking Sector - Capital Ratios and Returns

	Capital	Ratios	Return	on
	Regulatory Capital			
	to Risk-Weighted	Capital to Assets	Assets	Equity
	Assets			
Emerging Asia				
China	12.0	5.4	1.0	17.1
India	13.0	6.6	1.0	12.5
Indonesia	16.8	9.4	2.7	17.4
Korea	12.3	9.5	0.5	7.1
Emerging Europe				
Czech Republic	13.7	6.2	1.3	23.4
Hungary	12.3	8.1	1.1	15.3
Poland	11.7	7.9	1.1	15.6
Russia	18.5	13.6	0.5	3.6
Turkey	19.2	12.1	3.0	25.1
Africa/Middle East				
South Africa	13.5	7.9	1.0	17.2
Latin America				
Argentina	17.6	13.1	1.9	15.6
Brazil	18.5	9.2	1.1	11.6
Chile	13.6	7.4	1.1	14.7
Colombia	14.8	12.5	5.5	44.4
Mexico	15.2	9.1	1.2	12.7

economies dependent on bank credit for growth could find their prospects crimped by heavy capital demands from mature countries.

⁷³ Of course, the requirement to run higher EM capital ratios is not just that imposed by regulators or enlightened bank managements, but also that by local equity markets.

⁷⁴ The argument for maintaining buffers and passing higher regulatory minima through would be that the world has become a riskier place and prudence requires an acknowledgment of this, even in systems that had proven they were quite resilient in recent years.

- Probably the biggest concern about the new capital regime is the impact of new requirements relating to the composition of capital, and the possibility that significant amounts of what might now be countable as Tier 1 capital might not be treatable as such in the future. Most importantly, global proposals on exclusion of minority interests in financial institutions from the common equity component of Tier 1 capital would have serious repercussions on the way global institutions operate in emerging economies. Indeed, either partnering with or as a minority stakeholder in emerging economies is often a way for foreign banks to reduce risks associated with local expansion in emerging economies. The exclusion of minority interests could have a particularly significant effect on banking systems in Emerging Europe, where foreign ownership of local banks has become very significant in recent years. The minority interest exclusion will make it more costly for foreign owners to maintain and expand their operations in Emerging Europe, and will thus act as an unambiguous drag on activity. It should also be recognized that there are special characteristics of local capital market instruments in a number of emerging market jurisdictions—especially Latin America—which while diverse in form, comply with the general substantive principles of loss-absorbency endorsed by the BCBS proposals (for example, preferred stock with fundamentally similar loss absorbency characteristics as common stock).
- The potential application of a *leverage ratio* to off-balance sheet assets such as letters of credit, credit card lines, contingent lines of credit for small and medium-sized enterprises and trade finance instruments could have a penalizing effect.

Liquidity

Many emerging market banking systems have maintained relatively high levels of liquidity (either holdings at the central bank or of government debt) in recent years, so meeting some of new liquidity-related requirements may not be that challenging. This relatively ample stock of bank liquidity is, in part, a reflection of monetary policy tools in emerging economies, which are often based around the maintenance of required reserve requirements⁷⁵. It is also the result of foreign exchange intervention policies, where massive, regular intervention cannot be, or is not, fully sterilized.

Most emerging market banking systems will be challenged to meet net stable funding rule requirements, however, because long-term markets in bank paper are very thin. Enforcing the overall package of liquidity requirements could thus lead to a significant increase in banks' overall funding costs.

⁷⁵ Reserve requirements have long since been eschewed as a monetary policy instrument in mature economies.

Other Considerations

Most emerging market banking systems are dominated by several large, systemically important firms. As noted, three of the world's five largest banks (by market capitalization) are Chinese banks. Global proposals to add to special capital charges on systemically-relevant institutions; to impose a bank levy (tax) on large firms; or, at the limit, to enforce a break up of large firms could have significantly negative implications for banks and economies, especially in Emerging Asia and Latin America.

Indirect Effects

Capital Flows

The direct negative economic effects on emerging economies from regulatory reform will be compounded by indirect effects, which will operate mainly through the transmission mechanism of cross-border capital flows.

Lending to emerging market borrowers from banks in mature market economies will be adversely affected by higher capital charges. Under BIS rules, loans and other exposures to OECD members get more favorable risk-weighting than those outside OECD. Higher capital charges will thus further tilt this bias, and lead to reduced lending to emerging market economies⁷⁶.

Bank flows to emerging economies will also be adversely affected by the proposed treatment of off balance sheet items, such as trade finance instruments, which will increase the cost of trade finance. The collapse in world trade in late 2008 as a result of the evaporation of trade finance facilities was a strong reminder of the importance of bank credit in the trade finance mechanism, much of which is provided on a contingent basis. Moreover, large international banks – which will be significantly disadvantaged in this area – tend to play a key role in this market, including the provision of trade finance facilities to many of the poorest countries.


Cross-border bank lending to emerging market economies tends to move in cycles, with the latest (and greatest) surge to date peaking in 2007 (Chart 46). The collapse in crossborder lending to emerging economies was one key transmission mechanism through which the extreme turmoil in mature markets after September 2008 affected emerging economies, especially via the dislocation of trade finance. Stopping the decline in flows was more important than returning them to strong growth: Emerging economies have been able to lead the global recovery, even though there has yet to be an appreciable quickening in the pace of bank lending.

⁷⁶ There is an additional bias that will be reinforced, which is that BIS-related capital charges are also based on ratings, including sovereign ratings; recent IIF work has determined that sovereign ratings for emerging economies are systematically lower (all other things equal) than for mature market economies. See IIF (2010).

Chart 46

Bank Lending to Emerging Market Economies

IIF sample of 30 leading emerging economies




Each of the three last bank lending waves to emerging economies had a regional concentration (Chart 47). Moreover, each ended badly. In the early 1980s, the focus was on lending to Latin America, with excessive lending culminating in the 1982-83 debt crisis. In the mid 1990s, the focus was on Emerging Asia, with excess there culminating in the 1997-98 East Asia crisis. In the mid 2000s, the focus was on Emerging Europe, and the sudden reversal of these flows culminated in a sharp downturn in the region as part of the 2008-09 global recession⁷⁷.

As the region most recently affected by the boom and bust in cross-border bank lending, it is Emerging Europe that stands to suffer the most from a reduction in the propensity of foreign banks to hold cross-border claims on emerging market economies. Note that this effect will compound the negative resulting from a greater leeriness on the part of banks domiciled in the Euro Area to expand their local market activities in Emerging European countries because of the higher cost of capital resulting from the exclusion of minority interests from Tier 1 capital.

⁷⁷ The Emerging Europe credit boom should probably be seen as part of a more general reallocation of capital from surplus to debtor parts of Europe, fueled by convergence euphoria resulting from the introduction of the euro, and the growing view (at least through 2008) that its extension to most countries in Emerging Europe was simply a matter of time. The Emerging European credit boom and bust was the leading edge of a process that was evident within the Euro Area and recent market tension has now focused on how some countries within the Euro Area might deal with the down leg of this cycle.

Chart 47



It is widely accepted that proposed banking reform measures will have the effect of raising the cost of bank intermediation in mature economies and, all other things equal, the cost of credit to the private sector. Policy makers in mature economies have emphasized that they would be able to offset some of the restrictive impact of such an effect by either trimming official interest rates below where they would otherwise be. If that is not possible because if rates already being close to zero, then it would be possible to run a more expansionary monetary policy through quantitative easing. This monetary strategy has implications for capital flows emerging economies.

For one thing, a more expansionary monetary policy in mature economies (especially more quantitative easing) could lead to higher real commodity prices. This would tend to promote the flow of capital to commodity producing regions and countries (both speculative and fundamental). Depending on the size of these flows, this effect could even strengthen growth in these economies (Middle East, Africa and Latin America).

For another, wider interest differentials are apt to promote carry-trade related debt flows, and lead to expectations of currency weakness in mature economies versus emerging market currencies. Capital flows driven by expectations of long run currency appreciation seem most likely to be driven towards Emerging Asia.

Whether driven by higher commodity prices, wider interest differentials, or expectations of currency appreciation, such stronger capital flows than would otherwise prevail would then tend to boost local liquidity conditions, thus helping to offset the negatives resulting from other measures discussed above. As a result, we assigned a zero to the "indirect" effect associated with global capital flows for Emerging Asia, Latin America and Middle East and Africa in our scoring matrix (Table 16). The effect for Emerging Europe is significantly negative, however.

IIF Survey of Leading Emerging Market Banks

Our estimates of the impact of regulatory reform on emerging economies are less precise than those for mature economies. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that the impact will be somewhat restrictive, although not significantly so, with the possible exception of Emerging Europe.

As a cross-check to this intuitive result, and in order to better assess the potential impact of regulatory reform on banks in emerging economies, we asked a sample of our leading emerging market member banks some basic questions on the topic⁷⁸. The answers reflect the best judgments of commercial bank lending officers and other key officials. On balance, they underline the message that the likely impact of proposed regulatory reform on emerging market banks will be modestly negative, and with the greatest concerns relating to conditions in international markets. In general, the results get more negative the further away from the respondents' own institution that the questions move.


The three questions that we asked were as follows:

1) How do you believe your bank will be affected by the reforms especially on capital and liquidity being proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision?

The balance of respondents expect a somewhat adverse effect on their bank, although it is worth noting that two respondents expect their bank to be benefitted somewhat (Chart 48). Half of respondents view their banks as either largely unaffected or slightly help by the reforms, which underlines the likely modest nature of the magnitude of reforms. That said, two respondents see their banks as penalized considerably by the reforms.

⁷⁸ These questions were special questions in our latest (April) quarterly survey of emerging market bank lending conditions, which is conducted with the 33 leading emerging market banks that are members of the IIF's Emerging Markets Advisory Council (EMAC). The response rate to these questions in the survey was 21 banks out of the EMAC total of 33 (i.e., 63.6%). The regional samples were not large enough to allow us to make meaningful regional comparisons.

Chart 48



2) How do you expect the proposed reforms to affect bank lending conditions in your local economy in the years ahead, once fully enacted?

The majority of respondents expect lending conditions in the local economy to tighten as a result of regulatory change, although it is once again worth noting that two respondents expect some modest easing effect (Chart 49). More expect conditions to tighten considerably. Half of respondents take the view that there will be a modest tightening in local lending conditions.

3) How do you expect the proposed reforms to affect bank lending conditions in international markets in the years ahead, once fully enacted?

The most decisive message from our survey is that global bank reform is expected to lead to a tightening in lending conditions in international markets (Chart 50). This supports the view that the main impact of bank reform measures will fall on banks in mature economies, and that part of their adjustment process will be to rein in foreign lending. While this has global implications, such restraint would most hurt the region more heavily dependent on external borrowing through the banking system. In the current cycle, this has been Emerging Europe.

Chart 49





Chart 50



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